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Enough Is Enough:  Ten Years of Carcieri v. Salazar    
 
Bethany C. Sullivan* 
 
Jennifer L. Turner** 
 
Ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court issued its watershed 
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, landing a gut punch to Indian country.  
Through that decision, the Supreme Court upended decades of 
Department of the Interior regulations, policy, and practice related to the 
eligibility of all federally recognized tribes for the restoration of tribal 
homelands through the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934.  The 
Court held that tribes must demonstrate that they were “under federal 
jurisdiction” in 1934 to qualify for land into trust under the first definition 
of “Indian” in the IRA.  Carcieri has impacted all tribes by upending the 
land-into-trust process and requiring tribes (and Interior) to spend scant 
resources to establish statutory authority for trust land acquisitions, a 
burdensome task that had previously been straight forward. In addition, 
Carcieri has complicated, if not prevented altogether, trust acquisition for 
tribes who face difficulty in making the requisite jurisdictional showing. 
 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the last ten years 
of Indian law and policy that have unfurled from the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  It describes how Carcieri has been weaponized by states, local 
governments, citizens’ groups, individuals, corporations, and even other 
tribes, to challenge the exercise of tribal sovereignty through the 
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acquisition of tribal lands, and, at times, the very existence of Indian 
tribes.  This Article details the litigation that has since ballooned, 
illustrating the dangerous scope creep of Carcieri, while categorizing and 
evaluating the underlying claims.  It also looks to the future, and concludes 
that, while unlikely, a universal, clean congressional fix is the only real 
solution.  The last ten years of litigation, hearings, and never-ending 
debate demonstrate that Carcieri is not a constructive or appropriate 
framework for resolving larger policy questions about the land-into-trust 
process.  Finally, the Article ends by providing practice tips for tribes 
navigating the current Carcieri landscape. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ten years ago, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Carcieri v. Salazar,1 landing a gut punch to Indian country.  The 
Supreme Court upended decades of Department of the Interior 
(“Department” or “Interior”) regulations, policy, and practice by holding 
that tribes must demonstrate that they were “under federal jurisdiction” in 
1934 to qualify for land into trust under the first definition of “Indian” in 
the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).2  In so doing, the Court took aim 
at the critical ability of tribes to amass a land base over which to exercise 
jurisdiction—and effectively divided tribes into the haves and the have 
                                                           
1.  555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
2.  Id. at 382. Carcieri is often mischaracterized as requiring tribes to 
demonstrate that they were under federal jurisdiction to qualify for land-into-trust, 
full-stop.  As explained further in this article, that assertion ignores the plain language 
of the decision, other definitions of “Indian” in the IRA, as well as numerous 
alternative statutes authorizing land into trust for specific tribes.  Therefore, we are 
careful in this article to tie the holding of Carcieri to the first definition of “Indian” in 
the IRA only.    
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nots.  The “haves” consist of those tribes whose history readily 
demonstrates they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, while the “have 
nots” consist of those tribes who, through historical realities, face 
difficulty in making such a showing.  Moreover, the decision impacted all 
tribes by complicating and slowing down the land-into-trust process and 
requiring tribes (and Interior) to spend scant resources to establish 
statutory authority for trust land acquisition, a burdensome task that had 
previously been straight forward.   
Carcieri has been weaponized by states, local governments, 
citizens’ groups, individuals, corporations, and even other tribes, to 
challenge the exercise of tribal sovereignty through the acquisition of 
tribal lands, and, at times, the very existence of certain Indian tribes.  It 
has become a guise for anti-tribal, anti-gaming, and anti-competition 
sentiments, giving tribal opponents another platform on which to raise 
larger questions of federal Indian law and policy on their terms.  Are all 
tribes equal?  Do tribes need more land?  Is the fee-to-trust process broken?  
Should states and local governments have a veto power over fee-to-trust 
decisions?   
  Underlying these concerns is the specter of unfairness, that tribes 
are somehow gaining an unfair advantage via the land-into-trust process, 
gaming authorizations, and federal laws and policies aimed at promoting 
tribal welfare.  This mindset seeps through the language of court briefs, 
congressional testimony, and apoplectic statements by anti-tribal gaming 
groups.  Yet the specter is just that, an apparition of a false reality.  It 
ignores the historical seizure of tribal lands, the unique development of the 
federal-tribal relationship, fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty, 
and perhaps above all else, the inherently unfair playing field on which 
tribes have been forced to play. 
This Article comprehensively examines the ten years of Indian 
law and policy that have unfurled from the Carcieri decision, while 
providing tribal practitioners a primer on the land-into-trust process and a 
litigation toolkit.  First, this Article provides the necessary history of the 
IRA and the land-into-trust regulatory process.  Second, it describes the 
impetus behind and legal ramifications of the 2009 Supreme Court 
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar.  Third, it explains the immediate public, 
congressional, and executive responses to this watershed decision.  Fourth, 
it details the litigation that has since ballooned, illustrating the scope creep 
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of Carcieri, while categorizing and evaluating the underlying claims.3  The 
Article further notes that, despite protests of some members of Congress 
and fee-to-trust opponents, courts have overwhelmingly affirmed 
Interior’s response to Carcieri, including its legal framework and fee-to-
trust decisions.   
Finally, this Article looks to the future, considering pending 
litigation and proposed congressional and agency action.  The Article 
concludes that while unlikely, a universal, clean congressional fix is the 
only real solution.  The last ten years of litigation, hearings, and debate 
demonstrate that Carcieri is not a constructive or appropriate framework 
for resolving larger policy questions about the land-into-trust process.  The 
Article also concludes with practice tips for tribal attorneys navigating the 
hazardous Carcieri landscape for the indeterminable future. 
 
II. HISTORY OF THE IRA AND THE FEE-TO-TRUST PROCESS 
 
A rich body of scholarship already exists concerning the history 
of the IRA and the machinery it created to facilitate the re-acquisition of 
Indian lands.4  Yet its importance to Indian country cannot be overstated 
and therefore bears repeating here.  The following section outlines the 
history of the IRA, its statutory contours, and the resultant regulatory 
procedures for land acquisitions. 
Beginning with congressional enactment of the General Allotment 
Act in 1887, the federal government unilaterally imposed a policy of 
assimilation and allotment, breaking up communal tribal landholdings into 
individual allotments.5  The federal government was to hold these 
                                                           
3. This litigation and associated claims have led one judge on the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to exclaim “[e]nough is enough!” in 
dismissing a Carcieri-based challenge to the very existence of a tribe.  Stand Up for 
California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, __ S.Ct.        (2019). 
4.  See, e.g., THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND 
BILLS (Vine Deloria ed. 2002); ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE 
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 
(2000); INDIAN SELF-RULE (Kenneth R. Philip, ed., 1986).   
5. General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, ch. 119 (1887) 
(General Allotment Act); see also William Wood, Indian, Tribes, and (Federal) 
Jurisdiction, 65 KAN. L. REV. 415, 458 (2016) (describing the allotment policy and 
how allotted reservation lands were “subject to federal oversight and restrictions 
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allotments in trust for a period of 25 years or until the Indian beneficiary 
could demonstrate “competency” to hold title in fee simple.6  The 
remainder of tribal lands were considered “surplus” to Indian needs, and 
procedures were established to dispose of such “surplus” lands to the 
growing mass of non-Indian homesteaders.7  
By enacting the General Allotment Act, Congress hoped to 
eliminate communal land tenure and attendant tribal authority in favor of 
private landholdings and assimilation modeled on the western ideals of the 
independent farmer and rancher.8  This policy, however, proved to be a 
categorical disaster.9  In the course of nearly 50 years, tribal and Indian 
                                                           
against alienation, and federal bureaucrats managed individual Indians' property 
interests”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 16.03[2][b] (Nell Jessup 
Newton et. al. eds. 2017).  
6. General Allotment Act § 5 as modified by the Burke Act of 1906, 34 
Stat. 182, ch. 2348; see also Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into 
Law, Policy, and History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 521 (2013) (explaining that during 
the 25 year trust period, allotments could not be sold and were immune from local 
property taxes). 
7. General Allotment Act § 5, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 348; see also D.S. 
OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 8 (Francis P. Prucha 
ed., Univ. of Okla. Press, 1973) (“The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands 
and open them up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the Indians 
are but a pretext to get at the lands and occupy them.”) (citing an 1880 House Indian 
Affairs Committee minority report). 
8. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 224–27 (abridged ed., 1986) 
(explaining the near religious belief that Indian “civilization was impossible without 
the incentive to work that came only from individual ownership of a piece of 
property”); Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of 
Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust 
Through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 447-48 (2002/2003) 
(describing the federal policy on allotment and assimilation, and quoting President 
Chester A. Arthur’s proposal “to introduce among the Indians the customs and pursuits 
of civilized life and gradually to absorb them into the mass of our citizens” as a method 
of solving the “Indian problem”) (internal citation omitted). 
9. See generally The Problem of Indian Administration, The Inst. for 
Gov’t Research (Dept. of Interior 1928) (“Meriam Report”); id. at 7 (“[P]olicies 
adopted by the government in dealing with Indians have been of a type which, if long 
continued, would tend to pauperize any race”). See also Rebecca Tsosie, Land, 
Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America, 
34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2001) (describing how the General Allotment Act “left a severe 
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lands diminished by over two-thirds, from roughly 138 million acres to 48 
million acres.10  Valuable lands fell into the hands of speculators and white 
settlers, while Indians who were able to hold on to their allotments were 
often left with lands ill-suited for agriculture and without the necessary 
tools, supplies, and instruction.11  As a result, many Indians became 
landless and destitute, further suffering from social, psychological, and 
cultural impoverishment.12  Reservations transformed into checkerboards, 
dotted with lands held by the tribe, individual Indians, white settlers, and 
corporations, which created cultural conflict.13  Individual Indian 
allotments often became fractionated into dozens, sometimes hundreds, of 
interests due to the inalienability of the property and the laws of 
intestacy.14  Tribal governmental institutions were undermined by loss of 
communal lands, influx of non-Indians, and burgeoning administrative 
control by the federal government. 
In response to the dire state of Indians across the country, and in 
repudiation of the allotment policy, Congress passed the IRA in 1934.15  
The IRA was enacted to, among other purposes, “conserve and develop 
Indian lands and resources,” “extend to Indians the right to form business 
                                                           
and traumatic legacy for Indian nations”); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 
27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 10–15 (Spring 1995). 
10. See Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before 
the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 15–18 (Feb. 22, 1934) [hereinafter 
Hearings on H.R. 7902]. 
11. See Royster, supra note 9, at 12–14 (describing how thousands of 
individual Indian allottees lost their lands by voluntary or fraudulent sales or for non-
payment of taxes and, further, how the remaining “surplus” lands were wrested from 
tribes at the behest of western politicians and white settlers); Pommersheim, supra 
note 6, at 522 (explaining that the Allotment Act was “grossly undercapitalized, 
sometimes providing less than ten dollars per allottee for implements, seeds, and 
instructions,” and, moreover, that it was “insensitive to the hunting and food-gathering 
traditions of nonagricultural tribes”). 
12. See McCoy, supra note 8, at 448-49. 
13. Pommersheim, supra note 6, at 522–23.  
14.  Id. at 522; PRUCHA, supra note 8, at 297–98. 
15.  Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984.  See 
generally RUSCO, supra note 4. This legislation has been referred to as the “Indian 
New Deal,” in recognition of its place alongside the generally applicable New Deal 
legislation designed to ameliorate the national economic depression. See generally 
GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934-1945 (1980).  
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and other organizations,” and “grant certain rights of home rule to 
Indians.”16  Through this legislation, Congress intended to “establish 
machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater degree 
of self-government, politically and economically.”17  In other words, the 
IRA radically changed the course of federal Indian policy by arming tribes 
with the necessary legal mechanisms to strengthen tribal government 
institutions and rebuild tribal resources.  Congress hoped the IRA would 
reduce the bloated—and costly—federal administrative state over Indian 
affairs by encouraging tribal and individual Indian self-sufficiency.18 
The cornerstone of this remedial legislation was Section 5, now 
codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5108, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior 
to acquire lands “within or without existing reservations” for the “purpose 
of providing land for Indians.”19  Such acquired lands are held in trust by 
the federal government on behalf of the tribal or individual Indian 
beneficiary and exempt from state and local taxation.20  By authorizing 
tribal land acquisitions under Section 5, Congress hoped to reverse the 
“disastrous condition” of the Indians resulting from the allotment policy.21  
Furthermore, Congress recognized the critical link between Indian lands 
and the rehabilitation of Indian economies and tribal governance 
structures—that in order to govern well and provide economic 
opportunity, tribes must have a territorial home base.22  Accordingly, trust 
                                                           
16.  48 Stat. 984 (1934). 
17.  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974). 
18.  See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 14 (1997) (explaining that the “major thrust” of the IRA was to 
“minimize the enormous discretion and power exercised by the Department of the 
Interior” and transfer such power to tribal governments); see also PRUCHA, supra note 
8, at 263 (finding that “the paternalism of the federal government, which was supposed 
to end when the individual Indians disappeared into the dominant American society, 
increased instead of diminished, until the bureaucracy of the Indian Service dominated 
every aspect of the Indians’ lives” during the allotment era). 
19.  25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2018). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Hearings on H.R. 7902, supra note 10 (statement of Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs John Collier). 
22.  See MCCOY, supra note 8, at 423 (explaining that “[t]ribes share a 
meaningful relationship with tribal land because it is homeland and sacred land, which 
provides a sense of cultural, religious, and ethnic identity and community well-being.” 
McCoy further explains that “tribes are also attached to the land because it provides a 
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lands are largely removed from state and local regulatory authority and, 
instead, fall within the tribe’s jurisdiction.23 
Another critical IRA provision is Section 19, identifying those 
who are eligible for the IRA’s benefits.  Section 19 provides that “tribe” 
signifies “any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing 
on one reservation.”24  In turn, Section 19 includes three definitions of 
“Indian”: 
 
[A]ll persons of Indian descent who are [1] members of 
any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction, and [2] all persons who are descendants of 
such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within 
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall 
further include [3] all other persons of one-half or more 
Indian blood.25 
 
Section 18 of the IRA is also significant. That section, now 
inoperative, required the Secretary to hold elections regarding application 
of the IRA to each reservation.26  The “majority of the adult Indians on a 
reservation” could vote against the application of the IRA to the 
                                                           
space within which they can exist as autonomous nations—supplying a sense of 
political and national identify as well.”). 
23.  See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 
§ 3.04; City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005) (describing 
§ 5 of the IRA as the “proper avenue to reestablish sovereign authority over territory”); 
MCCOY, supra note 8, at 445 (explaining that “land taken into trust via Part 151 
becomes ‘Indian country’ (subject to the authority of tribes, generally exempting such 
land from state taxation and other laws)”).  Some state and local governments oppose 
fee-to-trust applications on the basis that trust acquisition removes state jurisdiction 
and taxation, infra note 118, but others enter into intergovernmental agreements with 
tribes to address the impacts of trust land acquisition.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 67928, 67932 
(Nov. 13, 2013) (noting that state and local governments may negotiate with tribes to 
resolve disagreements surrounding trust land acquisition).  See generally David H. 
Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American 
Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding First Nations’ Self-Government, 1 REV. 
CONST. STUD. 120 (1993) (describing the history and usefulness of intergovernmental 
agreements between tribes and their neighboring governments).   
24.  See 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (2018). 
25.  Id.   
26.  25 U.S.C. § 5125 (2018).   
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reservation.  The Secretary was required to conduct these votes within one 
year of the enactment of the IRA, which Congress later extended until June 
18, 1936.27  Originally, a tribe that voted against the IRA could not take 
advantage of the trust land provision in Section 5; however, in 1983, 
Congress amended the IRA to provide that Section 5 applies to “all tribes 
notwithstanding section [18].”28   
In the decades immediately following the IRA’s enactment, the 
Department exercised its Section 5 authority in a limited fashion, 
accepting land into trust via an unpublished agency process.29  Yet the 
dawn of the self-determination era brought with it an uptick in Section 5 
land acquisitions,30 generating the need for a clear, uniform, and publicly-
developed Departmental process.31  Accordingly, the Department 
promulgated the first set of land acquisition regulations through notice-
and-comment rulemaking in 1980.32 In 1995, the Department revised the 
regulations, imposing additional procedural requirements for off-
reservation land acquisitions.33  It is this iteration of the regulations that 
largely stands today and which can be found at 25 C.F.R. Part 151.34 
                                                           
27.  Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 260, § 2, 49 Stat. 378.  
28.  Act of Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2515 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2202 
(2018)).   
29.  See MCCOY, supra note 8, at 453–454. 
30.  See Larry E. Scrivner, Acquiring Land Into Trust for Indian Tribes, 
37 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 603, 604–605 (Spring 2003).  
31.  Land Acquisitions, 45 Fed. Reg. 62034, 62035 (Sept. 18, 1980) 
(explaining the need for new Federal land-into-trust regulations as to “enunciate land 
acquisition policy and to bring uniformity into the application of that policy”). 
32.  Id. at 62034 (originally codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 120a, subsequently 
redesignated as 25 C.F.R. Part 151). 
33.  Land Acquisitions (Nongaming), 60 Fed. Reg. 32874 (June 23, 
1995) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.11). 
34.  In 1996, the Department revised the notice requirements of the fee-
to-trust regulations to incorporate a 30-day waiting period between a fee-to-trust 
decision and the actual trust transfer. Land Acquisitions, 61 Fed Reg. 18082 (Apr. 24, 
1996).  A 2013 rule eliminated the waiting period and made changes to the notice 
requirements.  Land Acquisitions: Appeals of Land Acquisition Decisions, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 67928 (Nov. 13, 2013).  In addition, in 2001, the Department formally revised 
the fee-to-trust regulations. See BIA, Acquisition of Title to Land in Trust, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 3452 (Jan. 16, 2011). The Department, however, subsequently rescinded these 
revised regulations, leaving the 1995 regulations in place. Acquisition of Title to Land 
in Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (Nov. 9, 2001). The Department later made other 
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The fee-to-trust regulations include several requirements for tribes 
and individual Indians seeking trust land.35 Additional information 
concerning Departmental land acquisition procedures may be found in the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (“BIA”) fee-to-trust handbook, which includes 
a detailed 16-step process for trust acquisitions.36  The fee-to-trust process, 
which begins with the submission of an application, often takes years.   
As a threshold matter, tribal applicants must be federally 
recognized tribes.37  Regardless of whether the application involves on-
reservation or off-reservation land,38 the applicant must submit, and the 
Department must consider, information concerning: 
 
● The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition;  
● The need of the tribe for additional land;  
● The purpose for which the land will be used; 
● The impact on the state and its political subdivisions resulting 
from removal of the tract from tax rolls; 
● Jurisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use; 
● Whether the BIA is equipped to discharge the additional 
responsibilities resulting from the acquisition of the land in trust 
status; and 
                                                           
regulatory changes to eliminate a provision excluding land in Alaska from the 
regulations, Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76888 (Dec. 23, 
2014), and to revise title evidence requirements for land acquisitions. Title Evidence 
for Trust Land Acquisitions, 81 Fed. Reg. 30173 (May 16, 2016).      
35.  Given this Article’s focus on the impact of Carcieri on tribal, as 
opposed to individual Indian, land acquisitions, only the Part 151 provisions 
pertaining to tribal requests will be discussed.  
36.  See Acquisition of Title to Land Held in Fee or Restricted Fee Status 
(Fee-to-Trust Handbook), Version IV (rev. 1), BIA, DEP’T OF INTERIOR (issued June 
28, 2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/raca/handbook/ 
pdf/Acquisition_of_Title_to_Land_Held_in_Fee_or_Restricted_Fee_Status_50_OI
MT.pdf [hereinafter Fee-to-Trust Handbook]. 
37.  25 C.F.R. § 151.2(b) (2017). The regulations do not require a tribe 
to demonstrate that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. 
38.  Applications are considered “on-reservation” when the subject land 
is within or contiguous to the reservation. 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (2017). Additionally, 
“reservation” is defined as the “area of land over which the tribe is recognized by the 
United States as having governmental jurisdiction,” as well as former reservations in 
the State of Oklahoma or where there has been a final judicial determination of 
diminishment or disestablishment. 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(f). 
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● Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) and the Departmental procedures on hazardous 
substance determinations.39 
  
When an application is for an off-reservation tract of land, the 
Department must also consider: 
 
● The tribe’s business plan, if the land is to be acquired for a 
business purpose; and 
● The distance between the tract and the tribe’s reservation. As the 
distance increases, the Secretary must give greater scrutiny to the 
tribe’s justification of anticipated benefits and greater weight to 
the concerns raised by the state and local government.40 
 
Both on- and off-reservation applications require the Department 
to notify state and local governments of the potential acquisition and 
provide a 30-day window to comment on the potential impacts to 
regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes, and special assessments.41  The 
regulations require the Department to consider the impacts of the trust 
acquisition on state and local governments, but do not give such 
governments a veto power over a proposed acquisition.  The Supreme 
Court has described this process as “sensitive to the complex inter-
jurisdictional concerns that arise when a tribe seeks to regain sovereign 
control over territory.”42 
Following consideration of these regulatory factors, and 
compliance with NEPA and Departmental procedures on hazardous 
substance determinations, the Secretary of the Interior issues a written 
                                                           
39.  See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(a)–(c), (e)–(h). 
40.  See 25 C.F.R. § 151.11. 
41.  See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10.  The state and local government notice 
requirement only applies to discretionary acquisitions and is not invoked when an 
acquisition is mandated by legislation.  Id.  
42.  City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220-21.  Federal courts have only 
required Interior to consider, but not resolve, concerns raised by state and local 
governments.  See, e.g, City of Lincoln City v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 229 F. Supp. 2d 
1109, 1125 (D. Or. 2001) (“the regulations require BIA to ‘consider’ [potential tax 
impacts] but the regulations do not require the Tribe to agree to reimburse the City for 
revenues that might be lost due to a fee-to-trust transfer, and do not require the BIA to 
deny the application . . . merely because a potential impact exists”). 
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decision either approving or denying the application.43  This decision-
making authority is typically delegated to either the Assistant Secretary of 
Indian Affairs (“AS-IA”) or a BIA official, which then determines the 
appropriate title transfer and appeal procedures.44  AS-IA decisions result 
in the immediate transfer of title into trust.45  Additionally, AS-IA 
decisions constitute final agency action subject to immediate judicial 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).46  In contrast, 
BIA decisions are subject to administrative review procedures and title 
transfer does not occur until either the expiration of the 30-day window 
for filing a notice of appeal or upon exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.47  As a matter of current policy, AS-IA makes gaming and off-
reservation decisions, whereas BIA issues decisions on non-gaming, on-
reservation fee-to-trust acquisitions.48 
While Congress occasionally enacts special legislation to accept 
land into trust on a tribe-by-tribe basis, the Part 151 fee-to-trust process 
has become the primary mechanism by which tribes can build their land 
                                                           
43.  25 C.F.R. § 151.12. 
44.  The identity of the decisionmaker also determines notice procedures. 
When the decisionmaker is the AS-IA, notice of the decision is provided to the 
applicant and, if the decision is an approval, published in the Federal Register. 25 
C.F.R. § 151.12(c) (2017). When the decisionmaker is a BIA official, notice of the 
decision is provided to the applicant and, if the decision is an approval, notice is 
provided to the state and local government, interested parties, and published in a local 
newspaper of general circulation. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d). 
45.  Title transfer is contingent on the satisfactory completion of title 
review procedures under 25 C.F.R. § 151.13; see 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c)(2)(iii). 
46.  25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c).  Challenges to final Interior decisions to 
acquire land in trust are “garden-variety APA  claim[s].”  Match-E-Be-Nash-She-
Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 217 (2012).  Courts have 
upheld Interior’s broad discretion to decide whether lands should be acquired in trust.  
See, e.g, South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935, 943 (D.S.D. 
2004), aff’d, 423 F.3d 790, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). 
47.  25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d). Additionally, title transfer is contingent on 
the satisfactory completion of title review procedures under 25 § 151.13; see 25 C.F.R. 
§ 151.12(d)(2)(iv). 
48.  Off-Reservation Fee-to-Trust Decisions, Mem. No. NPM-TRUS-36, 
DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ASSISTANT SEC’Y INDIAN AFFAIRS (May 31, 2018); Fee-to-Trust 
Handbook, supra note 36, at 24.  
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base and, simultaneously, strengthen their tribal governments and 
economies.49   
We close this section by noting that the significance of trust land 
acquisition—and the land-into-trust process—to tribes cannot be 
overstated.  Interior has described taking land into trust as “one of the most 
important functions Interior undertakes on behalf of the tribes. Acquisition 
of land in trust is essential to tribal self-determination.”50  As noted 
previously, tribes exercise jurisdiction over trust lands, and state and local 
jurisdiction is limited.51  Trust status also qualifies land for certain federal 
programs and services, and provides “enhanced opportunities for housing, 
energy development, negotiated rights-of-way and leases, as well as 
greater protections for subsistence hunting and agriculture.”52   And yet 
today, the United States only holds approximately 57 million acres of land 
in trust,53 “a restoration of less than 10% of the lands lost in less than 50 
years under the allotment policy.”54  Thus, there is much work left to do.   
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S 2009 CARCIERI DECISION 
 
The long-established fee-to-trust process dramatically changed in 
2009 with the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Carcieri v. 
Salazar.55  The case started as a dispute between the Narragansett Indian 
Tribe (“Narragansett” or “Narragansett Tribe”), the State of Rhode Island, 
                                                           
49.  See MCCOY, supra note 8, at 445 (explaining that while, historically, 
tribal land bases were created or protected via congressional or executive action, the 
Part 151 process is “presently the primary method of placing land into trust [and] is 
critical to Indians and tribes because it is the principal mechanism for rebuilding the 
Indian land base.”). 
50. BIA, Fee-to-Trust, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.bia.gov/bia/ots/ 
fee-to-trust. 
51.  See supra note 23. 
52.  Fee-to-Trust, supra note 50. 
53. BIA, Programs & Services, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 
https://www.bia.gov/programs-services. 
54.  The Lack of Adequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Indian, 
Insular and Alaska Native Affairs of the H. Comm. on Nat. Resources, 114th Cong. 1 
(May 14, 2015) [hereinafter Lack of Adequate Standards Hearing] (statement of Kevin 
K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs). 
55.  555 U.S. 379.   
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and a local government over land use regulation.56  The Narragansett Tribe 
once occupied much of present-day Rhode Island, but, over time, lost its 
land base in transactions with the State and through the State’s policy of 
“detribalization.”57  The Narragansett Tribe brought suit against the State 
and others in the 1970s to reclaim its ancestral land,58 arguing the 
conveyances to the State violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act.59  
Congress ultimately settled the Narragansett Tribe’s lawsuit through the 
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1978.60  In exchange for 
relinquishing its land claims, the Narragansett Tribe received title to 
approximately 1,800 acres of land in the Town of Charlestown, Rhode 
Island,61 a small portion of its original land base.  Interior formally 
                                                           
56.  Id. at 385.  The facts behind, and holding of, Carcieri have been the 
subject of numerous articles, Congressional hearings, and Interior opinions, and thus 
we only provide a brief summary here. See, e.g., Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Ruth 
K. Khalsa, A Post-Carcieri Vocabulary Exercise: What If 'Now' Really Means 'Then?’ 
1 UNLV GAMING L. J., 39 (2010); Sarah Washburn, Distinguishing Carcieri v. 
Salazar: Why the Supreme Court Got it Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should 
Respond to Preserve Tribal and Federal Interests in the IRA’s Trust-Land Provisions, 
85 WASHINGTON L. REV. 603 (2010); Supreme Court Decision, Carcieri v. Salazar, 
Ramifications to Indian Tribes: Oversight Hearing before the H. Comm. on Nat. 
Resources, 111th Cong. (April 1, 2009) [hereinafter April 1, 2009 Carcieri Oversight 
Hearing]; Hearing to Examine Executive Branch Authority to Acquire Trust Lands for 
Indian Tribes: Oversight Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 
(May 21, 2009) [hereinafter May 21, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing]; M. Maureen 
Murphy, Carcieri v. Salazar: The Secretary of the Interior May Not Acquire Trust 
Land for the Narragansett Indian Tribe Under 25 U.S.C. Section 465 Because that 
Statute Applies to Tribes “Under Federal Jurisdiction” in 1934, Congressional 
Research Service RL34521, (Aug. 23, 2016) (on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. 
Rev.); The Meaning of “Under Federal Jurisdiction” for Purposes of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, Sol. Op. M-37029 (U.S. Dep’t of Interior Mar. 12, 2014) 
[hereinafter Carcieri M-Opinion or M-37029], https://www.doi.gov/sites/ 
doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37029.pdf.   
57.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 383.   
58.  Id. at 384.   
59.  25 U.S.C. § 177 (1834).  The Non-Intercourse Act prohibits the 
conveyance of tribal land without federal approval.   
60.  Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 
Stat. 813 (1978).  
61.  Id. § 8; Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384.  Unlike other trust land, the Act 
provided that the 1800 acres would be “subject to civil and criminal laws and 
jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.”  92 Stat. at § 8(a).  
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acknowledged the Narragansett Tribe through the Part 83 process in 
1983,62 and accepted the 1,800 acres of land in trust in 1988.63   
Shortly thereafter, the Narragansett Tribe’s housing authority used 
funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) 
to purchase 31 acres of land adjacent to the settlement lands from private 
developers for the purpose of providing low-income housing to tribal 
members.64  The housing authority then conveyed the land to the 
Narragansett.65  The State and Town of Charlestown sought an injunction 
to prevent the Narragansett Tribe from constructing housing on the parcel 
without obtaining permits and approvals under state and local law.66  In 
1997, the Narragansett Tribe requested that the BIA acquire the parcel in 
trust pursuant to Section 5 of the IRA to resolve questions about land use 
regulation and to ensure it could develop much-needed housing for its 
members.67  On March 6, 1998, despite objections from the Governor of 
Rhode Island and the Town, the BIA decided to acquire the land in trust 
on behalf of Narragansett.68   
The Governor and the Town appealed the BIA’s decision to the 
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”),69 which affirmed the BIA’s 
land-into-trust decision.70  The Governor and Town then challenged the 
fee-to-trust decision in federal district court, arguing, among other things, 
that the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for Indian tribes under 
the first definition of “Indian” in the IRA was limited to tribes who were 
                                                           
62.  Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett 
Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Feb. 10, 1983).   
63.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384–85.  
64.  Town of Charlestown, Rhode Island v. Eastern Area Director, 35 
I.B.I.A. 93, 95 (2000).  
65.  Id.  
66.  Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 
911–12 (1st Cir. 1996).   
67.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385; Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 95.  
68.  Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 95. 
69.  The IBIA is “an appellate review body that exercises the delegated 
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to issue final decisions for the Department of 
the Interior in appeals involving Indian matters.” About the Interior Board of Indian 
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/oha/organization/ibia.  BIA 
Regional Director (formerly Area Director) decisions to take land into trust may be 
appealed to the IBIA pursuant to 25 C.F.R. Part 2, and are stayed pending resolution 
of any administrative appeal. 25 C.F.R. § 2.6(a) (2017).   
70.  Town of Charlestown, 35 I.B.I.A. at 94. 
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federally recognized in 1934, which was the date of the IRA’s enactment.71  
According to the Governor and Town, the Narragansett Tribe could not 
meet the IRA’s first definition of “Indian” because Narragansett was not 
federally recognized until 1983 and was thus ineligible to have land placed 
into trust on its behalf.  The district court rejected this argument, holding 
that “as a federally-recognized tribe which existed at the time of the 
enactment of the IRA,” as shown through its acknowledgment, 
Narragansett was eligible to have land acquired in trust on its behalf.72 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, 
affirmed, but under a different rationale than the district court.73  The court 
concluded the term “now” in the first definition of Indian in the IRA, 
“members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” 
was ambiguous.  The court reasoned that “now” could operate “at the 
moment Congress enacted [the IRA] or at the moment the Secretary 
invokes it.”74  Applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,75 the Court deferred to the Secretary’s “reasonable” 
interpretation of the statute, which authorized trust acquisitions for tribes 
that were under federal jurisdiction and federally recognized at the time of 
the trust application.76   
The Supreme Court granted the Governor, State, and Town’s 
petitions for certiorari.77 Petitioners argued the IRA limits the Secretary’s 
authority to tribes who were both federally recognized and under federal 
                                                           
71.  Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 178-179 (D.R.I. 2003).  
72.  Id. at 180–81.  
73.  Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2008).  Prior to the 
decision, a panel of the First Circuit, in a decision that was later withdrawn, also 
upheld the trust acquisition.  Carcieri v. Norton, 398 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005).  On 
rehearing, the panel held that the Secretary was authorized to acquire land in trust for 
Narragansett, regardless of its status in 1934, and to hold otherwise “would diminish 
the Tribe’s privileges in relation to other federally recognized tribes,” contrary to 25 
U.S.C. § 476(f) (now § 5123(f)).  Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005), 
rehearing en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, withdrawn from West Reporter 
publication.    
74.  Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 26. 
75.  467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that, 
where statutory language is ambiguous, a court should defer to the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of the language in question and not substitute its own 
construction.  Id.   
76.  Carcieri, 497 F.3d at 30-31.   
77.  Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008).  
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jurisdiction in 1934.78  Twenty-one states filed a brief in support of the 
Governor and Town, complaining “the trust power has the capacity to 
change the character of an entire state.”79  The United States, supported by 
amicus briefs filed by Narragansett, two other tribes, the National 
Congress of American Indians, law professors, and historians, argued the 
IRA authorized the acquisition of land in trust for “tribes” and “Indians,” 
and the definition of “Indian” did not limit the definition of “tribe.”80  Even 
if it did, the United States argued that “now” did not unambiguously mean 
the date of the IRA’s enactment, and that ambiguity left a gap for the 
agency to fill.81 
The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit.82  In a majority 
opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held the term “now” in “members 
of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” was 
“unambiguous,” and referred to the time of the IRA’s enactment in 1934.83  
Justice Thomas relied on the “ordinary meaning” of the word “now,” the 
“natural reading” of the word “now” in context, and references to “now or 
hereafter” in other parts of the IRA, which, in Justice Thomas’s opinion, 
demonstrated Congress intended to limit the word “now” to “events 
contemporaneous with the Act’s enactment.”84  Although insisting it was 
not necessary for his holding, Justice Thomas noted that shortly following 
                                                           
78.  Brief for Petitioner Donald L. Carcieri at 13, Id. (No. 07-526); Brief 
for Petitioner State of Rhode Island at 21, Id.; Brief of Petitioner Town of 
Charlestown, Rhode Island at 25, Id.  
79.  Brief of the States of Alabama et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Petitioners, Id. These states included Alabama, Connecticut, Alaska, Arkansas, 
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Utah. 
80.  Brief for the Respondents at 12, Id. See also Briefs of the National 
Congress of American Indians, the Narragansett Indian Tribe, Law Professors 
Specializing in Federal Indian Law, Historians Frederick E. Hoxie, Paul C. Rosier, 
and Christian W. McMillen, and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and Nottawaseppi Huron 
Band of the Potawatomi in Support of Respondents, Id.  
81.  Brief for the Respondents at 10, Id.  
82.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387.   
83.  Id. at 390–91.  Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito 
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion.  Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion.  Justice 
Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice 
Ginsburg joined.  Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.   
84.  Id. at 388–90.  
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the IRA’s enactment, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, 
sent a letter in which he interpreted the first definition as applying to a 
recognized tribe “that was under Federal jurisdiction at the date of the 
Act.”85  Justice Thomas concluded the Secretary’s authority to acquire 
land in trust for tribes under the first definition of “Indian” is limited to 
tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934, when the IRA was enacted.86  
Critically, he did not define “under federal jurisdiction.”  Because none of 
the parties argued Narragansett was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, 
however, and the Secretary failed to challenge the Governor and Town’s 
assertion that the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 
1934, Justice Thomas concluded the Secretary did not have authority to 
take the 31-acre parcel into trust for the Tribe.87 
Numerous commentators have, correctly in our view, challenged 
Justice Thomas’s myopic and oversimplified analysis of the IRA, 
concluding the Court got it wrong.88  In addition, in a scathing report, the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs faulted the United States for failing 
to argue Narragansett was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and to file key 
documents with the Court, describing it as a “breach of the Federal 
government’s trust responsibility.”89  However, it is not the intent of this 
article to re-litigate Carcieri, but rather to address its aftermath and to 
recommend a path forward.  To do so, it is necessary to also consider the 
concurring opinions of Justices Breyer and Souter.  
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion setting forth several 
qualifications to his joining of the majority opinion.90  The last of these 
qualifications, in which he posited that the majority’s interpretation of 
“now” as meaning 1934 “may prove somewhat less restrictive than it at 
                                                           
85.  Id. at 390.  
86.  Id. at 382. 
87.  Id. at 382-383, 395–396. 
88.  See, e.g, Staudenmaier & Khalsa, supra note 56; Melanie Riccobene 
Jarboe, Collective Rights to Indigenous Land in Carcieri v. Salazar, 30 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 395 (Spring 2010); Washburn, supra note 56.  
89.  AMENDING THE ACT OF JUNE 18, 1934, TO REAFFIRM THE AUTHORITY 
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO TAKE LAND INTO TRUST FOR INDIAN TRIBES, 
S. REP. NO. 112-166, at 18 (May 17, 2012).   
90.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 396 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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first appears,”91 has been the subject of analysis and debate.92  To 
demonstrate potential flexibilities, Justice Breyer made three key points.  
First, he reasoned a “tribe may have been ‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in 
1934 even though the Federal Government did not believe so at the time,” 
citing examples of tribes the Department erroneously believed had 
dissolved or otherwise ceased to exist at one point but then later 
recognized.93  Second, he explained the first definition “imposes no time 
limit upon recognition;” in other words, “now” only modifies “under 
federal jurisdiction” and not “recognized.”94  Justice Breyer noted that a 
tribe could have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, despite not being 
formally recognized until later, and that, in fact, “later recognition reflects 
earlier ‘Federal jurisdiction.’”95  Finally, Justice Breyer identified some 
types of evidence that, in his view, demonstrated a tribe was under federal 
jurisdiction, including: (1) a treaty relationship; (2) congressional 
appropriations; or (3) enrollment with the Indian Office.96  
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also agreed with the 
majority that “now” meant 1934, and agreed with Justice Breyer’s three 
qualifications.97  Justice Souter added that “[n]othing in the majority 
opinion forecloses the possibility that the two concepts [of] recognition 
and jurisdiction, may be given separate content.”98  However, Justice 
Souter dissented in part on the basis that he would have remanded the case 
                                                           
91.  Id. at 397 (Breyer, J., concurring).  The other two qualifications were 
that: (1) Justice Breyer did not believe the statutory language itself was determinative, 
but did not afford the Department deference because of Collier’s 1936 letter and his 
view that the legislative history shows that Congress did not intend to delegate 
interpretive authority to the Department such that Chevron deference would apply; 
and (2) his view that the legislative history also shows that “now” means “in 1934.”  
Id. at 396-97 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
92.  See M-37029, supra note 56 (relying heavily on Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Citizens Against Reservation 
Shopping v. Jewell, Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433 
(2017)(No. 16-572) (faulting the Solicitor’s reliance on Breyer’s concurring opinion).   
93.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398–399 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
94.  Id. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
95.  Id. at 398–399 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
96.  Id. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
97.  Id. at 400 (Souter J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
98.  Id.   
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for the Department to consider whether the Tribe was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934.99   
Two other points regarding the Carcieri opinion bear mentioning.  
First, the majority opinion acknowledged the required demonstration of 
federal jurisdiction in 1934 under the first definition of “Indian” does not 
limit the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust under other statutory 
provisions.100  In that way, the Court left the door open for tribes qualifying 
under other definitions of Indian in the IRA, or other statutes, such as tribe-
specific restoration acts.101  As discussed in Section III(b)(iii) below, 
Interior has seized upon this language to support trust acquisition for tribes 
and to limit the holding of Carcieri.  Second, the 31 acres at issue in 
Carcieri remain in fee to this day.  The houses constructed with HUD 
funding have never been completed or used,102 providing just one example 
of the devastating impact that Carcieri has had on tribes. 
 
IV. RESPONSES TO CARCIERI 
 
Indian country immediately responded to the Carcieri decision 
with substantial concern and then swift action.  Indian law and policy 
experts criticized the Court’s cribbed reading of the IRA, as well as its 
antagonism to tribal interests.103  Although many identified the looming 
                                                           
99.  Id. at 401 (Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Stevens issued a dissenting opinion, sharply criticizing the majority’s 
“cramped” reading of a broad statute.  Id. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He argued 
that the Secretary had authority to acquire land in trust for “Indians,” which refers to 
both tribes and individuals.  Id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Only individuals are 
required to demonstrate that they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  Id. at 413 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Tribes, in Justice Stevens’ view, only had to demonstrate 
that they are recognized, and, as a federally recognized tribe, the Narragansett Tribe 
was therefore eligible to have land acquired in trust on its behalf.   Id. at 411, 413 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
100.  Id. at 392.  
101.  See § III(b)(iii) infra.  
102.  Mem. from Joe Webster and Jerry Straus, Hobbs Straus Dean & 
Walker, to Tribal Clients, SCIA Roundtable Discussion re Carcieri-fix legislation 4 
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.usetinc.org/wp-content/uploads/LizMalerba/ 
WWS%20LnP/4_3_15/Report%20on%20Carcieri%20Roundtable%204%201%2015
.pdf. 
103.  See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Decision’s in. “Now” begins work 
to fix Carcieri, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 25, 2009), 
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unknowns concerning the scope and meaning of “under Federal 
jurisdiction,” it was generally recognized the decision would, or should, 
not impact tribes with a longstanding, uninterrupted relationship with the 
federal government.104  Nonetheless, many feared that Carcieri-related 
litigation would greatly increase the time and cost of acquiring tribal trust 
lands, particularly for those tribes who had more recently obtained federal 
recognition through the Departmental acknowledgement process.105  
Indian law scholar Matthew Fletcher accurately forecast that Carcieri 
lawsuits may “forc[e] some tribes to undergo the strange and humiliating 
process of earning a kind of federal recognition all over again.”106  
                                                           
https://web.archive.org/web/20100108084036/http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/h
ome/content/40290987.html#close; Bryan Newland, Initial Reaction to Carcieri 
Opinion, TURTLE TALK (blog for Michigan State University College of Law, 
Indigenous Law & Policy Center) (Feb. 24, 2009), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/ 
2009/02/24/initial-reaction-to-carcieri-opinion/.  For a general discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s record in Indian law cases over the last 30 years, see Alexander 
Tallchief Skibine, University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 230 (2017) 
(concluding that “the Court has had difficulties upholding the federal policy of 
respecting tribal sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government”).   
104.  G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust 
Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 594 (2009) (“This decision will 
create a cloud upon the trust title of every tribe first recognized by Congress or the 
executive branch after 1934, every tribe terminated in the termination era that has 
since been restored, and every tribe that adopted the IRA or OIWA and changed its 
name or organizational structure since 1934.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 103; 
Newland, supra note 103.  It was also widely assumed that past tribal trust land 
acquisitions would be insulated from Carcieri challenges on the basis of the Quiet 
Title Act’s Indian lands exception.  Yet that assumption was put to bed by the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 Patchak decision, holding that the Quiet Title Act does not bar APA 
challenges to fee-to-trust decision once land is acquired in trust as long as the 
challenge is brought by plaintiffs not seeking to quiet title in themselves.  See Match-
E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 217 
(2012).   
105.  Newland, supra note 103 (noting that Carcieri would affect tribes 
not acknowledged until after 1934, “plac[ing] yet another litigation obstacle in front 
of tribes as they seek to have land placed into trust”); Fletcher, supra note 103 (noting 
that “Indian tribes in the twilight of the concurring opinions may be engaged in 
expensive litigation to prove that they were ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in 1934” and 
that such litigation “may require the heavy expenditure of funds for expert 
witnesses”); see also Rice, supra note 104 at 594. 
106.  Fletcher, supra note 103. 
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Prompted by these concerns, tribal leaders and pan-tribal organizations led 
the rallying cry at the doors of Congress and the Department, seeking a 
quick and forceful response by their federal trustee, as detailed below. 
 
A. Proposed Legislative Solutions 
 
Spurred by tribes, Congress sprang into action by holding hearings 
and considering legislation to address Carcieri.  Since the Carcieri 
decision in February 2009, Congress has introduced 15 clean Carcieri 
fixes to provide that Interior has authority to acquire land in trust for all 
tribes, without imposing other restrictions on the fee-to-trust process.  
Several bills to ratify prior acquisitions have also been introduced, as well 
as a bill to fix Carcieri but also requiring drastic changes to the fee-to-trust 
process.  Yet, with the exception of one tribe-specific bill, ten years later 
Congress has failed to enact legislation remedying Carcieri’s 
consequences.  And such universal legislation seems unlikely, despite the 
fact it remains desperately needed.  As we explain below, what started with 
the seemingly simple proposition that every federally recognized tribe 
should be eligible to put land in trust under the IRA has evolved into a 
much larger, at times ugly, debate about gaming and economic 
development, state and local government authority, tribal sovereignty, the 
legitimacy of certain tribes, and the fee-to-trust process as a whole.  The 
controversy over Carcieri has even led one reporter to characterize it as 
“[t]he new Indian wars in Washington.”107  The entrenched battle lines 
have led to congressional paralysis, which is unlikely to change anytime 
soon.  While many tribes and tribal organizations want a clean Carcieri 
fix, states and local governments, as well as citizens’ groups and some 
members of Congress insist on broader changes to the fee-to-trust process 
that most tribes do not want to see effectuated.  
 
1. Initial Congressional Response 
 
 Less than two months after the Carcieri decision, in April 2009, 
the House Natural Resources Committee held an oversight committee 
hearing on the decision’s ramifications for Indian tribes.108  Committee 
                                                           
107.  David Rogers, The New Indian wars in Washington, POLITICO (Oct. 
30, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/new-indian-wars- 
washington-215208.  
108.  April 1, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing, supra note 56.     
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members and panelists expressed significant concerns about both the 
Court’s reasoning in Carcieri and its implications.  These implications 
included: frivolous litigation challenging whether a tribe was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934; different classes of and false distinctions between 
tribes, contrary to 25 U.S.C. § 5123(f) and (g);109 questions about whether 
Interior could take land into trust for recently recognized tribes; barriers to 
economic development; confusion about and delays in the land-into-trust 
process; and questions about criminal jurisdiction.110  The overwhelming 
consensus was that Congress must act to address Carcieri.111  Only one 
panelist at the House hearing, Alaska attorney Don Mitchell, defended the 
Supreme Court’s decision as correctly decided.112   
The next month, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs also held 
an oversight hearing to discuss Carcieri.113  Committee members and 
                                                           
109.  25 U.S.C. § 5123(f) and (g), described as the “privileges and 
immunities” clause of the IRA, prohibits Interior from making distinctions between 
federally-recognized tribes.  
110.  April 1, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing, supra note 56, at 2 
(statement of the Honorable Nick J. Rahall, Chairman, Comm. on Nat. Resources) 
(discussing frivolous litigation); id. at 6–7 (statement of Colette Routel, Visiting 
Assistant Professor, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.) (arguing that the decision creates two 
classes of tribes, “the haves and the have nots,” and noting that Interior would not be 
able to acquire land in trust for recently recognized tribes without legislation); id. at 
16 (statement of Michael J. Anderson, Partner, Anderson Tuell, LLP) (discussing 
future delays and confusion about the land-into-trust process and noting Carcieri will 
hinder economic development); id. at 31 (response of Michael J. Anderson to question 
from Chairman Rahall) (noting possible challenges to criminal jurisdiction). 
Portending litigation and turmoil at the Department of the Interior for years to come, 
attorney Michael Anderson testified: 
Regrettably, some attorneys and their clients may see the Carcieri 
decision as a springboard to revisit assimilationist and 
antisovereignty positions best left in the termination era.  Facing such 
litigation or, possibly, after an erroneous decision by lower courts, 
the Department of the Interior could be compelled to examine the 
historical record for individual tribes.  My experience at the 
Department has shown that gaps in historic records, staffing 
shortages, restrictive interpretations, and well-funded opponents 
could delay land-into-trust acquisitions for years.  
Id. at 14.   
111.  See generally id.    
112.  Id. at 24–25 (Statement of Donald Craig Mitchell, Esq.). 
113.  May 21, 2009 Carcieri Oversight Hearing, supra note 56.  
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panelists expressed similar concerns to those raised in the House hearing 
and argued that Congress must act quickly to fix Carcieri.114  The National 
Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) proposed a clean Carcieri fix—
legislative language to remove the words “now under federal jurisdiction” 
from the first definition of “Indian.”115  However, the Attorney General of 
the State of South Dakota, on behalf of the Conference of Western 
Attorneys General, argued that Congress should use the Carcieri decision 
to revisit the entire land-into-trust process.116  Mirroring attacks on the fee-
to-trust process raised by states in the Carcieri litigation, he argued trust 
acquisitions inhibit economic development and the process was unfair to, 
and biased against, state and local governments.117  In addition to 
testimony provided at the hearing, numerous state and local officials, 
tribes, and attorneys, among others, provided written statements to the 
committee, demonstrating the importance of, and controversy 
surrounding, trust land acquisitions.118  
                                                           
114.  Id.  
115.  Id. at 19 (prepared Statement of Hon. Ron Allen, Sec’y, NCAI).  
Attorney Edward Lazarus also argued that any administrative approach include a 
brightline rule that any tribe that went through the federal acknowledgment process 
had already established that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, based on a 
finding that it had been “identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 
continuous basis since 1900.”  Id. at 5 (statement of Edward P. Lazarus, Partner, Akin, 
Gump, Strauss, Hauer, and Feld, LLP.)  
116.  Id. at 21 (prepared Statement of Lawrence E. Long, Att’y Gen., S. 
D., Chairman, Conference of Western Att’ys Gen.).  
117.  Id. at 22, 25. 
118.  Id. at 33–180. Submissions ranged from complaints that tribes 
improperly seek to circumvent state law through trust land acquisition, id. at 33 
(prepared statement of Robb and Ross Law Firm, on behalf of Artichoke Joe’s); 
complaints about the negative impacts of trust acquisitions on state and local 
government, id. at 46 (prepared statement of Hon. Richard Blumenthal, Att’y Gen., 
Connecticut), id. at 54 (prepared statement of Mike McGowan, Chairman, CSAC 
Housing, Land Use, and Transp. Comm. and Indian Gaming Working Grp.), id. at 135 
(Communication from the Chief Legal Offices of the Following States and Territories: 
Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Utah to Senator Dorgan et al); frustration that the current fee-to-trust process “does 
not provide for meaningful analysis of weighing of the input of states and local units 
of governments and is void of binding limits on the discretion of the secretary,” id. at 
135 (communication from the Chief Legal Offices of the Following States and 
Territories: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, 
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In addition to holding oversight hearings, members of Congress 
also introduced legislation to fix Carcieri.  In September 2009, Senator 
Byron Dorgan introduced a bill in the Senate to revise the first definition 
of “Indian” to include “any federally recognized Indian tribe.”119  In this 
way, the bill would have removed the Supreme Court’s requirement that a 
tribe demonstrate it was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, and the 
Secretary would have authority to acquire land in trust for all federally 
recognized tribes, as determined at the time of the trust application.  The 
bill applied retroactively to the date of the IRA.120   
The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
and following several amendments, was reported favorably out of 
committee through a business meeting.121  The full Senate never voted on 
the bill.   
Meanwhile, the House of Representatives introduced two bills to 
reaffirm the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for all Indian 
tribes.  The bills, introduced by Representatives Tom Cole and Dale 
Kildee, were identical.122  Like Senator Dorgan’s bill, they would have 
replaced “any recognized Indian tribe now under jurisdiction” in the IRA’s 
first definition of “Indian” with “any federally recognized Indian tribe.”123  
                                                           
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Utah to Senator Dorgan et al.); discussion of the devastating 
impacts of the Carcieri decision on tribes, id. at 47 (prepared Statement of Bruce S. 
“Two Dogs” Bozsum, Chairman, Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut), id. at 
126 (Apr. 13, 2009 Letter from Chairman Janice Mabee to Senator Bryon Dorgan); 
and challenging the legitimacy of numerous tribes id. at 59-61 (prepared statement of 
Donald Craig Mitchell, Attorney, Anchorage, Alaska) (arguing that, since June 18, 
1934, Congress and Interior “have created at least 104 ‘federally recognized tribes’”).    
119.  S. 1703, 111th Congress § 1(a)(2) (introduced Sept. 24, 2009).   
120.  Id. at § 1(b).  
121.  S. REP. NO. 111-247, 111th Cong. (2009).  The revised bill stated that 
it did not affect any other federal law or any limitation on the Secretary’s authority 
under any other federal law or regulation other than the IRA. S. 1703, as amended  § 
1(c).  It also required the Secretary to submit a report to Congress discussing the 
effects of the Carcieri decision within one year of enactment and including a list of 
each tribe and parcel of land effected by the decision.  Id. § 1(d). 
122.  H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (introduced Oct. 1, 2009); H.R. 3742, 111th 
Cong. (introduced Oct. 7, 2009). 
123.  H.R. 3697 § 1(a)(1); H.R. 3742, § 1(a)(1).  Unlike the Senate’s bill, 
however, they also would have replaced the existing definition of “Indian tribe,” “any 
Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation” with 
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The bills’ changes to the definition would have operated retroactively, 
with an effective date of June 18, 1934.124  In this way, the bills sought to 
remove any question about the validity of fee-to-trust decisions issued 
before the Carcieri decision.   
On November 4, 2009, the House Committee on Natural 
Resources held a legislative hearing on both bills.125  Testimony revealed 
the sharp differences of opinion about land-into-trust.  An Interior official, 
tribal officials, and attorneys spoke about the importance of trust land 
acquisition for tribes and the need to quickly act to fix Carcieri.126  State 
and local government officials criticized the land-into-trust process, and 
demanded a fix that would protect state and local governments.127  Some 
members were equally skeptical about a clean Carcieri fix—
Representative Doc Hastings noted that 27 state Attorneys General voiced 
concerns about the land into-trust process, and giving the Secretary 
unconditional authority to acquire land in trust.128  The committee did not 
vote on the bills, and they never made it out of committee. 
 The closest Congress came to enacting a Carcieri fix was in late 
2010, when the House of Representatives passed a continuing resolution 
(“CR”) for the 2011 fiscal year budget that included a clean Carcieri fix.129  
The House affirmed the authority of the Secretary to acquire trust land for 
all federally recognized tribes.130  The CR also expressly ratified and 
confirmed prior fee-to-trust decisions, to the extent there was a challenge 
based on whether a tribe was recognized or under federal jurisdiction in 
                                                           
a definition requiring federal acknowledgment. H.R. 3697, § 1(a)(2); H.R. 3742, § 
1(a)(2).  
124.  H.R. 3697, § 1(b); H.R. 3742, § 1(b).   
125.  Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3697 and H.R. 3742, to Amend the Act 
of June 18, 1934, to Reaffirm the Authority of the Secretary of the Interior to Take 
Land into Trust for Indian Tribes, 111th Congress (Nov. 4, 2009).   
126.  Id. (statements of: Chairman Bill Iyall, Cowlitz Indian Tribe; 
Chairman Janice Mabee, Sauk-Suiattle Tribe; Chairwoman Sandra Klineburger, 
Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians; and Riyaz Kanji, on behalf of the Grand Traverse Band 
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians).  
127.  Id. (statements of Steven Woodside, Sonoma Cty. Counsel; Att’y 
Gen. Richard Blumenthal, Conn.). 
128.  Id. at 3 (statement of the Hon. Doc Hastings).   
129.  House Continuing Resolution for 2011 Fiscal Year; H.R. 3082, 
111th Cong. § 2727 (2010). 
130.  Id. § 2727(a). 
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1934.131  Finally, like the Senate bill, the CR clarified that it did not affect 
other statutes.132  However, the version of the CR with the Carcieri fix did 
not pass the Senate.  It remains the only Carcieri fix to ever pass in either 
chamber of Congress.    
 
2. 112th and 113th Congresses 
 
In the next Congress, Representatives Dale Kildee and Tom Cole 
again introduced legislation clarifying the authority of the Department to 
acquire land in trust for federally recognized tribes.133  The bills were 
referred to the House Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native 
Affairs, which held a hearing on July 12, 2011.134  The same battle lines 
were drawn, with Interior and tribal officials lining up in support of a clean 
Carcieri fix135 and a local government official and citizens’ group 
representative demanding larger changes to the land-into-trust process.136  
Cheryl Schmidt, the Director of Stand Up For California!, also expressed 
significant concerns about gaming,137 despite the fact that only a tiny 
fraction of trust acquisitions are for gaming purposes.138  Both bills died in 
the subcommittee without further action.   
                                                           
131.  Id. § 2727(b). 
132.  Id. § 2727(c) 
133.  H.R. 1234, 112th Cong. § 1(a)(1) (introduced Mar. 29, 2011); H.R. 
1291, 112th Cong. §§ 1(a)(b) (introduced Mar. 31, 2011).  The Kildee bill also 
expressly ratified and confirmed prior fee-to-trust decisions, to the extent there was a 
challenge based on whether a tribe was recognized or under federal jurisdiction in 
1934.  Cole’s bill would have clarified that Section 5 of the IRA would not apply in 
Alaska.  
134.  Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1291, H.R. 1234 and H.R. 1421: House 
Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, 112th Cong. (July 12, 
2011).   
135.  Id. (statements of Donald “Del” Laverdure, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs; Chairman Earl J. Barbry, Sr, Tunica-Biloxi 
Tribe of Louisiana; Chairman Cedric Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe).   
136.  Id. (statements of Susan Adams, President, Marin County Board of 
Supervisors; Cheryl Schmit, Director, Stand Up For California!).  
137.  Id. (statement of Cheryl Schmit, Director, Stand Up for California!).   
138.  According to the Acting BIA Director, as of April 2018, there were 
21 pending gaming applications, less than two percent of the total pending fee-to-trust 
requests.  Tribal homelands hit a wall under President Trump after historic Obama 
era, INDIANZ (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/04/25/ 
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 Meanwhile, on the Senate side, Senator Daniel Akaka introduced 
legislation reaffirming the authority of the Secretary to acquire land in trust 
for all federally recognized tribes, with an effective date of June 18, 
1934.139  The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
which did not hold a legislative hearing.  However, the Senate Committee 
held an oversight hearing on the “Carcieri Crisis.”140  With one exception, 
all of the testimony at the hearing discussed the devastating impacts of the 
Carcieri decision on Indian country and urged Congress to quickly enact 
a clean Carcieri fix.141  However, the California State Association of 
Counties (“CSAC”) provided a statement opposing a clean fix, and instead 
urged Congress to address Carcieri as part of “broader trust reform 
legislation.”142 CSAC’s statement foreshadowed later debates and 
lobbying efforts that would make passing a clean Carcieri fix impossible.   
The Senate Committee reported the Akaka Carcieri fix favorably 
in a business meeting and heavily criticized the handling of the Carcieri 
litigation by the Department of Justice and the Interior Solicitor’s 
Office.143  The full Senate never took action on the Akaka bill.   
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Match-E-Be-Nash-
She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,144 the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs held a second oversight hearing during the 
112th Congress on Carcieri on September 13, 2012.145  After Carcieri the 
United States took the position that, once the Department acquired land in 
                                                           
tribal-homelands-hit-a-wall-under-presid.asp. 
139.  S. 676, 112th Cong. (as introduced, Mar. 30, 2011).   
140.  Oversight Hearing on the Carcieri Crisis: The Ripple Effect on Jobs, 
Economic Development and Public Safety in Indian Country: S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 112th Cong. (Oct. 13, 2011).   
141.  Id. These impacts included: “a more burdensome and uncertain fee 
to trust process;” an increase in costly litigation; barriers to economic development, 
including access to capital and job growth; and the creation of two classes of tribes.  
Id. at 10 (prepared statement of the Hon. Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y for Indian 
Affairs); id. at 24 (prepared statement of Richard Guest, Staff Att’y, NARF); id. at 
38–39 (prepared statement of William Lomax, President, Native Am. Finance Officers 
Ass’n).   
142.  Id. at 51.   
143.  Id. at 2, 5–7, S. REP. NO. 112-166 (May 17–20, 23–26, 2012).   
144.  567 U.S. 209 (2012). See generally infra § III(b).    
145.  Addressing the Costly Administrative Burdens and Negative Impacts 
of the Carcieri and Patchak Decisions: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
S. Hrg. 112-710, 112th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter S. Hrg. 112-710].   
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trust on behalf of an Indian tribe, subsequent challenges were barred by 
the “Indian lands” exception of the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”), 28 U.S.C. 
§2409a.146  In Patchak, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 
QTA does not bar judicial review under the APA unless the plaintiff seeks 
to quiet title to the property at issue.147  Therefore, because plaintiff David 
Patchak did not seek quiet title himself, his claim could proceed under the 
APA, despite the trust status of the land.148  The Patchak decision sent 
shockwaves through Indian country, as tribes became concerned that 
decades-old trust acquisitions could be reversed on Carcieri or other 
grounds.149   
At the 2012 oversight hearing, NCAI testified that the fee-to-trust 
process was under attack through “harassment litigation” against tribes 
regarding their status in 1934 and through retroactive challenges to trust 
land acquisitions following Patchak.150  Other panelists testified about the 
urgent need for congressional action to fix Carcieri and reaffirm past trust 
acquisitions, noting the costly burdens, including litigation, and 
uncertainty imposed by both the Carcieri and Patchak decisions.151  
However, the CSAC, in a written statement, urged Congress to enact 
legislation to amend the land-into-trust process generally in accordance 
with the views of state and local governments.152   
In the next congressional session, in 2013, the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs held a hearing entitled “Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to 
Trust Land Acquisitions.”153  The same battle lines were drawn again, 
including those linking a Carcieri fix to the negative effects of fee-to-trust 
                                                           
146.   See supra note 104. 
147.  Patchak, 567 U.S. at 217, 220–221. 
148.  Id.  
149.  S. Hrg. 112-710, supra note 145, at 12 (prepared statement of Hon. 
Jefferson Keel, President, NCAI).  
150.  Id.   
151.  Id. at 8 (prepared statement of Donald “Del” Laverdure, Acting 
Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs), 13 (statement of John EchoHawk, Exec. Dir., 
Native American Rights Fund), and 26-27 (prepared statement of Colette Routel).  
152.  S. Hrg. 112-710, supra note 145, Appendix at 31 (prepared 
statement, Prepared Statement of Mike McGowan, President, California State 
Association of Counties). 
153.  Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to Trust Land Acquisitions: Hearing 
before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (Nov. 30, 2013).   
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acquisitions and gaming on local communities.154  Also in the 113th 
Congress, Senator Jon Tester and Representative Cole and Markey 
introduced Carcieri bills mirroring prior proposed fixes, none of which 
progressed far in the legislative process.155  
 Despite Congress’ failure to enact a clean Carcieri fix in the years 
following Carcieri, Congress did enact a tribe-specific Carcieri related 
bill in the 113th Congress: the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act 
(“Gun Lake Act” or “Act”).156  The Gun Lake Act “ratified and confirmed” 
Interior’s 2009 trust acquisition for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band 
of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan (“Gun Lake” or “Gun Lake Band”),157 
                                                           
154.  Senator Feinstein, for example, stated that any Carcieri fix “must 
address concerns about tribal gaming.”  Id. at 6 (prepared statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein).  Diane Dillon, Supervisor, Napa County Board of Supervisors, also insisted 
on a fix that would address state and local concerns, describing Carcieri as “an historic 
opportunity.” Id. at 33 (prepared statement of Diane Dillon).  On the other side of the 
debate, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs testified in favor of a clean Carcieri 
fix, noting that the Department was “up to our eyeballs in litigation.”  Id. at 13 
(response to questioning by Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs).  NCAI also testified 
in support of a clean Carcieri fix, noting that state and local governments already have 
a role in the land-into-trust process, and describing the devastating impacts of the 
decision on Indian country. Id. at 22, 24 (prepared statement of Jacqueline Johnson-
Pata, Exec. Dir.). 
155.  Senator Tester’s bill, identical to his proposed fix in the previous 
Congress, was reported favorably out of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs after 
a hearing but never taken up by the full Senate. S. 2188, 113th Cong. (introduced Mar. 
31, 2014); Legislative Hearing to Receive Testimony on Several Bills, including S. 
2188 before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. (May 7, 2012) (testimony 
of Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, and Brian Cladoosby, 
President, NCAI) (both Interior and NCAI spoke out strongly in favor of a clean 
Carcieri fix). Representative Cole introduced a bill that would have, like his earlier 
bills, revised the definitions of “Indian” and “tribe” to address Carcieri but it died in 
subcommittee without a hearing.  H.R. 279, 113th Cong. (introduced Jan. 15, 2013).  
Representative Markey introduced a bill identical to the Senate bill, which was 
referred to subcommittee where no action was taken.  H.R. 666, 113th Cong. 
(introduced Feb. 13, 2013). 
156.  Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 
Stat. 1913 (Sept. 26, 2014). 
157.  Id. at § 2(a).  The Gun Lake Act provided that “an action (including 
an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) relating 
to the land described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal 
court and shall be promptly dismissed.”  Id.  
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which had been challenged on Carcieri grounds in the previously 
discussed Patchak litigation.158  The Gun Lake Act effectively ordered the 
dismissal of Patchak’s federal court action. 159   In passing the Act, the 
Senate explained that the legislation would provide certainty to the status 
of the land.160  The House acknowledged that there was “no consensus in 
Congress on how to address” Carcieri, and determined that bills to take 
specific lands in trust would be, for the time being, “the appropriate means 
of resolving trust land matters.”161  The House also questioned whether the 
prior trust acquisition for Gun Lake was lawful, noting that Gun Lake’s 
members “were not recognized and under federal jurisdiction on the date 
of the enactment of the IRA.”162  Thus, despite the significance of 
Congress providing certainty as to the status of Gun Lake’s trust lands, 
such progress must be measured against the statements by certain 
members of Congress taking a broad view of Carcieri and refusing to 
move forward with a clean Carcieri fix.   
 
3. 114th Congress 
 
During the 114th Congress, members of the House and Senate 
once again introduced three clean Carcieri fixes, which tracked the 
language of previous proposals.163  All three died in committee without a 
hearing.  Bills to reaffirm all prior trust acquisitions likewise never made 
it out of committee.164   
Although not specifically focused on Carcieri, in May 2015, the 
House Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs held a 
                                                           
158.  See infra Section IV(a)(iv). 
159.  Gun Lake Act § 2(b).  
160.  S. REP. NO. 113-194 at 2 (2014).   
161.  H. REP. NO. 113-590 at 3 (2014). 
162.  Id. 
163.  H.R. 249, 114th Cong. (introduced Jan. 9, 2015); H.R. 407, 114th 
Cong. (introduced Jan. 20, 2015); S. 732, 114th Cong. (introduced Mar. 12, 2015).   
164.  S. 1931, 114th Cong. (introduced Aug. 4, 2015); H.R. 407, 114th 
Cong. (introduced Jan. 20, 2015).  Senator Barrasso held a roundtable discussion to 
discuss a way forward on Carcieri, but, like prior hearings, panelists advanced their 
positions either for or against a clean Carcieri fix and land-into-trust without any 
progress towards a legislative fix.  Roundtable Discussion on the Carcieri v. Salazar 
Supreme Court Decision and Exploring a Way Forward, 114th Cong. (Mar. 25, 2015). 
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hearing attacking Interior’s approach to land-into-trust.165  The title of the 
hearing, “Inadequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934,” demonstrated the Republican majority’s 
antagonism towards the existing land-into-trust process.166  Ignoring the 
fee-to-trust regulations, the handbook,  countless decisions upholding 
Section 5 of the IRA,167 and specific fee-to-trust decisions, the Hearing 
Memorandum asserted that there were no “limits, conditions, or 
guidelines” on the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust under 
Section 5.168  The memorandum further asserted that Interior’s legal 
opinion on Carcieri, discussed in Section III(b)(ii), “effectively defines 
the term ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in a manner that—unsurprisingly—
serves to render the Supreme Court’s ruling meaningless and empower the 
Secretary to take lands in trust for a tribe at any time.”169  The Hearing 
Memorandum also complained that Interior had failed to provide the 
committee with information regarding how many tribes are affected by 
Carcieri.170 
In the Senate, Senator Barrasso introduced the Interior 
Improvement Act, which simultaneously addressed Carcieri and 
overhauled the land-into-trust process.171  The committee amended the bill 
and reported it to the full Senate.172  The bill would have revised the first 
definition of Indian to authorize fee-to-trust acquisitions for all federally 
recognized tribes and provided a new process for off-reservation 
acquisitions.173  Under the proposed process, tribes that had cooperative 
agreements with local governments would enjoy expedited treatment of 
their fee-to-trust applications, and an application could be “deemed 
                                                           
165.  Inadequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian, 
Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, 114th Cong. (May 14, 2015).  
166.  Id., Mem. from Majority Staff, Subcomm. On Indian, Insular and 
Alaska Native Affairs, to Nat. Res. Comm. Members [hereinafter Hearing Memo].   
167.  See e.g, Michigan Gaming Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 
30-33 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009); South Dakota v. U. S. 
Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 796-99 (8th Cir. 2005).  
168.  Hearing Memo, supra note 166, at 3.  
169.  Id. at 4.  
170.  Id. 
171.  S. 3879, 114th Cong. (introduced July 28, 2015). 
172.  S. REP. NO. 114-279 (2016).   
173.  Id. at § 3.   
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approved” if Interior did not meet the timelines specified in the bill.  The 
bill also would have increased notice requirements and codified existing 
regulatory requirements for off-reservation applications.174  The Senate 
never acted on the Interior Improvement Act, and it was not reintroduced 
in the next Congress. 
 Carcieri reversed decades of Interior’s policy of acquiring trust 
lands for all federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states.  State and 
local governments and other fee-to-trust opponents turned congressional 
debate and action on a possible fix into a debate about fee-to-trust 
generally and not just the Secretary’s statutory authority.  Ultimately, the 
opposition proved too much, and with each successive Congress, there has 
been diminishing congressional activity on a possible fix.  Therefore, it 
has been left to Interior to issue and defend individual decisions regarding 
whether specific tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  While 
Interior has successfully defended each of its determinations that a tribe 
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934—as predicted by tribes and 
representatives at the first hearing following Carcieri—the cost to Interior 
and tribes has been significant.   
 
B. The Department of the Interior’s Response 
 
The United States argued Carcieri in the waning days of the 
George W. Bush administration, at a time when Interior was skeptical of 
both land-into-trust generally, and off-reservation and gaming acquisitions 
in particular.175  When Carcieri was decided—barely a month after 
President Barack Obama took office—new political appointees had either 
just started or had yet to be appointed or confirmed at the Departments of 
Justice and Interior.176  The new political appointees wanted to reassure 
                                                           
174.  Id.  
175.  See e.g. Mem. from Assistant Sec’y Carl Artman to Reg’l Dirs., 
Guidance on taking off-reservation land into trust for gaming purposes (Jan. 3, 2008), 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/artman0103081.pdf.  
176.  The Senate unanimously confirmed Secretary Salazar on January 20, 
2009.  Ken Salazar Confirmed as 50th Secretary of the Interior, U.S. DEP’T OF 
INTERIOR (Jan. 20, 2009), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 
2009_01_20_release).  Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Larry EchoHawk was 
confirmed on May 20, 2009.  Senate Approves Nomination of Larry Echo Hawk for 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (May 20, 2009) 
https://www.indian.senate.gov/news/press-release/senate-approves-nomination-
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tribes who were frustrated with the land-into-trust policies of the Bush 
administration.177  These appointees faced pressure to forcefully respond 
to the Carcieri decision, which Indian country viewed as devastating and 
wrongfully decided.  It quickly became evident in the aftermath of 
Carcieri that a quick fix (either legislative or administrative) was unlikely, 
leading one commentator to later describe the decision as an “albatross” 
around the neck of the Obama administration.178  
Three days after the Supreme Court decided Carcieri, Interior 
Secretary Ken Salazar expressed his “disappoint[ment],” and committed 
to “supporting the ability of all federally recognized tribes to have lands 
acquired in trust.”179  Two weeks later, by memorandum dated March 12, 
2009, George Skibine, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and 
Economic Development, issued a memorandum to all BIA Regional 
Directors (“Skibine Memorandum”) regarding the application of Carcieri 
to pending fee-to-trust acquisitions.180  The Skibine Memorandum 
established four classes of tribes: (1) those that were unquestionably under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934; (2) those with land acquisition authority not 
derived from Section 5 of the IRA; (3) those with “an organizational 
history that raises any questions about whether they were under Federal 
jurisdiction in 1934”; and (4) those who were federally acknowledged, 
restored, or reaffirmed after June 1934.181  While applications for fee-to-
                                                           
larry-echo-hawk-assistant-secretary-indian-affairs).  Solicitor Hilary Tompkins, the 
first Native American Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, was confirmed on 
June 18, 2009.  ABQ Journal News Staff, U.S. Senate Confirms Tompkins for Interior 
Post, ABQ JOURNAL, June 18, 2009, https://www.abqjournal.com/17449/u-s-senate-
confirms-tompkins-for-interior-post.html. 
177.  See e.g. National Congress of American Indians Resolution #PHX-
08-008, Fee to Trust Land Acquisitions (Oct. 19–24, 2008).  
178.  Loretta Tuell, The Obama Administration and Indian Law – A 
Pledge to Build a Nation-to-Nation Relationship, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Apr. 2016, 
at 46.  
179.  Department of the Interior Statement on Carcieri Court Decision, 
DOI (Feb. 27, 2009), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 
2009_02_27_release.   
180.  Mem. from George Skibine to Reg. Dirs., Application of the Holding 
in Carcieri v. Salazar to Pending Requests to Acquire Land-in-Trust (Mar. 12, 2009), 
https://www.standupca.org/gaming-law/land-acquisitions/ 
March%202%2C%202009%20Memo%20to%20Regional%20Directors%20Carcieri
%20v.%20Salazar.pdf/view [hereinafter Skibine memo].  
181.  Id. at 2.  
 
 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 40 
   
 
72 
trust acquisitions from the first two groups could continue to be processed, 
the BIA was directed to seek advice from the Solicitor’s Office for 
applications from the latter two groups.182   
The Skibine Memorandum did not define “under federal 
jurisdiction” or explain how the Supreme Court’s holding should be 
applied, other than to note that the 1947 report, Ten Years of Tribal 
Government under the Indian Reorganization Act by Theodore H. Haas 
(“the Haas list”), would be “helpful as a starting point.”183  The Haas list 
identifies, inter alia, most of those tribes that held Section 18 elections 
under the Secretary in the years following the IRA’s enactment and voted 
to accept or reject the IRA.184  The Skibine Memorandum also requested 
information about tribes and trust acquisitions from the regional BIA 
offices, aiming “to identify tribes that may be impacted by the Carcieri 
decision.”185  Although tribes initially expressed concern that Interior 
might use information collected under the Skibine Memorandum to 
compile a list of tribes who were or were not under federal jurisdiction, 
Interior later clarified that it did not intend to prepare a list.186  At 
congressional hearings, Interior officials explained that all tribes were 
affected by Carcieri because the Department must issue a Carcieri 
determination for any tribe seeking land-into-trust under the first 
definition of “Indian” in the IRA.187 
Interior also held three tribal consultation sessions to receive tribal 
input on how Interior should respond to the Carcieri decision.188  At the 
                                                           
182.  Id.  
183.  Id.   
184.  Theodore H. Haas, Ten Years of Tribal Government Under I.R.A., 
U.S. INDIAN SERVICE, Table A (1947), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/ 
migrated/library/internet/subject/upload/Haas-TenYears.pdf [hereinafter Haas list].   
185.  Skibine memo, supra note 180, at 1.  
186.  Carcieri Tribal Consultation, Arlington Session Transcripts, BIA 
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR 15 (July 8, 2009), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-
ia/consultations/tribal-consultations-archive [hereinafter Arlington Consultation]. 
187.  See, e.g., Carcieri: Bringing Certainty to Trust Land Acquisitions: 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 13 (Nov. 30, 2013) 
(responses of Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs Kevin K. Washburn to questions).  
188.  Letter from Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs Larry EchoHawk to 
Tribal Leaders (June 9, 2009), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/sites/bia.gov/ 
files/as-ia/consultation/idc002746.pdf.  The Director of the Office of Indian Gaming 
also attended a Carcieri strategy session with the United South and Eastern Tribes 
(“USET”) on May 12, 2009. Carcieri v. Salazar United South and Eastern Tribes 
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consultation sessions, Interior requested tribal perspective on possible 
legislation to respond to Carcieri as well as input on whether Interior 
should amend its fee-to-trust regulations to define “under federal 
jurisdiction.”189  Although there was consensus that immediate action 
needed to be taken to address Carcieri, tribes had differing views on what 
that action should look like.190  Some tribes expressed concern that 
regulatory changes would lead to litigation and preferred a legislative 
approach,191 whereas other tribes expressed concerns that Congress would 
be unable to enact legislation and supported Interior taking regulatory 
action.192  Other tribes supported both routes.193  Several tribes argued 
Interior should take the position that all federally recognized tribes were 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, or otherwise respond to Carcieri in a 
manner that would indiscriminately permit trust acquisitions for all 
tribes.194  In response to questions about whether the land-into-trust 
process had stalled because of Carcieri, Interior officials explained that 
Interior was continuing to move forward with land-into-trust but was also 
taking a hard look at how to respond to Carcieri.195  
                                                           
Strategy Meeting, Session Summary, BIA (MAY 12, 2009), 
https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc-001875.pdf.  
The President of USET argued that Interior should interpret “under federal 
jurisdiction” to include all federally recognized tribes.  Id. at 1.  
189.  BIA, Carcieri Tribal Consultation Informational Powerpoint, U.S. 
DEP’T OF INTERIOR (JUNE 9, 2009), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/ 
files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc-002458.pdf.  
190.  See, e.g, Carcieri v. Salazar Tribal Consultation Session Summary, 
Bloomington, Minnesota, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (June 29, 2009) [hereinafter 
Bloomington Consultation]; Carcieri v. Salazar Tribal Consultation Session 
Summary, Sacramento, California, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (July 1, 2009) [hereinafter 
Sacramento Consultation]; Arlington Consultation, supra note 186 (all available at 
https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/consultations/tribal-consultations-archive).  
191.  Bloomington Consultation, supra note 190, at 3, 7; Sacramento 
Consultation, supra note 190, at 8; Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 25–26, 
66. 
192.  Bloomington Consultation, supra note 190, at 2, 5.  
193.  Sacramento Consultation, supra note 192, at 5, 6, 8–9; Arlington 
Consultation, supra note 186, at 70, 116.  
194.  Bloomington Consultation, supra note 190, at 5, 6; Sacramento 
Consultation, supra note 190, at 5, 6, 10; Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 
41, 73. 
195.  Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 62.  
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 In addition to answering the question of how to address Carcieri 
in fee-to-trust applications going forward, Interior also addressed Carcieri 
challenges to prior secretarial decisions.  As a result of the Supreme 
Court’s grant of certiorari in Carcieri, David Patchak, who resided close 
to property held in trust and used for gaming purposes by the Gun Lake 
Band, challenged Interior’s authority to acquire land in trust for the 
Band.196  The crux of his argument was that the Gun Lake Band was not 
federally recognized in 1934; therefore, Interior lacked authority to 
acquire land in trust for the Band.197  At the Carcieri consultations, Interior 
committed to forcefully defend against the challenge under the QTA198 as 
well as any challenges to the status of land already held in trust.199  
However, questions remained about whether Interior would be 
successful.200 
 Following the consultations, Interior weighed several options for 
responding to Carcieri in future fee-to-trust applications.  In a letter to 
Senator Bryon Dorgan, Interior announced its support for Dorgan’s 
proposed clean Carcieri fix in Congress, which would clarify the 
Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust for all federally recognized 
tribes without making other changes to the land-into-trust process or any 
                                                           
196.  Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d 
and remanded, 632 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and rehearing en banc denied (Mar. 
28, 2011), aff’d sub nom Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 
(2012).  Patchak’s lawsuit ultimately led Congress to enact the Gun Lake Act, 
discussed supra § III(a)(2).  
197.  Patchak, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 75.   
198.  28 U.S.C. § 2409a.  With limited exception, the QTA waives the 
United States’ sovereign immunity from a suit by a plaintiff asserting an interest in 
real property that conflicts with an interest claimed by the United States.  Id.  § 
2409a(d).  The waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply, however, to “trust or 
restricted Indian lands.” Id. § 2409a(a). The United States argued that all challenges 
to the United States’ title in trust or restricted land were therefore barred by the QTA’s 
Indian lands exception. E.g., Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees (Initial Brief) 
at 23–24, Patchak, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5324). 
199.  In fact, other litigation had sprung up—a citizens’ group in 
California challenged a decades old trust acquisition for the Jamul Indian Village of 
California on Carcieri grounds.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13–14, Rosales v. 
U.S., 89 Fed. Cl. 565 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (No. 10-5028) (arguing that the United States 
did not hold land in trust for the JIV it acquired decades earlier because the Tribe was 
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934).   
200.  Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 28–29, 64. 
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other statutory or regulatory schemes.201  The President and Interior 
maintained support for a clean fix throughout the remainder of the Obama 
administration; for example, the fix was included annually in the 
President’s budget requests beginning in fiscal year 2012.202   
 Other actions proved more difficult.  Regarding the administrative 
fix debated at the consultations, questions arose about whether it would be 
best accomplished through changes to the fee-to-trust regulations at Part 
151; a new stand-alone regulation defining “Indian” under the IRA; 
changes to the acknowledgment regulations; and/or a Solicitor’s 
Opinion.203  To this day, Interior has not promulgated any regulations 
addressing Carcieri, although it has set forth a Solicitor’s Opinion, as 
detailed in Section III(b)(ii).  
Even more problematic for Interior was how to define “under 
federal jurisdiction.”  At the consultations, tribes argued that based on the 
plenary power of the federal government in Indian affairs, “under federal 
jurisdiction” should mean all federally recognized tribes.204  This “plenary 
power” argument was advanced in a submission provided by the Cowlitz 
Indian Tribe (“Cowlitz” or “Cowlitz Tribe”)205 to Interior in support of the 
                                                           
201.  Letters from Secretary Ken Salazar, U.S. Sec’y of Interior, to the 
Hon. Bryon Dorgan (Oct. 23, 2009 and July 30, 2010) (included in S. REP. NO. 111-
247, 111th Cong., 12–13 (2010)).  
202.  Lack of Adequate Standards Hearing, supra note 54 (statement of 
Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs). 
203.  E.g., Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 59; see also Howard 
L. Highland, A Regulatory Quick Fix for Carcieri, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 933 (Fall 2011) 
(arguing that Interior could “fix” the Carcieri problem, at least for tribes 
acknowledged pursuant to Part 83, by asserting its authority under 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 
9).   
204.  E.g., Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, Comments of Randy 
Noka on behalf of NCAI, at 41.  As explained by the Supreme Court, “the Constitution 
grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers 
that [the Supreme Court has] consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”  
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).   
205.  In the interest of consistency, throughout this Article we cite to tribal 
names as they appear on the List of Federally Recognized Tribes currently published 
in the Federal Register.  84 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019).  In some instances, a tribe 
has changed its name since the tribe first submitted its fee-to-trust application, and 
Interior and court decisions may refer to a tribe by another name.   
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Tribe’s fee-to-trust application.206  As explained by Cowlitz, the 
Constitution “endows the United States Congress with plenary authority—
i.e., plenary legal jurisdiction—over all Indian tribes.”207  Cowlitz relied 
on the Webster’s Dictionary definition of “jurisdiction” from 1934, which 
defined jurisdiction as the “authority of a sovereign power to govern or 
legislat[e]; power or right to exercise authority; control.”208  Cowlitz 
further reasoned that “Congress’ jurisdiction over Indian tribes, is, as a 
legal matter, continuous and uninterruptable unless the tribe itself ceases 
to exist.”209  The failure or “disinclination” of Congress to exercise 
jurisdiction over a tribe did not “diminish the continued existence of that 
legal authority.”210  Applying this argument, by virtue of Congress’ 
plenary power over them, all tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934; 
therefore, all tribes are eligible for trust land acquisition.   
In July 2009, Interior announced that responding to Carcieri was 
its top priority; however, the Department could not commit to a timeframe 
for a fix, though it was looking at different interpretations of “under federal 
jurisdiction” in 1934.211  For the first year and a half after Carcieri was 
decided, Interior took no formal administrative action on Carcieri and 
declined to promulgate regulations, issue a Secretarial Order, or issue a 
Solicitor’s Memorandum Opinion (these Memorandum Opinions are often 
referred to as M-Opinions).212  Frustrated with the pace of Interior’s 
response, in June 2010, the NCAI enacted a resolution describing 
Interior’s inaction on Carcieri and fee-to-trust as “a failure of the trust 
obligation to take such lands into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes 
                                                           
206.  Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Fee-to-Trust Application and Reservation 
Proclamation Request Supplemental Submission on Carcieri’s “Under Federal 
Jurisdiction” Requirement, at 1 (June 18, 2009), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress. 
com/2009/11/cowlitz-carcieri-submission.pdf.   
207.  Id. at 11.  
208.  Id.   
209.  Id. at 13.   
210.  Id. at 14.  
211.  Arlington Consultation, supra note 186, at 74–75.   
212.  Departmental Manual, 209 D.M. 3.2(A)(11) (U.S. Dep’t of Interior 
March 16, 1992). An “M-Opinion” constitutes “final legal interpretations . . . on all 
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, which shall be binding, when 
signed, on all other Departmental offices and officials and which may be overruled or 
modified only by the Solicitor, the Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary.”  Id.   
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across the United States.”213  Six months later, Interior issued its landmark 
Cowlitz decision, in which it set forth its two-part test for determining 
whether a tribe was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. 
 
1. The Cowlitz Two-Part Framework 
 
On December 17, 2010, the Department issued a Record of 
Decision (“ROD”) accepting into trust nine land parcels amounting to 
roughly 152 acres for the Cowlitz Tribe.214  This decision marked the first 
test of Carcieri’s impact on recently recognized tribes.  The Cowlitz Tribe, 
which was formally recognized in 2002 through the Department’s 
acknowledgment process in 25 C.F.R. Part 83,215 held no land base.  It 
sought the trust acquisition to establish an initial reservation and develop 
housing, tribal government buildings, a wastewater treatment facility, a 
cultural center, and a casino resort.216  The Department determined that the 
Cowlitz Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and, therefore, 
eligible for trust acquisition.217  The ROD was subsequently litigated and 
remanded to the Department because of gaming-related issues.218  On 
                                                           
213.  Calling on the Secretary of Interior to Follow Through on His 
Commitment to Acquire Land into Trust, NCAI Resolution #RAP-10-016 (June 20–
23, 2010), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_ 
lnuZCDWPilZXamRndgbgRkSRNOTGgQVEvSpcZUeVsGNbdFzRnaP_RAP-10-
016_amended.pdf.  
214.  Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87-
acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Rec. 
of Decision, (BIA Dec. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Cowlitz ROD], 
http://cowlitzeis.com/documents/decision_package/section_1.pdf.   
215.  In order to obtain federal acknowledgement, the Cowlitz Tribe had 
to demonstrate that it existed as an Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis 
since at least 1878–80, and otherwise satisfy the criteria in 25 C.F.R. Part 83.  See 
Confed. Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 394 (D.D.C. 
2014).  The acknowledgment regulations at Part 83 have since been revised.  See BIA, 
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37861 (July 1, 2015). 
216.  Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87-
acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, Rec. 
of Decision (BIA Apr. 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Cowlitz ROD], 
http://www.cowlitzeis.com/documents/record_of_decision_2013.pdf. 
217.  2010 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 214, at 77–103. 
218.  Confed. Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Salazar, Nos. 11-384 & 
11-378, 2012 WL 3757655 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2013).   
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April 22, 2013, the Department issued a new ROD on remand.219  The 
Carcieri analysis is substantially the same in the 2010 and 2013 RODs.   
The Department’s 2013 ROD devoted 28 pages to analyzing the 
impact of Carcieri on the Department’s IRA Section 5 authority and the 
Department’s ability to use this authority to acquire trust land for the 
Cowlitz Tribe.220  It began by considering Carcieri’s holding that the 
Department may only acquire trust land for tribes that were “under federal 
jurisdiction” in 1934.  The Department found that the Court had not 
defined or explained the phrase “under federal jurisdiction.”221  Therefore, 
it was left to the Department to determine whether the phrase had a plain 
meaning.  After considering at length the IRA’s legislative history, text, 
and implementation, as well as relevant dictionary definitions and 
fundamental principles of federal Indian law, the Department concluded 
there was no plain meaning of “under federal jurisdiction.”222 
Relying on these same sources, the Department interpreted the 
phrase as requiring a two-part inquiry.223  First, the Department examined 
“whether there is a sufficient showing in the tribe’s history” that the tribe 
was under federal jurisdiction in or prior to 1934.224  In other words, the 
Department considered evidence demonstrating the United States had, in 
1934 or earlier, “taken an action or series of actions—through a course of 
dealings or other relevant acts for or on behalf of the tribe or in some 
instances tribal members—that are sufficient to establish or generally 
                                                           
219.  2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 1. 
220.  Id. at 78–106. 
221.  Id. at 82–83. 
222.  Id. at 84–94. See id. at 90 (supporting the lack of an unambiguous or 
global understanding of which tribes are “under federal jurisdiction” by quoting a 
1980 Solicitor’s Office opinion that found “it is very clear from the early 
administration of the [IRA] that there was no established list of ‘recognized tribes now 
under [f]ederal jurisdiction’ in existence in 1934 and that determinations would have 
to be made on a case by case basis for a large number of Indian groups”). 
223. 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 94.  The Cowlitz Tribe and 
other parties had argued that all tribes are under federal jurisdiction as a matter of law 
pursuant to Congress’ Constitutional plenary power, and therefore no further inquiry 
is necessary.  Id. at 96–97.  However, the Department found that relying exclusively 
on the plenary power doctrine would be at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Carcieri; accordingly, the Department determined there must be a further showing 
that the federal government actually exercised its jurisdiction over the particular tribe.  
Id. at 97 (emphasis added). 
224.  Id. at 94. 
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reflect federal obligations, duties, responsibility for, or authority over the 
tribe by the Federal Government.”225  The Department noted that certain 
types of federal actions standing alone may conclusively demonstrate 
federal jurisdiction status, whereas other types of actions, viewed together, 
sufficiently show that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction.226 
The second prong of the inquiry required the Department to 
“ascertain whether a tribe’s jurisdictional status remained intact in 
1934.”227  The Department found this may be illustrated by circumstantial 
evidence.228  The Department noted that the absence of federal actions 
towards a particular tribe during this period did not necessarily reflect the 
loss or termination of federal jurisdiction.229  Further, the Department 
noted that the “lack of probative evidence that the tribe’s jurisdictional 
status was terminated or lost prior to 1934” strongly indicated that 
jurisdiction remained intact.230  As a general evidentiary note, the 
Department found that the “extensive factual and historical record 
developed . . . as part of the [Federal Acknowledgment process] 
establishes significant factual underpinnings relevant to th[e] 
determination” of whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.231  
As applied to the Cowlitz Tribe, the Department found the first 
prong was satisfied by evidence of the federal government’s unsuccessful 
treaty negotiations with one of the Cowlitz’s predecessor bands in the 
1850s and 1860s.232  The Department determined this was clear indicia of 
a government-to-government relationship, which was further buttressed 
by evidence of federal actions to distribute goods to Cowlitz members, 
enumerate tribal members on the local superintendent’s annual census, and 
provide educational and medical services to tribal members.233 
                                                           
225.  Id. at 94–95. 
226.  Id. at 95. 
227.  Id.  
228.  Id.  
229.  Id.  
230.  Id.  
231.  Id. at 79. 
232.  Id. at 97–98. 
233.  Id. at 98–99.  Additionally, federal officials had considered whether 
to authorize special legislation for the Cowlitz Tribe that would allow it to bring a land 
claim against the United States.  Id. at 100.  Although this legislation was never 
enacted, the Tribe later successfully brought suit before the Indian Land Claims 
Commission.  Id. 
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The Department then applied the second prong of the test and 
determined that the federal provision of goods and services to the Cowlitz 
Indians continued in the 1930s, thereby supporting the conclusion that the 
Tribe remained under federal jurisdiction in 1934.234  These actions 
included the attendance of Cowlitz children at BIA schools; authorization 
of federal expenditures for health services, funeral expenses, and store 
goods for tribal members; enumeration of tribal members on various types 
of BIA censuses; and granting of allotments to tribal members.235  The BIA 
also approved an attorney contract for the Cowlitz Tribe in 1932, which 
was close in time to the IRA’s enactment.236  
Taking all the historical evidence into consideration, including the 
lack of clear evidence that federal jurisdiction was terminated, the 
Department found the Cowlitz Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 
1934.237  As a result, the Department determined it had authority pursuant 
to the IRA to accept the parcels into trust.238  As discussed in Section IV 
below, the 2013 ROD and the two-part Carcieri framework were 
immediately challenged in federal court.   
 
2. Institutionalization of the Two-Part Framework in M-37029 
  
Following development and application of the two-part Carcieri 
framework to Cowlitz, the Department issued a formal Carcieri M-
Opinion in 2014.239  The M-Opinion set forth the Department’s legal 
authority to acquire land in trust following the Carcieri decision.  Building 
on its analysis in the Cowlitz fee-to-trust decision, the M-Opinion 
thoroughly examined the Carcieri holding, the remaining ambiguity as to 
                                                           
234.  2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 99–103.  See also id. at 99 
n.115 (acknowledging the potential argument that federal actions toward individual 
Indians does not sufficiently demonstrate federal jurisdiction over the tribe, and 
rejecting it on the basis of the whole record, which included federal actions vis a vis 
the Cowlitz Tribe, as well as on the basis of the federal acknowledgment decision 
which found that the Tribe had continuously existed since at least 1855). 
235.  Id. at 99–103. 
236.  Id. at 103. 
237.  Id. at 106. The Department also expressly considered, and rejected, 
arguments raised by third parties contesting the Tribe’s jurisdictional status.  See id. 
at 103–106.  
238.  2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 106. 
239.  Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56.   
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the meaning of “under federal jurisdiction,” and the necessary backdrop 
of both federal Indian law and principles of judicial deference to agency 
interpretations.240  Importantly, the M-Opinion institutionalized the two-
prong test adopted in Cowlitz, wherein the Department must determine: 
(1) whether there is a sufficient showing in a tribe’s history that during or 
prior to 1934, the tribe was under federal jurisdiction; and (2) whether the 
tribe’s jurisdictional status remained intact in 1934.241   
The M-Opinion constitutes an essential resource for an Indian law 
attorney with a fee-to-trust practice.  Because the M-Opinion is 
comprehensive, this Article will only highlight the most critical aspects.  
First, the M-Opinion fleshed out the types of evidence relevant to or 
determinative of federal jurisdiction but did not provide an exhaustive list.  
Relevant evidence includes: “the negotiation of and/or entering into 
treaties; the approval of contracts between a tribe and non-Indians; 
enforcement of the Trade and Intercourse Acts (Indian trader, liquor laws, 
and land transactions); education of Indian children at BIA schools; and 
the provision of health or social services to a tribe.”242  Evidence is 
considered on a case-by-case basis.243 The M-Opinion also determined that 
tribes who voted on whether to opt out of the IRA in the years immediately 
following the IRA generally need not make an additional showing of 
federal jurisdiction.244  This remains true regardless of how the tribe voted, 
because the holding of the election itself is clear contemporaneous 
evidence that the federal government found the underlying tribe met the 
IRA’s definition of “Indian” and was therefore subject to the Act’s 
provisions.245  
The M-Opinion also elucidated the second prong of the test—
whether jurisdiction remained intact in 1934—by explaining that federal 
jurisdiction may, during certain periods, exist but lie dormant.246  Further, 
“evidence of executive officials disavowing federal responsibility in 
certain instances cannot, in and of itself, terminate federal jurisdiction 
                                                           
240.  See generally id.  
241.  Id. at 19. 
242.  Id. at 19. 
243.  Id. at 23.   
244. Id. at 20 (discussing IRA Section 18, which allowed reservation 
Indians to vote on whether to opt out of the Act). 
245.  Id. at 21. 
246.  Id. 
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without express congressional action.”247  This latter point highlights the 
importance of Congress’ plenary power over Indian tribes, a foundational 
legal principle the M-Opinion explained should be considered in all 
determinations of federal jurisdiction.248 However, the M-Opinion again 
rejected the argument that plenary power and federal jurisdiction (as 
understood by the Carcieri Court) are coterminous, and instead found that 
Carcieri demands the actual exercise of federal jurisdiction over a tribe.249   
The Carcieri M-Opinion also clearly differentiated federal 
recognition from federal jurisdiction.250  While the Carcieri Court held 
that, pursuant to the first definition of Indian in the IRA, a tribe must have 
been “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, the Department rejected the 
argument that Carcieri similarly imposed a temporal requirement on when 
a tribe is formally recognized.251  Relying on Justice Breyer’s concurring 
opinion, the M-Opinion found the IRA “imposes no time limit on 
recognition,” and “a tribe may have been ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in 
1934 even though the Federal Government did not realize it at the time.”252 
Moreover, the M-Opinion explained that untethering formal 
federal recognition from 1934 jurisdiction is reasonable in light of the 
evolving concept of federal recognition and the practical realities at the 
time of the IRA.  The M-Opinion found the term “recognized Indian tribe” 
has historically been used in various ways, including the cognitive or 
quasi-anthropological sense (which is the sense reflected in the IRA’s 
                                                           
247.  Id. 
248.  Id. at 12–16. 
249.  Id. at 18 (“I believe that the Supreme Court's ruling in Carcieri 
counsels the Department to point to some indication that in 1934 the tribe in question 
was under federal jurisdiction.  Having indicia of federal jurisdiction beyond the 
general principle of plenary authority demonstrates the federal government's exercise 
of responsibility for and obligation to an Indian tribe and its members in 1934.”). 
250.  See 2013 Cowlitz ROD, supra note 216, at 87-89. The Carcieri M-
Opinion elaborated on analysis that contrasted federal recognition with federal 
recognition in the Cowlitz decision.   
251.  See 25 U.S.C. § 5129; Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56, at 24.  
The full statutory definition of “Indian” that was at issue in Carcieri covers “persons 
of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction.”   
252.  Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56, at 24 (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). 
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legislative history) as well as the legal or political sense.253  It further 
explained that the process for obtaining such political recognition has 
evolved substantially over the course of the United States’ dealings with 
tribes.254  Presently, recognition or “federal acknowledgment” is typically 
attained through a formal departmental process, established in 1978 and 
codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 83.255  Yet this formal acknowledgment process 
did not exist in 1934 when the IRA was enacted, and historically, political 
recognition of a tribe occurred on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis.256 So, 
contrary to what one might assume, in 1934 there was no common 
understanding of the term “recognized Indian tribe,” no list of recognized 
Indian tribes, and no single, formal process for becoming a recognized 
Indian tribe.  However, it is important to note, as the M-Opinion does, that 
evidence submitted during the modern Part 83 acknowledgment process 
“may be highly relevant and may be relied on to demonstrate that a tribe 
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.”257 
The Carcieri M-Opinion provides the legal foundation for most 
fee-to-trust acquisitions.  Nonetheless, the Department has at different 
times employed alternative legal bases to support trust acquisition 
decisions. 
 
3. Alternative Approaches 
 
As an alternative to undertaking the often highly laborious, fact-
intensive inquiry into whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 
1934, the Department has also used other statutory authorities to effectuate 
trust land acquisitions.  This approach was sanctioned by the Carcieri 
Court, which noted that “[i]n other statutory provisions, Congress chose 
to expand the Secretary’s authority to particular tribes not necessarily 
encompassed within the definitions of ‘Indian’ set forth in [Section 
                                                           
253.  Id. (describing the cognitive sense as one by which federal officials 
simply knew or assumed that an entity constituted by an Indian tribe and the political 
sense as one by which an Indian tribe is recognized as a governmental entity holding 
a political relationship with the United States government).   
254.  Id. at 24–25. 
255.  Id.  Congress may also acknowledge tribes via specialized 
legislation, however this mechanism for recognition is rare. 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. at 25. 
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19].”258  Alternative authorities relied upon by the Department include the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, tribe-specific legislation, the Alaska IRA, 
and other definitions of “Indian” contained within Section 19 of the IRA. 
 
a. Authority Pursuant to the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act 
 
In 2011 and 2012, the Department issued two decisions to acquire 
trust lands in Oklahoma for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee 
Indians in Oklahoma (“UKB”) tribal corporation pursuant to the 
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (“OIWA”).259  Historically, the UKB was 
considered a cultural society within the Cherokee Nation aimed at 
preserving Indian traditions.  Congress formally recognized the UKB as a 
separate tribe in 1946 via special legislation.260  Following its recognition, 
the UKB formed a tribal corporation pursuant to Section 3 of the OIWA, 
which authorizes the formal organization of tribal corporations in 
Oklahoma and allows such tribal corporations to “enjoy any other rights 
or privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe under the [IRA].”261  The 
UKB then sought to place lands in trust where its community services 
center was located and where it operated a casino.262 
Both decisions relied on the OIWA to establish the Department’s 
authority to acquire trust land.  The Department determined that its land 
acquisition authority was derived from OIWA Section 3, extending the 
benefits and privileges of the IRA to Oklahoma tribal corporations, 
thereby implicitly authorizing the Department to acquire trust land for the 
                                                           
258.  Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 392 (2009). 
259.  See Trust Acquisition of Community Services Parcel, Decision Letter 
(BIA May 24, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 UKB Decision]; Trust Acquisition of 
Keetoowah Casino Property for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Tribe, 
Decision Letter (BIA July 30, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 UKB Decision], 
https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Docs/2012/7/6486_UKB30July2012.pdf. 
260.  2012 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 2. 
261.  See id. at 2; 25 U.S.C. § 5203. The UKB corporate charter, approved 
by the Secretary, expressly set out the tribal corporation’s right to acquire land for the 
Band. See Corporate Charter of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 
Oklahoma, sections 1(b), 3(r) (ratified Oct. 3, 1950), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/american-indian-consts/PDF/51061613.pdf. 
262.  See 2011 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 1; 2012 UKB Decision, 
supra note 259, at 1–2. 
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UKB corporation.263 Moreover, the Department found Carcieri 
inapplicable to the exercise of IRA benefits by these Oklahoma tribes 
because Carcieri’s limitations attach only to the IRA’s definition of 
“Indian,” whereas tribes organized under the OIWA are separately defined 
under its statutory scheme.264 Accordingly, the Department did not analyze 
whether the UKB were under federal jurisdiction in 1934 pursuant to 
Carcieri.265 
 
b. Authority Pursuant to Specialized Legislation 
 
The Department invoked alternative legal authority when 
acquiring trust lands for the Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, this time relying 
on specialized legislation.  On January 19, 2018, the Department issued its 
decision to acquire in trust 102.98 acres of land in Texas County, 
Oklahoma for the Shawnee Tribe.266  The Shawnee Tribe originally 
resided in Pennsylvania but, following several rounds of forced removal, 
ultimately settled in Oklahoma.267  Although the Shawnee historically 
constituted a distinct tribal entity, the federal government imposed the 
Tribe’s integration into the Cherokee Nation following the Civil War.268  
It was not until 2000 that Congress formally recognized the Shawnee Tribe 
again, as a separate and independent tribal government pursuant to the 
                                                           
263.  2011 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 4; 2012 UKB Decision, supra 
note 259, at 6. 
264.  See 2011 UKB Decision, supra note 259, at 4. The 2011 UKB 
Decision only alludes to this argument, which was later fleshed out in more detail in 
the Federal Government’s brief before the 10th Circuit. See Opening Brief for Federal 
Appellants at 25–27,  Cherokee Nation v. Zinke, 2017 WL 6017500 (10th Cir. Dec. 
1, 2017) (No. 17-7044) (arguing that the District Court “mistakenly conflates the 
IRA’s benefits—‘rights or privileges’ that the OIWA extended to Oklahoma tribes 
regardless whether those tribes are ‘necessarily encompassed within’ the IRA’s 
definitions of ‘Indian,’ Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 392—with the IRA’s beneficiaries, 
namely, any ‘Indian’ as defined under the IRA”) (emphasis in original). 
265.  Both decisions were subsequently challenged in federal district 
court. See infra Section IV(a)(vii). 
266. Trust Acquisition of 102.98 acres in Texas County, Oklahoma for the 
Shawnee Tribe, Rec. of Decision (BIA Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 Shawnee 
Decision), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/ 
gaming-applications/2018.01.19%20Shawnee%20151%20Decision%20Signed.pdf. 
267.  Id. at 3. 
268.  Id. at 4. 
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Shawnee Tribe Status Act.269  The Act, in addition to restoring the Tribe’s 
recognition, expressly established the Tribe’s eligibility to acquire trust 
lands pursuant to Section 5 of the IRA and Section 1 of the OIWA.270 
In its 2018 fee-to-trust decision, the Department addressed its 
legal authority for the Shawnee land acquisition as required by 25 C.F.R. 
§ 151.10(a).271  It highlighted the Carcieri Court’s comment that “[i]n 
other statutory provisions, Congress chose to expand the Secretary’s 
authority to particular Indian tribes not necessarily encompassed within 
the definition of ‘Indian’ set forth” in the IRA.272  The Department cited 
the Shawnee Tribe Status Act as providing such authority, which 
eliminated the need for the Department to undertake a Carcieri analysis of 
whether the Shawnee Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.273 
 
c. Authority Pursuant to the IRA’s Other Definitions of “Indian” 
 
Beyond alternative statutory frameworks, the Department has also 
relied on multiple sources of authority contained within the IRA itself.  In 
September of 2015, the Department issued a decision to acquire two 
parcels of land into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (“Mashpee” 
or “Mashpee Tribe”) in Massachusetts.274  The Mashpee Tribe has a long 
recorded presence in southeastern Massachusetts, existing before 
European contact in the 1600s.275  Similar to the Narragansett Tribe of 
Rhode Island, the subject of the Carcieri litigation, the Mashpee were 
                                                           
269.  Id.  
270.  2018 Shawnee Decision, supra note 266, at 4 (citing Pub. L. 106-
568, Title VII, 114 Stat. 291 (2000) (amended by Pub. L. No. 109–159, 119 Stat. 1939 
(Aug. 10, 2005)). 
271.  Id. at 9. 
272. Id. at 12 (citing Section 7 of the Shawnee Tribe Status Act, which 
provides that “[t]he Tribe is eligible to have land acquired in trust pursuant to Section 
5 of the [IRA] and Section 1 of the [OIWA]”). 
273.  Id. 
274.  Trust Acquisition and Reservation Proclamation for 151 Acres in the 
City of Taunton, Massachusetts, and 170 Acres in the Town of Mashpee, 
Massachusetts, for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, Rec. of Decision (BIA Sept. 
2015) [hereinafter 2015 Mashpee ROD], 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/ public/oig/pdf/idc1-031724.pdf. 
275.  Id. at 62. 
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often left to the authority of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.276 
Although the federal government intermittently interacted with the Tribe 
and its members, it typically deferred to Massachusetts’ handling of Indian 
affairs.277  It was not until 2007 that the federal government formally 
recognized the Mashpee Tribe through the Part 83 acknowledgment 
process.278  Immediately following its acknowledgment, the Mashpee 
Tribe submitted an application for the Department to acquire in trust land 
in the Town of Mashpee for governmental services, cultural preservation, 
and housing, as well as land in the City of Taunton for a casino-resort.279 
Eight years later, the Department approved the Mashpee Tribe’s 
application. 
In contrast to the majority of the Department’s fee-to-trust 
decisions, the Mashpee decision relied exclusively upon the authority of 
the IRA’s second definition of Indian: “[A]ll persons who were 
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within 
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.”280  As the language 
indicates, the IRA’s applicability pursuant to this definition focuses on 
reservation residence in 1934, as opposed to membership in a tribe under 
federal jurisdiction (as contemplated by the first definition).  
Since Mashpee provided the first instance in which the 
Department relied primarily on the oft forgotten second definition, the 
Department undertook extensive analysis of the statutory language in its 
decision document.  It found the language ambiguous in several respects, 
including whether the term “such members” incorporated, by reference, 
the entire first definition of “Indian” and, consequently, the Carcieri 
limitations.281  To clarify these ambiguities, the Department considered the 
                                                           
276.  See, e.g., id. at 117–119. 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id. at 4. 
279.  Id. 
280.  See id. at 80–120. As detailed supra, Section II, the Carcieri decision 
addressed the first definition of Indian—“members of any recognized Indian tribe now 
under Federal jurisdiction”—and did not opine on the remaining categories of Indians 
set forth in § 19. See also Carcieri M-Opinion, supra note 56, at 4. 
281.  2015 Mashpee ROD, supra note 274, at 80-81. Other points of 
ambiguity identified by the Department include: whether the second definition applies 
only to individuals or also to tribes; what constitutes a “reservation”; whether “present 
boundaries” refers to boundaries as of 1934 or at the time of the Act’s application; and 
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IRA’s purpose, legislative history, implementation, and other tools of 
statutory construction.282  The Department ultimately concluded that “such 
members” incorporates only “members of recognized Indian tribes” in 
1934 and not the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” as interpreted 
by Carcieri.283  Accordingly, the Department held that it need not 
determine whether the Mashpee Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 
1934 for purposes of satisfying the second definition of Indian.284  Rather, 
the test was whether the Mashpee Tribe consists of “descendants of 
members of a recognized Indian tribe who maintained residence within the 
boundaries of an Indian reservation as of June 1, 1934.”285  After 
thoroughly reviewing the historical evidence, the Department concluded 
that Mashpee satisfied this definition, and therefore, the Department had 
authority under the IRA to acquire the trust lands.286 
As described later in this Article, the Department’s 2015 decision 
for Mashpee was successfully challenged in federal district court on 
several grounds, including the Department’s statutory interpretation of the 
second definition of “Indian.”287  
 
d. Authority Pursuant to IRA Section 13 
 
The Department has also relied on Section 13 of the IRA as 
statutory authority for trust acquisitions on behalf of certain Oklahoma 
tribes.  In Section 13, Congress excluded the application of certain IRA 
provisions to 29 tribes in Oklahoma.288  In a recent fee-to-trust decision 
                                                           
whether the 1934 residency requirement attaches to “descendants” or to “members.” 
Id. at 81. 
282.  Id. at 81–92. 
283.  Id. at 93–95. Regarding the other statutory ambiguities, the 
Department concluded that: the second definition applied to both individuals and 
tribes; a “reservation” is land set aside of land for Indian use and occupation; “present 
boundaries” means as of 1934; and it need not determine whether the 1934 residency 
requirement attaches to “descendants” or “members,” because Mashpee satisfied 
either interpretation. Id. at 92–93, 95–100. 
284.  Id. at 93–95. 
285.  Id. at 101. 
286.  Id. at 120.  
287.  See Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D. 
Mass. 2016). 
288.  25 U.S.C. § 5118 (2018). 
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for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the Department concluded that since 
certain provisions of the IRA do not apply to Section 13 listed tribes, 
Congress intended the remaining provisions of the IRA, including Section 
5, to apply.289  Therefore, listing in Section 13 eliminates the need for any 
further analysis under Carcieri. 
 
e. Authority Pursuant to the Alaska IRA 
 
The history of native lands in Alaska is both complicated and 
singular.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the 
nuances of Alaskan native lands, a brief primer is necessary to understand 
the Department’s post-Carcieri approach to Alaska fee-to-trust.  
When the IRA was enacted in 1934, Congress excluded Alaska 
and other U.S. territories from the land acquisition authority set forth in 
Section 5.290   However, in 1936, Congress amended the IRA to explicitly 
extend Section 5 to Alaska, along with the authority to proclaim new 
Indian reservations in Alaska.291  Following Alaska’s entrance to statehood 
in 1958 and in response to mounting unresolved Alaskan native land 
claims, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
                                                           
289.  Trust Acquisition for The Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Decision Letter 
9 (BIA Apr. 30, 2018), [hereinafter Muscogee Decision], 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/gaming-applications/The 
Muscogee %28Creek%29 Nation, April 30, 2018, Trust Acquisition Decision 
Letter.pdf. 
290.  See Authority to Acquire Land into Trust in Alaska, Sol. Op. M-
37043 at 2 (Dep’t of Interior Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter M-37043] (citing IRA § 13 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5118 (2018)). Although certain provisions were made 
inapplicable to Alaska, the original IRA expressly included Alaskan natives within its 
general scope. See M-37043 at 2 (citing IRA § 19 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (2018) 
which includes “Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska” in the Act’s 
definition of “Indian”).  
291.  See id. at 4 (citing Act of May, 1936, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified 
at 25 U.S.C. § 5119 (2018)) (“Alaska IRA”); see also Land Acquisitions in the State 
of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888 and 76,889 (Dec. 23, 2014) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 
151.1(2018)). The Alaska IRA established two different authorities for designating 
Indian reservations in Alaska. First, it extended the IRA § 7 reservation proclamation 
provision to Alaska. Alaska IRA § 1. Second, it created a new authority to designate 
Indian reservations on various types of land reservations and public lands in Alaska. 
Alaska IRA § 2. 
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(“ANCSA”) in 1971.292  Through ANCSA, Congress extinguished all 
aboriginal land claims in Alaska in exchange for the transfer of $962.5 
million and 44 million acres of fee land to ANCSA native corporations.293  
Additionally, Congress revoked the existing reservation status of Alaska 
Indian reserves, with the exception of the Metlakatla Indian Community, 
Annette Island Reserve.294  Importantly, ANSCA did not explicitly repeal 
the applicability of IRA Section 5 to Alaska.295  Shortly thereafter, in 1976, 
Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”). FLPMA rescinded the Department’s authority to establish 
new Indian reservations in Alaska pursuant to Section 2 of the Alaska IRA 
but again did not repeal or amend the Department’s IRA Section 5 fee-to-
trust authority in Alaska.296 
Subsequently, the Department grappled with the lack of clarity 
concerning its fee-to-trust authority in Alaska.  Following internal 
deliberation and guidance from the Solicitor’s Office, the Department 
initially concluded that it lacked authority to utilize IRA Section 5 to 
acquire trust lands in Alaska.297  This position was embodied in the 
Department’s first set of fee-to-trust regulations, promulgated in 1980, and 
was known as the Alaska exception.298  Following litigation on the issue 
and full reconsideration of the law and policy governing fee-to-trust in 
Alaska, the Department promulgated a new rule in 2014, which eliminated 
                                                           
292.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 
688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2018)) (“ANCSA”). 
293.  M-37043, supra note 290, at 7 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1605, 
1607). 
294.  Id. at 7–8 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a)). ANSCA set forth a new 
policy promoting the rapid settlement of Native claims in Alaska “without creating a 
reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship.” 43 U.S.C.  § 1601(b). 
295.  See M-37043, supra note 290, at 8; Land Acquisitions in the State of 
Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76889. 
296.  M-37043, supra note 290, at 8 (citing Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 
2744 (1976)) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2018)). 
297.  Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76889; M-
37043, supra note 290 at 8 & n.64. 
298.  See Land Acquisitions, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,034, 62,036 (Sept. 18, 1980) 
(formerly codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.1). Although Alaska lands were generally 
excluded from the fee-to-trust process, the Department provided an exception for 
acquisitions on behalf of the Metlakatla Indian Community. Id.  
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the Alaska exception from the Part 151 regulations.299  The new rule was 
followed in 2017 by a Solicitor’s M-Opinion (“M-37043”) that supported 
the continued existence of the Department’s land acquisition authority in 
Alaska and determined that Carcieri does not apply to trust acquisitions in 
Alaska.300  Yet the change of presidential administration brought with it 
another pivot of the Department’s position on Alaska fee-to-trust.  On June 
29, 2018, the Solicitor’s Office issued M-37053, which withdrew M-
37043 and provided for a six-month notice-and-comment period followed 
by a six-month agency review period on “the Secretary’s exercise of his 
authority to take off-reservation land into trust in Alaska.”301  
Putting aside whether ANSCA, FLPMA, or other federal laws 
repeal or limit the authority of the Department to acquire trust land in 
Alaska, the Department’s interpretation of Carcieri’s impact on Alaska 
land acquisitions is an open question following M-37053.  M-37043 stated 
that Congress’ extension of the IRA to Alaska in 1936 provided 
independent specific authority for trust acquisitions for Alaskan tribes and, 
accordingly, Carcieri was inapplicable.302  This position was supported by 
the Carcieri decision itself, which noted that: “[i]n other statutory 
provisions, Congress chose to expand the Secretary’s authority to 
particular tribes not necessarily encompassed within the definitions of 
‘Indian’ set forth in [Section 19],” expressly citing the Alaska IRA as an 
                                                           
299.  See Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76,888 
(Dec. 23, 2014) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2018)); see also Akiachak Native 
Cmty. v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that ANSCA did not 
implicitly repeal the Department’s fee-to-trust authority in Alaska and the Alaska 
exception violates the anti-discrimination provision at 25 U.S.C. § 476(g) (now § 
5123), and ultimately vacating the Alaska exception from the Part 151 regulations), 
vacated on other grounds by Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 827 
F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
300.  See generally M-37043, supra note 290. 
301.  Letter from Principal Deputy Sol. to Sec’y, Assitant Sec’y, and Dir. 
BIA, Withdrawal of Solicitor Opinion M-37043, “Authority to Acquire Land into 
Trust in Alaska” Pending Review, M-37053 (June 29, 2018) 
https://edit.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37053.pdf [hereinafter M-37053]. 
The comment period closed on December 20, 2018. See BIA, Alaska IRA and Land-
into-Trust in Alaska, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/raca/regulations-
development-andor-under-review/alaska-ira-and-land-trust-alaska. 
302.  M-37043, supra note 290, at 9-12. 
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example.303  Additionally, the Department found that Carcieri does not 
impact the Department’s authority to acquire trust land for the other 
categories of Indians as set forth in IRA Section 19.  Section 19 separately 
and explicitly provides: “Eskimos and aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall 
be considered Indians.” The Department concluded that these groups need 
not also qualify as “recognized Indian tribes now under Federal 
jurisdiction,” as set forth in the first definition.304 
With the issuance of M-37053 and the reopening of the 
Department’s fee-to-trust authority in Alaska, it is unclear whether the 
Department will maintain its position that Carcieri does not limit or 
prohibit Alaska trust land acquisitions.  The outcome may depend, in part, 
on the comments the Department receives.  However, it is important to 
note that the Department’s rationale for withdrawing M-37043 concerned 
only the legal developments concerning ANCSA, FLPMA, and non-
Carcieri issues since the Alaska IRA.305  It did not directly question the 
validity of the Department’s position on Carcieri. 
 
V. THE LITIGATION AFTERMATH OF CARCIERI 
 
A. Administrative Procedure Act Challenges to Interior Fee-to-Trust 
Decisions 
 
Beginning with the original Cowlitz ROD in December 2010, 
local governments, tribes, citizens’ groups, and individuals have 
challenged Interior’s determinations that Carcieri does not limit its fee-to-
trust authority for particular tribes.  Fee-to-trust opponents have also 
challenged title to land acquired in trust before Carcieri was decided.  As 
predicted at the early congressional hearings, these lawsuits have not only 
challenged whether tribes were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, but also 
questioned tribes’ histories, membership, and even their existence.306   
                                                           
303.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379, 392 & n.6; see also M-37043, supra note 
290, at 10–12. 
304.  M-37043, supra note 290, at 12–20. 
305.  See generally M-37053, supra note 301. 
306.  Some of these lawsuits are brought by organizations, characterized 
by some as anti-Indian hate groups, whose underlying mission is to challenge the 
exercise of tribal sovereignty in any setting. See Anna V. Smith, Why Don’t Anti-
Indian Groups Count as Hate Groups? HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018). 
 
2019 ENOUGH IS ENOUGH  
 
93
Although the majority of Carcieri challenges have failed, 
plaintiffs continue to press the same claims.  Despite the continued success 
of tribes and the United States in defending determinations that tribes were 
under federal jurisdiction, the never-ending litigation has consumed 
limited tribal and federal resources.  These are resources that otherwise 
would be spent supporting tribal governments and providing vital services 
to tribal members.307  Unless Congress enacts a clean Carcieri fix, the 
lawsuits summarized below will continue for as long as Interior acquires 
land in trust for tribes.  
 
1. Cowlitz Indian Tribe 
 
Following Interior’s April 2013 fee-to-trust decision for Cowlitz, 
the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon 
(“Grand Ronde”), who operate a nearby casino, and a group of plaintiffs 
including Clark County, the City of Vancouver, a citizens’ group, 
cardrooms, and others, challenged the decision in federal district court, 
alleging negative impacts from the proposed casino.308  Plaintiffs argued 
that Interior’s two-part test violated the IRA, and that the Interior lacked 
authority to acquire land in trust for the Cowlitz because the tribe was 
neither “recognized” nor “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934.309  Plaintiffs 
also challenged Cowlitz’s recently expanded enrollment, arguing 
Interior’s failure to consider it voided the fee-to-trust decision.310  The 
district court rejected all of plaintiffs’ arguments and upheld Interior’s 
decision.311 
                                                           
307.  Lack of Adequate Standards Hearing, supra note 54 (statement of 
Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y, for Indian Affairs).  
308.  Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 75 F. 
Supp. 3d 387 (D.D.C. 2014). 
309.  Id. at 397, 402.  
310.  Id. at 408.  In addition, plaintiffs argued that the Secretary erred in 
determining that the parcel was eligible for gaming under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act’s “initial reservation” exception, and made several environmental 
challenges.  Id. at 409, 415.   
311.  Id. at 424.  Relevant to Carcieri, the court determined that “under 
federal jurisdiction” was ambiguous and thus Interior’s two-part test was entitled to 
deference under Chevron. Id. at 404.  The court also upheld Interior’s application of 
the two-part test to Cowlitz.  Id. at 406–08.   
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Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
and the court affirmed.312  The D.C. Circuit first rejected plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Supreme Court in Carcieri had “foreclosed any role” for 
Interior in interpreting the first definition of Indian.313  The court 
concluded that Carceri’s holding “reache[d] only the temporal limits of 
the Federal-jurisdiction prong,” and both “recognized” and “under federal 
jurisdiction” were ambiguous.314  Applying Chevron, the court held that 
the Secretary “reasonably interpreted and applied” the IRA in developing 
the two-part test and concluding that the Cowlitz were a “recognized tribe 
now under federal jurisdiction.”315  The court upheld Interior’s reliance on 
treaty negotiations and Interior’s actions in taking the Cowlitz’s land after 
failed treaty negotiations as evidence of federal jurisdiction over the 
Cowlitz.316  The D.C. Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) and tribal membership arguments.317   
The citizens’ group, Citizens Against Reservation Shopping 
(“Citizens”), as well as the cardrooms, filed a petition for certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court.318  In their petition, Citizens argued that, 
contrary to Interior’s interpretation, the first definition of Indian requires 
a tribe to have been “recognized” and “under federal jurisdiction” in 
1934.319  Citizens also argued, for the first time, that to be under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934, Cowlitz needed to reside in Indian country in 1934.320  
The United States, less than two months into the Trump administration, 
filed a brief opposing Citizens’ petition.321  The Supreme Court denied 
                                                           
312.  Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 
552 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
313.  Id. at 559.  
314.  Id. at 560, 564.  
315.  Id. at 556.  
316.  Id. at 565. 
317.  Id. at 568–570. 
318.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Citizens Against Reservation 
Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433 (2017) (No. 16-572).  Neither Clark County nor 
Grand Ronde filed a petition for certiorari.   
319.  Id. at 10.    
320.  Id. at 19.   
321.  Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, Citizens Against 
Reservation Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433 (2017) (No. 16-572). 
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Citizens’ petition,322 and the Cowlitz casino has been successful since 
opening.323   
 
2. Ione Band of Miwok Indians 
 
Interior’s two-part Carcieri framework was also the issue in 
litigation challenging a 2012 fee-to-trust decision for the Ione Band of 
Miwok Indians of California (“Ione” or “Ione Band”).  Ione is a successor 
in interest to the signatories of an unratified treaty between the United 
States and California Indians in the mid-1800s.324  In the early 1900s, the 
Ione occupied an approximately 40-acre tract in Amador County, 
California.325  Beginning in 1915, the United States sought to purchase the 
land for the Ione Band, but title issues prevented the purchase, leaving Ione 
without a permanent reservation.326  In 1972, the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs sent a letter to the Ione acknowledging it as an Indian tribe, 
directing the Regional Office to assist the Ione Band in efforts to organize, 
and agreeing to accept the 40 acres of land in trust.327  However, the 
acquisition was never completed,328 and Interior began to question whether 
Ione was, in fact, federally recognized.  In 1990, Interior argued in 
litigation that Ione was not a recognized tribe.  In 1994, Interior reversed 
course once again, and, in a letter by then Assistant Secretary Ada Deer, 
“reaffirm[ed]” the Commissioner’s 1972 determination that the Band was 
recognized.329  Interior included the Ione on the list of federally recognized 
                                                           
322.  Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 1433 
(2017).  
323.  Marissa Luck, After Six Months, Business is Booming at Ilani, THE 
COLUMBIAN, Nov. 2017, https://www.columbian.com/news/2017/nov/29/ilani-
casino-clark-county-business/. 
324.  Trust Acquisition of the 228.04-acre Plymouth Site in Amador 
County, California, for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians, Rec. of Decision 54 (BIA 
May 2012). 
325.  Id.  
326.  Id.  
327.  Id. at 57.  
328.  Id.  
329.  Cty. of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 64 (2018). 
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tribes published in the Federal Register the next year.330  However, the 
Ione remained landless.  
In May 2012, Interior issued a decision to acquire 228 acres of 
land in Amador County in trust for the Ione Tribe to use for gaming 
purposes.  Amador County and No Casino in Plymouth, a citizens’ group, 
filed separate lawsuits in federal district court challenging the decision on 
Carcieri and IGRA grounds.331  The County challenged the legitimacy of 
the Ione Band, arguing that it is not “a separate and distinct tribal entity in 
its own right.”332  The County argued that Interior did not hold a Section 
18 vote on the IRA or an election to organize under Section 16, and thus, 
the Ione Band was not a distinct tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934.333  
The district court rejected these arguments, noting that it was reasonable 
for Interior to conclude that no election was held for Ione because it had 
no “Rancheria” in 1934.334  The court declined the County’s invitation to 
“conduct an independent investigation into the genealogy and political 
history supporting recognition of Ione as a distinct tribe” as beyond its 
“authority and expertise,” and instead deferred to Interior’s determination 
that the Ione Band was a distinct tribe under federal jurisdiction in 1934.335  
The court also rejected the County’s argument that Interior’s failure to 
acquire land for Ione meant that Ione was not under federal jurisdiction, 
finding no support for the County’s bare assertion.336   
In its separate action, the citizens’ group also challenged Interior’s 
determination that Ione was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.337  The 
citizens’ group argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri 
foreclosed Interior from judicial deference in interpreting “under federal 
jurisdiction.”338  The district court rejected this argument, noting that the 
Supreme Court did not interpret “under federal jurisdiction,” nor provided 
standards for being under federal jurisdiction.339  The court determined 
                                                           
330.  Id.  
331.  Cty. of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D. 
Cal. 2015); No Casino in Plymouth v. Jewell, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (E.D. Cal. 2015).   
332.  Cty. of Amador, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1210.  
333.  Id. at 1208.   
334.  Id. at 1209–1210.  
335.  Id. at 1213.  
336.  Id. at 1213–1214.  
337.  No Casino in Plymouth, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.  
338.  Id.  
339.  Id. at 1184.  
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that Interior’s determinations under its two-part framework were entitled 
to deference, and upheld Interior’s fee-to-trust decision in both actions.340 
 The County and the citizens’ group appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  
In a short memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the citizens’ 
group’s appeal for lack of organizational standing.341  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision upholding Interior’s fee-to-trust 
decision.342  The court agreed with Interior that “the better reading” of the 
first definition of “Indian” is that “now” only modifies “under federal 
jurisdiction,” and a tribe need only be recognized at the time of the fee-to-
trust decision.343  The court upheld Interior’s interpretation of “under 
federal jurisdiction” using its two-part framework and the framework’s 
application to Ione.344  The court declined to rule on whether Chevron 
deference was owed to Interior in its two-part framework because “we 
reach the same conclusion as the agency even without it.”345  The court 
concluded it was reasonable for Interior to interpret its efforts to purchase 
land for Ione, beginning in 1915, as evidence that Ione was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934.346  The County filed a petition for certiorari with the 
Supreme Court on Carcieri and IGRA grounds, and the petition was 
denied.347   
 
3. Oneida Indian Nation 
 
The Secretary’s application of the two-part framework to trust 
acquisitions for the Oneida Indian Nation (“Oneida”) was also the subject 
of federal litigation.  In May 2008, nine months before the Supreme Court 
decided Carcieri, Interior issued a decision to acquire 13,000 acres of land 
in trust in central New York for the Oneida.348  Interior’s decision did not 
                                                           
340.  Id. at 1192–93; Cty. of Amador, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1197. 
341.  No Casino in Plymouth v. Zinke, 698 Fed. Appx. 531 (9th Cir. 2017). 
342.  Cty. of Amador, 872 F.3d at 1015.   
343.  Id. at 1024.  
344.  Id. at 1027–1028.  
345.  Id. at 1025.  
346.  Id. at 1027.  
347.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cty. of Amador, Cal. v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 139 S. Ct. 64 (2018) (No. 17-1432). 
348.  Oneida Indian Nation of New York Fee-to-Trust Request, Rec. of 
Decision (BIA May 2008). 
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address Carcieri.349 Following the Carcieri decision, state and local 
governments and citizens’ groups argued in federal district court that the 
Oneida were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, as required by the 
Supreme Court.350  Rather than decide that “threshold inquiry”351 in the 
first instance, the district court remanded the fee-to-trust decision to the 
Department to “further develop the record” on the Department’s authority 
to acquire the land in trust.352 The court recognized Interior’s “specific 
expertise that the Court lacks,” and that the Carcieri question is “one that 
requires a detailed analysis of contested, factually-laden historical 
accounts.”353   
 Following the court’s remand, Interior requested briefing from the 
litigants on whether the Oneida were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.354  
Before Interior issued their subsequent decision, the Oneida, the State of 
New York, Madison County, and Oneida County entered into a historic 
agreement to settle long standing fee-to-trust, tax, land claim, and gaming 
issues.355  The state and counties agreed to abandon their challenges to the 
13,000 acre acquisition as well as other legal disputes.356  
In December 2013, Interior issued an amendment to the original 
fee-to-trust decision, adopting a 40-page opinion prepared by the 
Solicitor’s Office on the Carcieri question.357  Interior applied its two-part 
framework and determined that the Oneida were under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934.358  Interior’s decision relied on evidence of a vote by the Oneida 
to reject the IRA in 1936; the Treaty of Canandaigua between the Oneida 
                                                           
349.  Id.  
350.  N.Y. v. Salazar, Nos. 08–64, 08-648, 08–633, 08–647, 08–660, 2012 
WL 4364452 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).   
351.  Id. at *14. 
352.  Id. at *1.  
353.  Id. at *14–*15.   
354.  Mem. from Jennifer L. Turner, Assistant Sol., Branch of Env’t & 
Lands, to Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Determination of 
Whether the Oneida Indian Nation was Under Federal Jurisdiction in 1934, at 2 (Dec. 
23, 2013) https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/344-interior-rod- 
amendment.pdf [hereinafter Memo from Jennifer L. Turner]. 
355.  Settlement Agreement by the Oneida Nation, the State of N.Y., the 
Cty. of Madison, and the Cty. of Oneida (May 16, 2013) (on file with State of N.Y.). 
356.  Id. at Art. VI.  
357.  Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. Fee-to-Trust Request, Am. to the May 
20, 2008 Rec. of Decision (BIA Dec. 2013).   
358.  Memo from Jennifer L. Turner, supra note 354, at 3. 
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and the United States in 1794; and land claim litigation brought by the 
United States on behalf of the Oneida shortly before the IRA’s enactment; 
and other evidence of federal jurisdiction, either taken alone or together.359  
Interior also found it unnecessary to determine whether the Oneida were 
recognized in 1934; but, in any event, noted that the Oneida have been 
recognized since the Treaty of Canandaigua in 1794.360 
 Several citizens’ groups and two local towns challenged the fee-
to-trust decision, including the Carcieri opinion.  One set of citizens’ 
groups, led by Central New York Fair Business Association 
(“CNYFBA”), argued that the Oneida were neither recognized nor under 
federal  jurisdiction in 1934.361  CNYFBA made a number of assertions: 
(1) the Oneida were under state, and not, federal jurisdiction; (2) any 
remaining federal jurisdiction ended with the Removal Act and the Treaty 
of Buffalo Creek in the 1830s; (3) the United States’ land claim litigation 
was on behalf of individual Indians, and not the Tribe; and (4) the IRA 
vote was not conclusive as to the Onieda’s federal jurisdictional status in 
1934.362  Applying Chevron deference—due to ambiguity in the phrase 
“under federal jurisdiction”—the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
arguments.363  Relying on the Treaty of Canandaigua, the court concluded 
the Oneida were under federal jurisdiction.364  The court noted it was 
                                                           
359.  Id.  
360.  Id. at 34.  
361.  Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 08-660, 2015 WL 
1400384 (N.D.N.Y. 2015), reconsideration denied, 2015 WL 6694117 (N.D.N.Y. 
2015), aff’d 673 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2016). Another citizens’ group plaintiff in this 
lawsuit was Citizens Equal Rights Alliance (“CERA”), whose website declares that 
“Federal Indian Policy is unaccountable, destructive, racist, and unconstitutional.  It 
is, therefore CERF and CERA’s mission to ensure the equal protection of the law as 
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution of the United States.” Citizens Equal 
Rights Alliance Website, http://citizensalliance.org/.  Their website links to an article 
declaring that Obama’s Indian law policy, included fee-to-trust, threatened all 
Americans, by “subverting our constitutional order and successfully transferring vast 
land holdings and natural resources to corrupt, federally controlled tribal 
governments.”  Elaine Willman, Warpath: Obama’s Indian Policy Threatens All 
Americans, Both Tribal and Non-tribal Citizens, THE NEW AMERICAN (Aug. 31, 
2016), https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/23964-warpath-
obama-s-indian-policy-threatens-all-americans-both-tribal-and-non-tribal-citizens. 
362.  Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n, 2015 WL 1400384.   
363.  Id. at *7. 
364.  Id. at *8. 
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bound by Second Circuit precedent, which had held that the Oneida 
reservation was not disestablished by the Treaty of Buffalo Creek, the 
reservation remained intact, and that the affirmative land claim litigation 
had been brought on behalf of the Tribe.365  Additionally, the court 
affirmed that Interior’s interpretation that the IRA places no time limit 
upon recognition was reasonable, and the Oneida are federally 
recognized.366  
CNYBA appealed the district court’s decision to the Second 
Circuit, which affirmed.367  However, CNYFBA did not appeal on the 
Carcieri issue, but instead focused on if the Oneida reservation had been 
disestablished, as well as a constitutional claim.368  The Supreme Court 
denied CNYFBA’s petition for certiorari.369   
 Another set of plaintiffs, led by citizens’ group Upstate Citizens 
for Equality (“UCE”), argued that the Oneidas were under state 
jurisdiction with a state reservation.370  Additionally, UCE, like CNYFBA, 
challenged the Oneida’s status as a federally recognized tribe.371  The 
district court rejected these arguments, noting that it was bound by Second 
Circuit precedent.372  The court declined to disturb Interior’s determination 
that the Oneida are a federally recognized tribe.373  UCE appealed the 
                                                           
365.  Id. at *9 (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 
F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2003)).  
366.  Id. at *11. The two towns did not brief the Carcieri issue on summary 
judgment, despite having raised it in their complaint.  Town of Verona v. Jewell, No. 
08-647, 2015 WL 1400291 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015).  The court therefore 
concluded that they had not met their burden, and granted the United States’  motion 
for summary judgment on the towns’ Carcieri claims in their complaint.  Id.  The 
towns appealed to the Second Circuit, but did not raise a Carcieri argument.  Upstate 
Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. U.S., 841 F.3d 556, 564 at n. 9 (2d. Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied __ S.Ct. __ (2017).  
367.  Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, 673 F. App’x 63 (2d. Cir. 
2016).   
368.  Id. 
369.  Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017).  
370.  Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., v. Jewell, No. 08-0633, 2015 WL 
1399366 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). UCE has been cited as an example of an 
anti-Indian hate group for its “multifaceted attempts to reduce Indigenous political 
power while promoting racial stereotypes.” See Smith, supra note 306.  
371.  Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., 2015 WL 1399366 at *5. 
372.  Id. at *5–6. 
373.  Id. at *1, *6.  
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district court’s decision to the Second Circuit, but did not raise Carcieri.  
Instead, UCE challenged the constitutionality of IRA Section 5 and the 
applicability of the IRA to the Oneidas.374 The Second Circuit rejected 
these arguments, and ultimately, the Supreme Court denied UCE’s petition 
for certiorari.375 
 
4. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of 
Michigan 
 
As previously noted in Section II(a)(ii), in 2012, the Supreme 
Court held that the QTA does not bar APA challenges to a fee-to-trust 
decision once the land is in trust, but the challenge cannot be brought by 
plaintiffs seeking to quiet title themselves.376  The Supreme Court’s 
decision allowed David Patchak’s Carcieri-based challenge to Interior’s 
decision to acquire trust land for the Gun Lake Band to proceed as a 
“garden-variety APA claim.”377  The Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings.378  
While the case was pending before the district court on remand, 
Interior determined that the Gun Lake Band was under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934 for purposes of a different fee-to-trust acquisition.379  Applying its 
two-part Carcieri framework, Interior determined that the historical 
record, which included numerous treaties between the United States and 
the Band; Interior’s provision of benefits to the Band; and federal efforts 
to remove the Band from Michigan, “reflect[ed] a course of dealings 
between the United States and the Gun Lake Band beginning in 1795 and 
. . . there is sufficient subsequent evidence that the Tribe remained under 
                                                           
374.  Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., 841 F.3d at 577.   
               375.      Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. U.S., __ S.Ct.__, 199 L. Ed. 2d 
372, 2017 WL 5660979 (2017).  Interestingly, Justice Thomas dissented from the 
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, arguing that, in his view, the Indian Commerce 
Clause did not give Congress power to “authorize the taking of land into trust under 
the IRA.”  Id. at *2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).      
376.  Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 217 (2012).   
377.  Id. at 220-21.  
378.  Id. at 228.   
379.  Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 158 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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federal jurisdiction through the passage of the IRA in 1934.”380  Patchak 
challenged Interior’s determination and argued that Interior’s fee-to-trust 
decisions were not entitled to Chevron deference because the IRA was 
unambiguous and Interior’s two-part Carcieri framework was set forth in 
an informal, internal memorandum.381  Patchak also challenged Interior’s 
application of the two-part framework to Gun Lake, noting that Gun Lake 
was not federally recognized until it completed the federal 
acknowledgment process in 1999, years after the IRA was enacted.382  
 However, the merits of Interior’s Carcieri decision were never 
decided in court because in September 2014 Congress enacted the Gun 
Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act.383  The Act reaffirmed Interior’s 
decision to acquire land in trust for the Band and ordered the dismissal of 
Patchak’s case.384  Although Patchak challenged the constitutionality of 
the Act, arguing it violated separation of powers, the First Amendment 
right to petition, due process, and the bill of attainder clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, the district court upheld the Act and dismissed Patchak’s 
lawsuit.385  The district court never reached the question of whether the 
Gun Lake Band was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.386  The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.387  On February 27, 2018, in 
a decision by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Act, concluding that the Act was “well within” 
congressional authority to strip federal courts of jurisdiction.388 
 Patchak’s Carcieri arguments and constitutional claims bear 
noting because they track those of other tribal opponents, and these 
arguments are likely to reappear in challenges to other fee-to-trust 
decisions or tribe specific legislation.   
 
                                                           
380.  Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of the U.S.’s 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 28, id. (No. 08-1331). 
381.  Plaintiff’s Consolidated Reply to Defendants’ and Intervenor-
Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, 10, id. In 
addition, Patchak described the two-part framework as “limitless,” accusing Interior 
of rendering the term “under Federal jurisdiction” “meaningless.”  Id. at 11 
382.  Id. at 18. 
383.  Gun Lake Act, 128 Stat. 1913.  
384.  Id.  
385.  Patchak, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 165.  
386.  Id. at 158-59, 165. 
387.  Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
388.  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018).   
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5. Northfork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California 
 
In litigation involving trust acquisitions for Cowlitz, Ione, Oneida, 
and the Gun Lake Band, the plaintiffs challenged the Department’s two-
part Cariceri framework.  However, another central component of the 
Carcieri M-Opinion was the memorialization of the Department’s bright-
line test, which states that the holding of a Section 18 vote by a tribe on 
whether to accept or reject the IRA is dispositive of whether a tribe was 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  In Stand Up for California! v. U.S. 
Department of the Interior, this bright-line test was challenged by a 
citizens’ group opposed to gaming, a tribe operating a competing casino, 
and others seeking to overturn a fee-to-trust decision for the Northfork 
Rancheria of Mono Indians (“North Fork” or “North Fork Rancheria”).389  
In Stand Up!, the plaintiffs objected to the Department’s decision to 
acquire in trust for North Fork a 305 acre parcel of land in Madera County, 
California, located 38 miles from the North Fork Rancheria.   
Stand Up!’s complaint and briefs focused on the perceived evils 
of gaming and an allegedly greedy, fraudulent tribe.390  However, the 
                                                           
389.  204 F. Supp. 3d 212, 229 (D.D.C. 2016).  Prior to the fee-to-trust 
decision, Interior had issued a two-part determination under IGRA, finding that the 
proposed off-reservation casino on was in the best interest of the North Fork Rancheria 
and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community.  Secretarial 
Determination Pursuant to the IGRA for the 305.49-Acre Madera Site in Madera 
County, California, for the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, Rec. of Decision 
(BIA Sept. 1, 2011) (on file with the Public Land & Resources Law Review).  The 
Governor of California concurred in the Department’s determination. Trust 
Acquisition of the 305.49-Madera site in Madera County, Cal., for the North Fork 
Rancheria of Mono Indians, Rec. of Decision 1 (BIA Nov. 2012), 
http://www.northforkeis.com/documents/rod/ROD.pdf [hereinafter North Fork IRA 
ROD]. 
390.  See, e.g. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief ¶¶ 1, 5, 26, 28, Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 71 F.Supp.3d 
109 (D.D.C. 2014) (Nos. 12-2039 & 12-2071) (complaining about the alleged 
negative impacts of gaming, and that the Tribe already has trust land but is engaging 
is “reservation shopping” to build a mega-casino far away from its reservation); 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment at 
3, 11–17, Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212 
(D.D.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 
F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Nos. 12-2039 & 12-2071) (arguing that there was no link 
between the Indians for whom Interior acquired land for in 1916 and for whom the 
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history of the North Fork Rancheria, as well its current circumstances, tell 
the opposite story. Interior had originally set aside approximately 80 acres 
of “absolutely worthless” land for North Fork in 1916, an area that became 
known as the North Fork Rancheria.391  In June 1935, the Secretary held a 
Section 18 vote, in which a majority of the adult Indians residing on the 
Rancheria voted against the application of the IRA, as reflected in the Haas 
List.392 In 1958, as part of the shift in federal Indian policy towards 
termination, Congress enacted the California Rancheria Act, which 
authorized the Secretary to “terminat[e] . . . the Federal trust relationship” 
with several California tribes, including the North Fork Rancheria, and to 
distribute the Tribe’s lands to individual ownership.393   In 1966, the 
Secretary published notice in the Federal Register that title to the 
Rancheria had passed to an individual Indian.394  In 1983, following 
litigation brought by 17 Rancherias, including North Fork, the Secretary 
agreed to recognize North Fork and restore the Rancheria to trust status.395 
Interior subsequently acquired 61.5 acres of land in trust for North Fork 
for housing, government, and conservation purposes, but the land was 
unusable for economic development purposes.396  
In agreeing to accept the 305-acre Madera site in trust for North 
Fork, the Secretary determined the acquisition would “promote the long-
term economic self-sufficiency, self-determination, and self-governance 
of the Tribe.”397  The Secretary also noted that North Fork had entered into 
a memorandum of understanding with the County to address impacts of 
                                                           
Secretary held an election and the North Fork Rancheria today); Stand Up Plaintiffs’ 
Final Opening Brief at 24,  Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 F.3d 
1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) cert. denied sub nom. Stand Up for California v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, 139 S. Ct. 786 (2019) (Nos. 16-5327 & 16-5328) (arguing that there is no 
evidence of continuous tribal existence). 
391.  Stand Up for California!, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 212, 229.  
392.  Haas List, supra note 184, at 15.   
393.  Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, § 9, 72 Stat. 619 (1958).   
394.  Certain Rancherias in California: Notice of Termination of Federal 
Supervision Over Property and Individual Members, 31 Fed. Reg. 2911 (Feb. 18, 
1966).   
395.  Restoration of Federal Status to 17 California Rancherias, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 24,084 (June 11, 1984).   
396.  North Fork IRA ROD, supra note 389, at 4-5.  
397.  Id. at summary, 1. 
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the trust acquisition.398  Regarding Carcieri, in a short analysis, the 
Department determined that the “calling of a Section 18 election at the 
Tribe’s Reservation [on June 10, 1935] conclusively establishes that the 
Tribe was under Federal jurisdiction for Carcieri purposes.”399 The 
Department also reasoned that North Fork’s vote against the IRA did not 
limit its ability to have land acquired in trust under the IRA, based on 1983 
legislation amending the IRA to provide that Section 5 “applies to all tribes 
notwithstanding Section 18 of such Act.”400  Interior did not provide any 
other reasoning for the Department’s statutory authority to acquire land in 
trust for North Fork Rancheria. 
Plaintiff citizens’ group and the Picayune Rancheria of the 
Chukchansi Indians, who operate a competing casino, challenged the 
North Fork decision in federal district court on Carcieri and other 
grounds.401  With respect to Carcieri, the plaintiffs argued that a Section 
18 election “cannot, on its own, be conclusive evidence that a tribe was 
under federal jurisdiction.”402  Plaintiffs asserted that the Indians who 
voted were not necessarily members of one particular “tribe.”403 Plaintiffs 
then went one step further and argued that the present-day North Fork 
Rancheria is not the same tribe for whom Interior acquired the Rancheria 
in 1916 or for whom the Secretary held a vote in 1935.404  Plaintiffs 
accused the Secretary of fabricating “a narrative of recognition, 
termination, and restoration.”405   
On September 6, 2016, the district court upheld Interior’s 
decision.406 The court held that a Section 18 election “can, by itself, 
conclusively establish the existence of a tribe under federal jurisdiction” 
because under the definitions section of the IRA, ‘“Indians residing on one 
reservation’ constitute a ‘tribe’” and Section 18 elections were held for 
                                                           
398.  Id. at 56.  
399.  Id. at 55.  
400.  Id. (citing the Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 
96 Stat. 2515 (1983), codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2202 (2018)).   
401.  Stand Up for California!, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212 (D.D.C. 2016) (also 
addressing claims based in IGRA, the Clean Air Act, and NEPA).   
402.  Id. at 281.  
403.  Id. at 282.   
404.  Id. at 283.  
405.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of 
Summary Judgment at 11–12, Id. (Nos. 12-2039 & 12-2071). 
406.  Stand Up for California!, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 323. 
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Indians at reservations.407  In other words, a Section 18 vote of the adult 
Indians on a reservation was a vote of a tribe. The court also held that the 
IRA “does not require ‘unified’ tribal affiliation,” and chided the plaintiffs 
for conflating recognition and federal jurisdiction.408 The court concluded 
that North Fork’s jurisdictional status in 1934 was confirmed by Interior’s 
purchase of the Rancheria in 1916.409 Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ 
challenge to North Fork’s “continuing Tribal existence” noting that any 
such claims were untimely and that, in any event, the Secretary “was not 
required to make factual findings regarding the North Fork Tribe’s 
continuous existence.”410   
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
which affirmed.411  Plaintiffs again argued that participants in the 1934 
election did not belong to any one tribe, and that Interior had not 
demonstrated a connection between the Indians who voted in 1935 and the 
North Fork Rancheria today.412  The D.C. Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ 
argument, citing the definition of “tribe” as including “Indians residing on 
one reservation,” and concluding that “a section 18 election on a 
reservation establishes that the Indian residents qualify as a tribe subject 
to federal jurisdiction.”413  With respect to plaintiffs’ argument challenging 
North Fork’s continued tribal existence, the D.C. Circuit exclaimed 
“Enough is enough!” and affirmed the Department’s reliance on the 
“unremarkable assumption that a political entity, even as its membership 
evolves over time, retains its essential character.”414  Plaintiffs, refusing to 
take the D.C. Circuit’s words to heart, filed a petition for rehearing en 
banc, which was denied.  Plaintiffs then filed a petition for certiorari with 
the Supreme Court.415 In its petition, plaintiffs asserted, as it did below, 
that a Section 18 vote was held only for a reservation, and not for a 
                                                           
407.  Id. at 283, 284-286.  
408.  Id. at 283, 288.   
409.  Id. at 283.  
410. Id. at 291–292, 301–302.   
411.  Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 879 F.3d 1177 
(D.C. Cir. 2018), rehearing en banc denied (Apr. 20, 2018).   
412.  Id. at 1182. 
413.  Id.  
414.  Id. at 1186. The D.C. Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ IGRA and 
Clean Air Act arguments. Id. at 1190–1191.  
415.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stand Up for California! v. U.S. 
Dep’t. of Interior, 139 S. Ct. 786 (2019) (No. 18-61). 
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particular tribe.416  On January 4, 2019, the Supreme Court denied 
plaintiff’s certiorari petition in Stand Up!.417  
 
6. Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California 
 
A similar challenge to the Secretary’s reliance on a Section 18 
vote as dispositive evidence separately arose in the Ninth Circuit.  In 
November 2012, Interior decided to acquire 40 acres of trust land in Yuba 
County, California, for gaming purposes for the Enterprise Rancheria of 
Maidu Indians of California (“Enterprise”).418 The decision section 
discussing Carcieri mirrored Interior’s North Fork decision by relying on 
the Section 18 vote as dispositive evidence of Enterprise’s federal 
jurisdictional status.419  In addition, Interior summarized the history of 
Enterprise.  Enterprise had limited land holdings—40 acres—that did not 
provide a usable land base for economic development.420  Interior found 
that Enterprise demonstrated a need for land “to better exercise its 
sovereign responsibility to provide economic development to its tribal 
citizens.”421   
 Citizens for a Better Way, other citizens’ groups, individual 
citizens,422 and two other tribes who operate competing casinos, 
challenged Interior’s fee-to-trust decision in federal district court.423  The 
citizens’ groups argued that the Secretary’s authority to acquire trust land 
under the IRA was limited to tribes who were recognized in 1934, which 
                                                           
416.  Id. at 13. Stand Up! also argued that the Secretary erred in 
concluding that the casino would not be detrimental   to the surrounding community. 
Id. at 9.  
417.  Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 139 S. Ct. 786 
(2019). 
418.  Trust Acquisition of the 40-acre Yuba County Site in Yuba County, 
California, for the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California, REC. OF 
DECISION 1 (BIA Nov. 2012), https://docs.google.com/file/d/edit. 
419.  Id. at 43–44 (citing Haas List, supra note 184, at 15).  
420.  Id. at 44.  
421.  Id.  
422.  These plaintiffs were represented by the same attorneys who 
represent the citizens’ groups in Grand Ronde and Stand Up for California!. 
423.  Citizens for a Better Way v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 12-3021, 
2015 WL 5648925 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015). In addition to Carcieri  ¸plaintiffs raised 
arguments based on the IRA, NEPA, and IGRA. 
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they alleged Enterprise was not.424  The groups also argued that Section 18 
votes were held by reservation, not by tribe, and thus a vote among Indians 
residing on the Enterprise Rancheria in 1935 did not establish that 
Enterprise, as a tribe, was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.425  In an 
unpublished decision, the district court rejected the citizens’ groups’ 
arguments and upheld Interior’s fee-to-trust decision on all grounds.426  
Regarding Carcieri, the court “found no reason to stray” from Interior’s 
practice of determining federal jurisdiction, including the reliance on the 
Section 18 vote as dispositive evidence.427 
 The citizens’ groups as well as one tribe appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.428 Once again, the citizens’ groups argued 
that votes were held by reservation, not by tribe.429  The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument, noting that it ignored the “expansive definition of 
‘tribe’ contained in the IRA,” which included “Indians residing on one 
reservation.”430  The Ninth Circuit held that the Section 18 vote established 
that Enterprise was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, noting that this 
holding was consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Stand Up!.431  
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Interior’s acquisition of the 
Rancheria for Enterprise in 1915 was additional evidence that Enterprise 
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.432  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision upholding the acquisition.433  
 
7. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma 
 
As discussed above, in separate decisions dated 2011 and 2012, 
Interior agreed to accept land in trust for the corporate arm of the UKB for 
gaming and community purposes, respectively.  In both decisions, Interior 
                                                           
424.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 11, Id. (No. 12-3021).  
425.  Id. at 7.  
426.  Citizens for a Better Way, 2015 WL 5648925 at *24.  
427.  Id. at *22.  
428.  Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v. 
Zinke, 889 F.3d 584, 594 (9th Cir. 2018).   
429.  Id. at 595.  
430.  Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 5129).   
431.  Id.  
432.  Id. at 594. 
433.  Id. at 608. 
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concluded that Carcieri did not limit the Secretary’s authority to acquire 
land in trust for the UKB because the OIWA extended the benefits of the 
IRA, including land-into-trust, to OIWA tribes.434  The Cherokee Nation 
separately challenged both decisions in federal court.435  In May 2017, the 
district court ruled in favor of the Cherokee Nation in the non-gaming 
parcel litigation, remanding the decision to Interior to obtain the Cherokee 
Nation’s consent and for further consideration of Carcieri and potential 
jurisdictional conflicts and administrative burdens the acquisition would 
place on the BIA.436  Regarding Carcieri, the district court found that the 
OIWA incorporated the IRA as a whole, and thus UKB must demonstrate 
that it satisfied a definition of “Indian” in the IRA.437  As explained by the 
court, “[t]o allow a corporation formed under the OIWA to enjoy a portion 
of the IRA’s provisions without regard to its other provisions and 
definitions would be to provide it more rights and privileges than the IRA 
provides.”438  The United States and UKB appealed to the Tenth Circuit, 
where the case remains pending.439  In its appeal, the United States argued 
that incorporated Oklahoma tribes “need not meet the IRA’s separate 
definition of ‘Indian’ because . . . the OIWA extended the IRA’s ‘rights or 
privileges’ to ‘the incorporated group’ of ‘[a]ny recognized tribe or band 
of Indians residing in Oklahoma.’”440  The district court has yet to rule on 
the separate gaming decision. 
 
8. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 
 
As discussed above, in September 2015, Interior decided to accept 
two parcels of land in trust on behalf of the Mashpee Tribe for gaming and 
                                                           
434.  See supra Section III(b)(iii)(a).  
435.  The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. 12-493, 2013 WL 5329787 
(N.D. Okla. 2013); The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. 14-428, 2017 WL 2352011 
(E.D. Okla. 2017). 
436.  The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, 2017 WL 2352011 at *1, *7. 
437.  Id. at *7. 
438.  Id. at *6.  
439.  The Cherokee Nation v. Zinke, Nos. 17-7042 & 17-7044, 2017 WL 
2352011 (10th Cir. 2017).  
440.  Opening Brief for Federal Appellants at 18, id. (10th Cir. Dec. 1, 
2017) (Nos. 17-7042 & 17-7044). 
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other purposes.441 Interior declined to make a determination as to whether 
Mashpee was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, instead relying on the 
second definition of “Indian” in the IRA.442  That definition includes: “all 
person who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, 
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.”443  
Interior found that Mashpee satisfied that definition.444  As part of its 
determination, Interior concluded that the reference to “such members” in 
the second determination was ambiguous as to whether it incorporated the 
entire first definition, “all persons of Indian descent who are members of 
any recognized tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” or whether it only 
incorporated a portion of the definition, “members of any recognized 
Indian tribe.”445  Considering the broad remedial purposes of the IRA, its 
legislative history, and other rules of statutory construction, Interior 
determined the second definition only incorporated a portion of the first 
definition, and did not require Mashpee to demonstrate it was under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934 to satisfy the second definition.446 
 Plaintiffs David Littlefield and other residents of the Town of 
Taunton, opposed to the Mashpee’s planned development, challenged 
Interior’s decision in federal court, arguing, inter alia, that the Mashpee 
did not meet the second definition of “Indian” in the IRA, because, in their 
view, it plainly incorporated the first definition.447  They argued that “such 
members” refers to the entirety of the first definition, and thus, in addition 
to meeting the second definition’s residency requirements, Mashpee 
needed to show that it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.448  The court 
agreed with plaintiffs, finding that the second definition unambiguously 
                                                           
441.  2015 Mashpee ROD, supra note 274. See also supra Section 
II(b)(iii)(c). 
442.  Id. at 79–80.  
443.  25 U.S.C. § 5129.  
444.  2015 Mashpee ROD, supra note 274 at 79. See also supra Section 
II(b)(iii)(c).    
445.  Id. at 81.  
446.  Id. at 94–95.  
447.  Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391, 396 (D. 
Mass. 2016).  In press interviews, plaintiffs made it clear that they did not oppose 
casinos generally, or even a casino in their town, but rather opposed a tribal casino.  
See, e.g, Sean P. Murphy, Taunton casino’s foes will press on, BOSTON GLOBE (June 
28, 2016).  
448.  Littlefield, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 396.   
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incorporated the entire first definition, and no deference was due to 
Interior’s interpretation under Chevron.449  The court also suggested that 
Mashpee was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934— despite the fact that 
Interior had never decided the question—apparently on the basis that 
Mashpee was not formally recognized until 2007.450  At Interior’s request, 
the court subsequently issued an order clarifying that it did not decide the 
jurisdictional issue, and remanded the matter to Interior for a 
determination on whether the Mashpee were under federal jurisdiction in 
1934.451   
 Following the district court’s decision, Mashpee intervened as a 
defendant452 and appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.453  Interior 
filed a notice of appeal, which it later dismissed.454  The First Circuit 
stayed Mashpee’s appeal pending Interior’s decision on remand, which, as 
discussed in Section V(c), was issued on September 7, 2018.  The Tribe 
has since filed a lawsuit challenging Interior’s decision on remand in 
federal district court in the District of Columbia.455   
 
9. Interior Board of Indian Appeals 
 
Several IBIA decisions have addressed Carcieri.  The IBIA 
reviews decisions of BIA Regional Directors to acquire land in trust, 
among other decisions.  In several cases, the IBIA has upheld BIA’s 
reliance on a Section 18 vote as dispositive evidence that a tribe was under 
federal jurisdiction.  The IBIA first addressed the issue in Shawano County 
v. Midwest Area Director, in which the County challenged a fee-to-trust 
decision for the Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin.456  The 
                                                           
449.  Id. at 400.   
450.  Id.  
451.  Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D. Mass. 
2016). 
452.  Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 318 F.R.D. 558 (D. Mass. Sept. 
23, 2016).  
453.  Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, No. 16-2484 (1st 
Cir.). 
454.  Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 16-2481, 2017 WL 
10238203, at *1 (1st Cir. May 8, 2017). 
455.  Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke, No. 18-2242 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 
2018).   
456.  Shawano Cty. v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 53 I.B.I.A. 62, 75–76 (2011).  
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IBIA held that the “Secretary’s act of calling and holding this [Section 18 
election] for the Tribe informs us that the Tribe was deemed to be ‘under 
Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934.”457  In addition, citing a Supreme Court 
decision, the IBIA concluded that even if, at times, the state had exercised 
jurisdiction, and “Federal supervision had not been continuous, that did 
not destroy the Federal government’s jurisdiction over the [t]ribe.”458 
The next year, the IBIA again concluded that a Section 18 vote 
was conclusive of the Carcieri question, upholding Interior’s authority to 
acquire trust land for the Oneida Nation on the basis of a Section 18 
vote.459 The IBIA reasoned that Interior’s holding of a Section 18 vote 
“necessarily was premised upon a determination by the Executive Branch 
that the individuals allowed to vote were ‘adult Indians’ within the 
meaning of the [25 U.S.C. § 5129].”460  Although not necessary to its 
holding, the IBIA noted that other evidence in the historical record further 
demonstrated federal jurisdiction over the Oneidas, including lands 
already held in trust for the Tribe and individual Indians, and the 
“inclusion in the Indian population census and assignment of the Tribe to 
the jurisdiction of a BIA agency.”461   
Likewise, in a separate decision concerning the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe, the IBIA held that the Secretary’s calling of a Section 18 
vote was dispositive evidence that the Tribe was under federal 
jurisdiction.462  The IBIA noted in that case that the set aside of a 
reservation for the Tribe, through a treaty, also indicated federal 
jurisdiction.463  Moreover, the IBIA cited the United States bringing 
affirmative litigation on behalf of the Tribe in 1938 as additional evidence 
of federal jurisdiction.464  The IBIA also relied on the Secretary’s call for 
a vote on whether to accept or reject the IRA in cases affirming trust 
                                                           
457.  Id. at 72.    
458.  Id. at 74 (citing U.S. v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 n.20, 652–653 
(1978)). 
459.  Vill. of Hobart v. Midwest Reg’l Dir., 57 I.B.I.A. 4, 22–23 (2013).  
460.  Id. at 23.  
461.  Id. at 24. 
462.  N.Y. v. Acting E. Reg’l Dir., 58 I.B.I.A. 323, 332 (2014).  
463.  Id. at 333.  
464.  Id.  
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acquisitions for the La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians of the La 
Posta Indian Reservation, California465 and the Wyandotte Nation.466 
Additionally, the IBIA has upheld BIA Carcieri determinations 
for tribes lacking a Section 18 vote but where other types of federal actions 
demonstrated federal jurisdiction.  For example, in Mille Lacs County v. 
Acting Midwest Regional Director, the IBIA upheld a BIA decision to 
acquire land in trust for the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians of the 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (“Mille Lacs Band”).467  The IBIA 
acknowledged that while there was nothing in the record demonstrating 
the occurrence of a Section 18 vote, “the absence of such evidence does 
not compel a finding that the tribe was not under Federal jurisdiction in 
1934.”468  To establish that the Mille Lacs Band was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934, the IBIA relied on the “long history of Federal 
treaties, statutes, congressional appropriations, and executive agency 
actions undertaken with or on behalf of the Mille Lacs Band prior to and 
contemporaneous with the enactment of the IRA.”469  For example, the 
Mille Lacs Band entered into seven treaties with the United States between 
1825 and 1867, and Congress enacted 12 statutes relating to the tribe 
between 1884 and 1933.470  The IBIA rejected Mille Lac County’s 
argument that the Mille Lacs Band today is a “new and distinct entity from 
the Mille Lacs band which existed historically.”471 
The IBIA also relied on treaty rights as compelling evidence of 
federal jurisdiction over the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians, Michigan (“Grand Traverse Band”).472  In Grand 
Traverse County Board of Commissioners v. Acting Midwest Regional 
Director, other acts, in addition to a treaty, similarly showed federal 
jurisdiction.473  Specifically, upon an authorization by Congress, the Grand 
                                                           
465.  Rodney R. Starkey v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 63 I.B.I.A. 254, 264 (2016). 
466.  State of Kansas v. Acting E. Okla. Reg’l Dir., 62 I.B.I.A. 225, 236 
(2016).  
467.  Mille Lacs Cty. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 62 I.B.I.A. 130 
(2016).  
468.  Id. at 142.  
469.  Id. at 140.  
470.  Id. at 141. 
471.  Id. at 143. 
472.  Grand Traverse Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 
61 I.B.I.A. 273 (2015).  
473.  Id.  
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Traverse Band filed a claim with the Court of Claims Commission 
resulting in a judgment being awarded and the BIA compiled a roll to 
distribute the judgment.474  However, the County argued that the Secretary 
terminated federal recognition of the Grand Traverse Band in 1872 and 
that correspondence around the time of the IRA questioned the tribe’s 
status.475 The County further noted that the Department had not extended 
IRA benefits to the Grand Traverse Band.476  The IBIA rejected that this 
evidence was dispositive, citing Justice Breyer’s comment in Carcieri that 
“a tribe may have been ‘under federal jurisdiction’ in 1934 even though 
the Federal government did not believe so at the time.”477  The IBIA also 
explained: “in 1934, the Tribe undoubtedly held a reservation of Federally 
protected fishing rights and other associated property rights, and those 
legal rights could be neither diminished nor terminated by the Secretary’s 
improper de facto ‘termination’ of the Federal government’s relationship 
with the Tribe, based on his erroneous interpretation of the 1855 treaty.”478 
In several cases, the IBIA accepted requests by the Regional 
Director to have a fee-to-trust decision remanded to the Region to address 
Carcieri.  In those cases, the Regional Director acknowledged that the 
decision had not considered Carcieri, and thus, the trust acquisition could 
not proceed.479  In another case, the IBIA held that Carcieri did not limit 
the Secretary’s authority to acquire land in trust under separate statutory 
authority found in a restoration act.480 
 
 
 
                                                           
474.  Id. at 279. 
475.  Id.  
476.  Id. at 279.   
477.  Id. at 281 (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 397 (2009) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)).  
478.  Id. at 282.  
479.  Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., 51 I.B.I.A. 141 (2010) (trust 
acquisition for Big Lagoon Rancheria, California); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Acting E. 
Reg’l Dir., 57 I.B.I.A. 192 (2013) (acquisition for the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians); 
Pres. of Los Olivos v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., Nos. IBIA 05-050A & 05-05-1 (May 17, 2010) 
(order vacating decision in part and remanding in part) (acquisition for the Santa Ynez 
Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation).  
480.  City of Bloomfield v. Acting Great Plains Reg’l Dir., 61 I.B.I.A. 296, 
300 (2015) (affirming mandatory trust acquisition for the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska).  
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10. Summary  
 
 To date, courts and the IBIA have approved every single Interior 
determination that a particular tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, 
satisfying the first definition of “Indian” in the IRA.  Federal courts have 
also unanimously upheld the Department’s interpretation of “under federal 
jurisdiction” in 1934, concluding it was reasonable.  Critically, courts have 
also recognized Interior’s unique and specialized expertise in determining 
whether a particular tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.481  In only 
two instances has a court struck down an Interior fee-to-trust decision 
based on Carcieri, Interior’s decisions in UKB and Mashpee.  However, 
in both of those cases Interior did not determine whether the tribe was 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934—Interior relied on other authority 
instead.   
 Certain categories of claims have emerged over the last ten years 
of litigation.  Several cases challenged the validity of Interior’s statutory 
interpretation of “under Federal jurisdiction” as embodied in its two-part 
framework.482  These cases generally included claims that not only federal 
jurisdiction, but also formal federal recognition, is required in 1934.483  
Additionally, some litigants argued evidence that an IRA Section 18 
election was held at the tribe’s reservation is not dispositive of 1934 
jurisdiction.484  Other cases challenged Interior’s application of its two-
                                                           
481.  See, e.g, Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v, Jewell, 
75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 407 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that “the Secretary has exercised her 
expertise in Indian Affairs to construe ambiguous statutory language and in 
reconciling different approaches taken by different agencies as they exercise their 
responsibilities to Indian tribes”);  N.Y. v. Salazar, No. 6:08–CV–00644, 2012 WL 
4364452, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“There is an institution specifically designed and 
coordinated to have expertise in the social, cultural, political, and legal history of the 
indigenous people of the United States. This institution is not the Court. It is the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.”). 
482.  See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty., 75 F. 
Supp. 3d 387; Cty. of Amador v. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012 (2017); No Casino 
in Plymouth, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (2015). 
483.  See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 
830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 6:08–cv–
0660 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).  
484.  See, e.g., Stand Up for California! V. Dep’t of Interior, 204 F. Supp. 
3d 212 (D.D.C. 2016); Citizens for a Better Way v. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2015 WL 
5648925; Shawano County, 53 I.B.I.A. 62; Village of Hobart, 57 I.B.IA. 4. 
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part framework to particular tribes.485  Several cases involved claims that 
the tribe did not actually exist as a tribal entity in 1934, regardless of 
whether its individual members were under federal jurisdiction.486 
Similarly, some litigants argued that a modern tribe was not the same 
entity as the tribe that was allegedly under federal jurisdiction in 1934.487 
A few cases raised claims that the historical exercise of state jurisdiction 
ousted the existence of federal jurisdiction.488  None of these categories of 
claims have been successful.   
 
B. Collateral Attacks on Interior Trust Decisions 
 
Litigation spurred from the Carcieri decision has not been limited 
to direct attacks on the Department’s land acquisition authority.  Thus far, 
Carcieri has also reared its ugly head through collateral attacks on 
decades-old trust acquisitions, illustrating the dangerous scope creep of 
historically misinformed court precedent.489  This section examines 
collateral Carcieri claims raised in cases related to IGRA—such as the 
duty to negotiate compacts in good faith, state causes of action for IGRA 
violations, and gaming eligibility of Indian lands—as well as in the context 
of tax liability for trust lands and the legality of state gaming license 
preferences. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
485.  See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty., 75 F. 
Supp. 3d 387; Cty. of Amador, 872 F.3d 1012; Mille Lacs Cty., 62 I.B.I.A. 130; Grand 
Traverse Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 61 I.B.I.A. 273.  
486.  See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Way, 2015 WL 5648925; Cty. of 
Amador, 872 F.3d 1012; Kansas, 62 I.B.I.A. 236. 
487.  See, e.g., Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., 841 F.3d 556; Cty. of 
Amador, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193. 
488.  See, e.g., Central N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n, 2015 WL 14000384; New 
York, 58 I.B.I.A. 323; Shawano Cty., 53 I.B.I.A. 62. 
489.  See, e.g., ROBERT A WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 
(2005) (discussing how Indian law decisions rooted in racial prejudices, stereotypes, 
and historical half-truths necessarily, and undesirably, expands its reach over time due 
to the principle of stare decisis).  
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1. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
 
In litigation involving the Big Lagoon Rancheria in California 
(“Big Lagoon”), the State of California argued that IGRA imposed no duty 
to negotiate in good faith for a gaming compact when the underlying trust 
lands, on which gaming is intended, were acquired for a tribe that was 
allegedly not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.490  Big Lagoon originally 
filed the litigation in 2009 after years of failed negotiations with California 
concerning the siting of and environmental specifications for Big 
Lagoon’s proposed casino.491  California responded with a post hoc 
argument that it could not be compelled to negotiate in good faith because 
the lands did not qualify as “Indian lands” for purposes of triggering IGRA 
because the Department had allegedly acquired the land in trust for the 
tribe without proper authority, as defined by Carcieri.492  Bear in mind that 
the land acquisition at issue occurred in 1994 and, at that time, the State 
had not challenged the Department’s authority under the IRA.493  Nor had 
the State attempted to join the United States to the subsequent Big Lagoon 
litigation.494  
Despite these facts, the Ninth Circuit originally held that the State 
could raise its Carcieri-related claim, regardless of the APA’s six-year 
statute of limitations, because the State’s interests in the trust acquisition 
were not invoked until Big Lagoon filed its IGRA lawsuit.495 The Ninth 
Circuit then proceeded to rule on the merits, deciding after a cursory 
review of an incomplete record that Big Lagoon was not under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934; therefore, the Department lacked authority to acquire 
the trust land, and Big Lagoon had no right to compel negotiations to 
conduct gaming activities on that land.496  Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit 
righted course upon rehearing en banc, where it tossed California’s 
Carcieri-based claim because the State failed to bring a timely APA claim 
                                                           
490.  See generally Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d 947 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (2015 Big Lagoon Decision), reversing and remanding 741 F.3d 
1032 (9th Cir. 2014) (2014 Big Lagoon Decision).  
491.  2015 Big Lagoon Decision at 951–952. 
492.  Id. at 952. 
493.  Id. 
494.  Id. at 954. 
495.  2014 Big Lagoon Decision at 1042–1043. 
496.  Id. at 1043–45. 
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against the United States to challenge the 1994 trust acquisition.497  The 
Ninth Circuit also rejected an attempt by California to challenge BIA’s 
recognition of Big Lagoon, concluding that such a challenge would be 
time-barred.498  
While the Ninth Circuit considered California’s collateral 
challenge in Big Lagoon, the Eleventh Circuit grappled with a similar 
challenge raised by the State of Alabama against the Poarch Band of 
Creeks (“Poarch” or “Poarch Band”).  In Alabama v. PCI Gaming 
Authority, Alabama sued the tribal gaming authority and tribal officials for 
the alleged operation of Class III gaming activities.499  As part of its claims, 
Alabama argued that Poarch Band’s casinos were not located on “Indian 
lands” as required by IGRA.500  Although the Department issued trust 
deeds for the lands in 1984, 1992, and 1995, Alabama argued that these 
acquisitions were invalid because the Poarch Band was not federally 
recognized until 1984, and therefore was not “under federal jurisdiction” 
in 1934 for purposes of Carcieri.501  
The Eleventh Circuit wholeheartedly rejected Alabama’s attempt 
to circumvent the APA.  Noting the Supreme Court’s Patchak language 
that a fee-to-trust challenge is a “garden-variety APA claim,” the Eleventh 
Circuit found that Alabama “cannot raise . . . a collateral challenge to the 
Secretary’s authority to take the lands at issue into trust” in litigation 
brought decades after the transfer of trust title and without the Secretary’s 
involvement as a party.502  Moreover, and in line with the Big Lagoon en 
banc decision, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that Alabama’s APA action 
accrued at the time the agency decision was issued.503  The Eleventh 
Circuit did, however, consider Alabama’s argument that it qualified for an 
                                                           
497.  2015 Big Lagoon Decision at 954.  Id. at 954 (“Allowing California 
to attack collaterally the BIA’s decision to take the eleven-acre parcel into trust outside 
the APA would constitute just the sort of end-run that we have previously refused to 
allow, and would cast a cloud of doubt over countless acres of land that have been 
taken into trust for tribes recognized by the federal government.”). 
498.  Id.  
499.  See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015), 
aff’ing 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (M.D. Ala. 2014).  
500.  Id. at 1290–1291. 
501.  Id. at 1290–1292. 
502.  Id. at 1291. 
503.  Id. at 1291–1292 (“[T]he statute begins to run when the agency 
issues the final action that gives rise to the claim”). 
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exception to the APA’s six-year statute of limitations, yet ultimately 
rejected this argument since there was no evidence that Alabama was 
unaware of the trust acquisitions at the time they were made.504 
Big Lagoon is not the only tribe in the Ninth Circuit to contend 
with an improper collateral attack on its trust land under the auspices of a 
gaming challenge.  A citizens’ group challenged a decades old trust 
acquisition for the Jamul Indian Village of California (“JIV”).  Jamul 
Action Committee (“JAC”) brought a lawsuit against the National Indian 
Gaming Commission’s purported issuance of an Indian lands 
determination under IGRA for the JIV on Carcieri grounds. JAC argued 
that because JIV was neither federally recognized nor under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934, JIV’s reservation did not qualify as “Indian lands” 
under IGRA.505 The district court dismissed JAC’s complaint in part, 
concluding that JAC’s challenge to the status of JIV’s land was barred by 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Big Lagoon.506  JAC appealed the district 
court’s decision, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.507  JAC then 
appealed a final judgment by the district court to the Ninth Circuit, and the 
case remains pending.508 
 
2. Tax Liability 
 
Carcieri also played a central role in a lawsuit between the Poarch 
Band and the Tax Assessor for Escambia County, Alabama, concerning 
                                                           
504.  Id. at 1292. 
505.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 86–99, Jamul 
Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 2015 WL 1802813, (E.D.Cal. 2015) (No. 13-1920). JAC 
routinely issues “legal updates” challenging not only the Tribe’s plans for economic 
development but also the existence of and status of the JIV.  See, e.g, JAC Legal 
Update (Aug. 17, 2016), https://jacjamul.com/news/20160817.shtml (arguing that 
JIV’s Reservation is not held in trust, is not eligible for gaming, and that JIV was not 
properly recognized and does not possess sovereign immunity).  
506.  Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 200 F. Supp .3d 1042, 1051–
1052 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 651 Fed. Appx. 689, 
690 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
507.  Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, No. 16-16442, 2017 WL 
3611433 (9th Cir. June 15, 2017).  
508.  See Jamul Action Com. v. Stevens, No. 17-16655 (9th Cir.). 
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the Poarch Band’s tax liability for its trust land.509  This litigation involved 
the same three tribal properties at issue in PCI Gaming Authority, acquired 
in trust in 1984, 1992, and 1995.510  The County sought to levy property 
taxes against the Poarch Band’s trust land, arguing that the lands were 
improperly taken into trust because Poarch had not been under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934 and, accordingly, they remained fee lands.511  Poarch 
filed suit to enjoin the County from levying the property tax.512  The 
district court relied on its prior decision granting a preliminary injunction, 
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, as well as the holding in PCI Gaming 
Authority, to grant a permanent injunction and declaratory relief 
prohibiting the County from assessing taxes on Poarch’s trust property.513  
In effect, this decision reaffirmed that neither a state nor county may 
collaterally attack Departmental fee-to-trust decisions outside the APA 
framework and six-year statute of limitations. 
 
3. State Gaming Laws 
 
In Massachusetts, a non-Indian casino development company, KG 
Urban Enterprises, sued the Governor of Massachusetts and the 
Massachusetts Gaming Commission (collectively “Massachusetts” or “the 
                                                           
509.  See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth, No. 15-277, 2015 WL 
4469479 (S.D. Ala.) (granting preliminary injunction against the Escambia County 
Tax Assessor), aff’d, 656 Fed. Appx. 934 (11th Cir. 2016); Poarch Band of Creek 
Indians v. Moore, No. 15-277, 2016 WL 10807587 (S.D. Ala.) (final order granting 
permanent injunction and declaratory judgment against the Escambia County Tax 
Assessor). 
510.  See Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 656 Fed. Appx. at 937. 
511.  See Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 2015 WL 4469479 at *2. 
512.  Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 2016 WL 10807587 at *2. 
513.  See id. at *4. The District Court granted the Tribe’s requested relief 
even though the Escambia County Tax Assessor had since withdrawn his opposition 
to the injunction, arguably mooting the controversy.  Id. at *2. While the County’s 
change of position may have been partially fueled by change of personnel in the 
Escambia County Tax Assessor role, it was certainly also prompted by the related 
outcome in PCI Gaming Auth, supra note 499. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 2016 
WL 10807587 at *4. In any event, the District Court entered the declaratory judgment 
and permanent injunction, finding this relief will “inevitably serve a ‘useful purpose’ 
to settle the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty and freedom from local property taxes and 
will ‘afford relief’ from any future uncertainty that this issue will be revisited.” Id. at 
*5. 
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Commonwealth”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s gaming law and 
licensing procedures violated the U.S. Constitution by creating a racial 
preference for Indian tribes in the state.514 Although the plaintiff’s claims 
were grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, 
they implicated Carcieri to the extent the Commonwealth argued that its 
special treatment of tribal gaming applicants was authorized by Congress, 
and therefore justified by Supreme Court precedent in Washington v. 
Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation.515 In order for 
the State to invoke Yakima, however, it had to show that it was acting 
pursuant to federal law, which in this case was IGRA.516 Yet IGRA could 
only provide the necessary federal hook if the tribal license preference was 
for proposed gaming on “Indian lands.” At the time of litigation, the First 
Circuit found there were no qualifying “Indian lands” in Massachusetts, 
although the Mashpee Tribe had a fee-to-trust application pending with 
the Department of the Interior.517  The plaintiff argued that because both 
of Massachusetts’ federally recognized tribes—the Wampanoag Tribe of 
Gay Head (“Aquinnah”) and the Mashpee Tribe—were recognized after 
1934, the Department lacked authority under Carcieri to acquire trust land 
for their benefit; therefore, neither tribe could qualify for gaming under 
IGRA, resulting in the unconstitutionality of the tribal preference in the 
state gaming law.518   
In vacating the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, 
the First Circuit issued a rather opaque decision holding that the plaintiff’s 
Carcieri-based claim has sufficient merit to survive a motion to dismiss.  
The First Circuit agreed with plaintiff that neither Mashpee nor Aquinnah 
                                                           
514.  KG Urban Enter. v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (upholding 
the district court’s denial of preliminary injunction but vacating the district court’s 
dismissal of complaint and remanding for further proceedings); KG Urban Enter. v. 
Patrick, No. 11-12070, 2014 WL 108307 (D. Mass.) (2014) (granting summary 
judgment to the defendants).  
515.  KG Urban Enter., 693 F.3d at 20-21. Yakima holds that states may 
step into the shoes of the federal government when enacting legislation that singles 
out Indian tribes, and such state legislation does not trigger strict scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause when the state does so pursuant to federal authorization. See 
generally Washington v. Confed. Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 
U.S. 463 (1979). 
516.  693 F.3d at 19–21. 
517.  Id. at 21; See also supra Section III(b)(iii)(c). 
518.  693 F.3d at 12, 20, and 22–23. 
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were federally recognized in 1934, and the court described the Carcieri 
question as both a “serious issue” and the plaintiff’s “strongest 
argument.”519   The First Circuit essentially found that while the 
Commonwealth may arguably claim a valid tribal preference as authorized 
by IGRA, this argument “become[s] weaker with the passage of time and 
the continuation of the status that there are no ‘Indian lands’ in the 
region.”520  In other words, the longer the Commission waited for a 
Massachusetts tribe to acquire trust lands that qualify for IGRA gaming, 
the more unlikely that IGRA actually applied and authorized the 
Commonwealth and Commission to implement a tribal licensing 
preference.  Ultimately, however, the strength and scope of plaintiff’s 
Carcieri-related argument was not tested by the courts.  Between the First 
Circuit’s decision and the district court’s decision on remand, the 
Massachusetts Gaming Commission opened the licensing application 
process to all commercial applicants, tribal or not.521  Accordingly, the 
district court found that the 18 months between passage of the 
Massachusetts Gaming Act and the opening of the commercial application 
process to any applicant was a constitutionally permissible amount of 
time.522 As a result, the district court did not need to evaluate whether a 
continued tribal preference would have been justified under IGRA by the 
likelihood that either Massachusetts tribe would be able to acquire trust 
land in light of Carcieri.523  
There are two takeaways from these rulings on collateral Carcieri 
claims.  First, Carcieri has the potential to create or bolster claims far 
                                                           
519.  Id. at 11, 22. 
520.  Id. at 24-25; See also KG Urban Enter., 2014 WL 108307 at *4 
(“Although the First Circuit’s guidance to this district court, and perhaps others, is 
inscrutable, a careful reading yields a consistent rationale for its decision: despite not 
being fully authorized by the IGRA, the Massachusetts statute can be considered a 
“valid parallel mechanism” to the IGRA and, therefore, warrants rational basis review 
for a ‘limited period of time.’”) (quoting the First Circuit decision in KG Urban). 
521.  KG Urban Enter., 2014 WL 108307 at *15–16. 
522.  Id. at *15-17. The District Court also determined that the review 
criteria for the application process did not, on its face or as applied, constitute a racial 
preference. Id. at *18-32. 
523.  Id. at *17-18 (“Because the Court finds that the Commission’s 
opening of the commercial application process frames the applicable time period, it 
need not speculate as to the ultimate resolution of the so-called Carcieri question with 
respect to the rights of the Mashpee or Aquinnah tribes to take land into trust. Any 
lingering uncertainty with respect to the Mashpee tribe’s eligibility is immaterial.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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outside the traditional APA fee-to-trust decision setting.  It seems any 
creative lawyer can finesse an argument that lands do not amount to 
“Indian country” or a tribe does not constitute a “real” tribe on the basis of 
Carcieri, regardless of the particular facts or claims at issue. Second, and 
more reassuringly, courts appear reluctant to allow parties, even states, to 
challenge decades old fee-to-trust decisions outside of the APA.  
 
VI. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: CARCIERI’S ONGOING 
IMPACTS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
Given the tremendous amount of activity that has occurred in the 
wake of Carcieri’s issuance in 2009, it is unsurprising that much remains 
to be resolved.  In this section, we attempt to summarize the major 
Carcieri-related actions that are on the horizon, offering our perspectives 
on what may come and providing advice for tribal leaders and practitioners 
as they continue to pursue important trust land objectives. 
 
A. The Future of Legislative Action 
 
Clean Carcieri fixes did not advance in the 115th Congress nor 
did any Senator even introduce a clean fix in the Senate.  In the House, 
Congressman Cole again introduced a clean fix, which was referred to 
subcommittee but no action was taken.524  In an interesting twist, a 
controversial bill to revise the Federal acknowledgment process was 
amended by Representative Grijalva to include a retroactive Carceri fix.525  
The revised bill was reported favorably out of committee, but did not pass 
the House.526   
The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Indian, Insular 
and Alaska Native Affairs held a general land-into-trust hearing on July 
13, 2017, where it was again apparent that the Republican majority 
opposed the existing fee-to-trust process and Interior’s response to 
Carcieri.527  The hearing memorandum asserted: “[f]or decades the 
                                                           
524.  H.R. 130, 115th Cong. (introduced Jan. 3, 2017).  
525.  Tribal Recognition Act, H.R. 3744, 115th Cong. (introduced Sept. 
12, 2017).  
526.  H.R. REP. No. 115-953 (2018). 
527.  Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition with the intent of 
the 73rd Congress in Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act: Oversight Hearing 
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secretary has acquired land in trust regardless of the impact on other tribes, 
state local governments, and landowners, and regardless of the capacity of 
the government to manage the trust lands.”528  The memorandum criticized 
the IRA’s lack of “limits, standards, or guidelines” on the Secretary’s 
power to acquire land in trust, and that “[d]espite Carcieri,” M-Opinion 
37029 “enable[d]  the Secretary . . . to acquire land in trust for tribes 
recognized after 1934.”529  The Interior representative at the hearing, 
Associate Deputy Secretary Jim Cason, also expressed concern about the 
impact of fee-to-trust on local communities, and speculated, without any 
specific examples, that tribes could seek land in trust for one purpose, only 
to initiate a different purpose, i.e. gaming, once the land was in trust.530 
Regarding Carcieri, Cason expressed concern: “the criteria [in M-37029] 
is very wide and it doesn’t respond very particularly to the Supreme Court 
decision.  So we have concerns about the current advice in the Solicitor’s 
Opinion, about being specific enough to actually distinguish between 
                                                           
Before the H. Subcomm. On Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs, 115th Cong. 
1, (July 13, 2017) [hereinafter Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition 
Oversight Hearing]. 
528.  Id., Mem. from Majority Comm. Staff, Subcomm. On Indian, Insular 
and Alaska Native Affairs to All Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native 
Affairs Members, https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov// 
uploadedfiles/hearing_memo_--_ov_hrg_07.13.17.pdf.  
529.  Id. at 4. M-37029 was also the subject of attack at an oversight 
hearing of the House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations hearing on May 24, 2017.  The Hearing Memo states “[i]nstead of 
applying the IRA on its plainly-read terms as directed by the Supreme Court, [M-
Opinion 37029] . . . provides DOI’s own opinion and focus of the Court’s holding in 
Carcieri to ultimately justify accepting land into trust on behalf of tribes that were not 
formally recognized by 1934.”  Mem. from Majority Staff, Subcomm. On Oversight 
and Investigations to All Subcomm. Members, Oversight Hearing: Examining 
Impacts of Federal Natural Resources Laws Gone Astray (May 22, 2017), 
https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov//uploadedfiles/hearing_memo_--
_ov_hrg_on_05.24.17.pdf. 
530.  Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition Oversight Hearing, 
supra note 527 (statement of James Cason, Acting Deputy Sec’y).   
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applications.”531  Cason did not commit to endorsing a Carcieri fix but did 
note that a fix would “simplify matters.”532 
On January 9, 2019, at the start of the 116th Congress, 
Congressman Cole again introduced a clean Cariceri fix, which has been 
referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources.533  
 
1. Tribe Specific Fixes 
 
 Despite congressional paralysis on a nationwide Carcieri fix, 
Congress actively considered several targeted, tribe or parcel specific bills 
in the 115th Congress. The House of Representatives alluded to this 
approach in 2014 when it passed the Gun Lake Act, noting that, because 
of the lack of consensus regarding how to fix Carcieri, “consideration of 
bills to take specific lands in trust, as long as they have the support of the 
elected representatives for the affected lands, tribes, and communities, is 
the appropriate means of resolving trust land matters.”534  
 Several tribe-specific fee-to-trust bills related to Carcieri were 
considered by the 115th Congress.  For example, members of both the 
Senate and the House introduced bills to “ratify and confirm” Interior’s 
2015 trust land acquisition for Mashpee.535 These bills tracked language in 
the Gun Lake Act, which “ratified and confirmed” the Secretary’s trust 
acquisition decision for the Gun Lake Band.536  The two Democratic 
Senators from Rhode Island sent a letter to Senate Minority Leader Charles 
                                                           
531.  Trump Administration backs away from yet another pro-tribal legal 
opinion, INDIANZ (July 25, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/25/ 
trump-administration-backs-away-from-yet.asp. 
532.  Indian County outnumbered at hearing on Indian Reorganization 
Act, INDIANZ (July 13, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/13/indian-
country-outnumbered-at-hearing-on.asp. 
533.  H.R. 375, 116th Cong. (introduced Jan. 9, 2019). 
534.  H.R. REP. NO. 113-590 at 3. 
535.  Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Reservation Reaffirmation Act, S. 
2628, 115th Cong. (introduced Mar. 22, 2018); Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 
Reservation Reaffirmation Act, H.R. 5244, 115th Cong., (introduced Mar. 9, 2018). It 
is unclear how Interior’s recent decision, finding that the Mashpee Tribe was not under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934, might impact trust acquisition legislation for Mashpee. 
See infra Section V(b); Letter from Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney 
to Chairman Cedric Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (Sept. 7, 2018) 
[hereinafter 2018 Mashpee Remand Decision]. 
536.  Id.  
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Schumer in July 2018 threatening to use “all avenues to block this 
legislation if there is an attempt to move it,” and arguing that it would 
circumvent the Carcieri decision for and open the door to Rhode Island 
tribes seeking similar legislation.537 The letter is notable in that it 
demonstrates the significant controversy surrounding Carcieri fix 
legislation even among Democrats.  The letter also misses the mark—the 
Mashpee Bill and the Gun Lake Act were specifically tailored to specific 
land that was already in trust.  And the broader Carcieri fixes considered 
by Congress do not guarantee trust land acquisition, rather, they simply 
resolve the statutory authority requirement of a fee-to-trust decision.  Even 
if a clean Carcieri fix is passed, Interior will still be required to carefully 
consider the interests of state and local governments and any 
environmental impacts, among other criteria.   
Congressman Byrne introduced a bill to reaffirm the status of 
lands held in trust for the Poarch Band in the House of Representatives.538  
The Poarch bill passed the House, and was referred to the Senate, but not 
passed.  The House also passed a bill to ratify and confirm the actions of 
Interior in acquiring approximately 1400 acres of land in trust for the Santa 
Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation, 
California (“Chumash”), which again was referred to the Senate.539 The 
Chumash bill included a prohibition on gaming.540  It did not pass the 
Senate.  Each of these tribes has been the subject of litigation seeking to 
                                                           
537.  Letter from Senator Jack Reed and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse to 
Senator Charles Schumer (July 11, 2018), https://twt-media.washtimes.com/media/ 
misc/2019/01/10/Ltr_from_ReedWhitehouse_to_Schumer_on_Mashpee_7.11.2018.
pdf.   
538.  Poarch Band of Creek Indians Land Reaffirmation Act, H.R. 1532, 
115th Cong. (introduced March 15, 2017). Noting the Poarch Band had to defend 
against Carcieri challenges to its trust land, the House Natural Resources Committee 
Report attacked Interior’s response to Carcieri and M-37029, noting that, “rather than 
work with the Committee to find a resolution to Carcieri, the Obama Administration 
increased the potential for litigation over the trust status of untold acres of lands owned 
by tribes.”  H.R. REP. NO. 115-513, at 2, 115th Cong. (2018).  
539.  Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians Land Affirmation Act, H.R. 
1491, 115th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2017). 
540.  Id. 
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invalidate the trust transfers on the basis that the tribes were not under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934.541   
In addition, Congress considered, but did not enact, two bills to 
acquire land in trust for tribes that would eliminate the need for Carcieri 
determinations for specific trust acquisitions.  The first bill, the Lytton 
Rancheria Homelands Act, would have taken certain land in trust for the 
Lytton Rancheria of California (“Lytton”), and prohibited gaming on the 
property.542 Opponents to the trust acquisition argue that Carcieri 
forecloses trust acquisitions for Lytton,543 and the legislation would have 
resolved the Carcieri question by mandating the trust acquisition.  The 
Lytton Act also would have adopted a memorandum of agreement 
between the tribe and the county governing land use regulation.544 The 
Lytton Act passed the House but did not pass the Senate.  Additionally, 
Congressman Rick Larsen introduced a bill to acquire 97 acres of land in 
trust for the Samish Indian Nation (“Samish”).545  At the time the 
legislation was introduced, a Carcieri determination for Samish remained 
pending with Interior, and, as is the case for Lytton, the legislation would 
have resolved the question of statutory authority, at least for the 97 
acres.546 The Samish bill would have prohibited gaming on lands acquired 
pursuant to the bill.547   It died in subcommittee.  
As of mid-January 2019, only one tribe-specific bill to address 
Carcieri had been introduced in the 116th Congress.  On January 8, 2019, 
                                                           
541.  See Sections IV(viii)(a) and IV(b)(i), supra, Anne Crawford-Hall v. 
United States, No. 17-1616, In Chambers Order Granting Def.’s Partial Mot. to 
Dismiss (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2018) (rejecting Carcieri challenge to 1400 acre-trust 
acquisition for Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Decision for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies).   
542.  Lytton Rancheria Homelands Act of 2017, H.R. 597, 115th Cong., 
§§ 4, 5 (Jan. 20, 2017).  
543.  Michael Robison and Mike Healy, Close to Home: Future of Lytton 
tribe’s land is not inevitable, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT (Sept. 6, 2015), 
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/opinion/4435433-181/close-to-home-future-of.  
544.  Id. at § 6.  
545.  Samish Indian Nation Land Conveyance Act, H.R. 2320, 115th 
Cong. (May 3, 2017).  
546.  Legislative Hearings on H.R. 212, H.R. 2320, H.R. 3225 Before the 
Subcomm. on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, 115th Cong. (Nov. 15, 2017) 
(statement of John Tahsuda, III, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs).  
547.  H.R. 2320, § 5.  
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Representative William Keating from Massachusetts introduced a bill to 
reaffirm the trust status of land Interior acquired in trust for Mashpee.548   
In sum, upon examination of recent congressional activity on 
Carcieri, several themes become apparent. First, Congress is less likely to 
enact a clean Carcieri fix than ever before.  No Senator even introduced a 
Carcieri bill during the 115th Congress.  And no hearings were held on 
the two Carcieri fixes pending in the House.  Even though the Democrats 
took control of the House of Representatives, the last time Democrats had 
a majority in both houses, they were unable to pass a clean Carcieri fix.  
At most, if one is introduced, a clean Carcieri bill could pass the House, 
but it would likely be dead on arrival in the Republican-controlled Senate.  
Second, certain House Republicans strongly oppose Interior’s approach to 
Carcieri, as evidenced by comments in hearing memoranda and 
committee reports.549  These Republicans are of the view that Carcieri 
requires “recognition” in 1934, and that tribes like the Gun Lake Band who 
went through the Federal acknowledgment process cannot meet this 
requirement.   
Third, the congressional debate about Carcieri is in reality a 
debate about the land-into-trust process, and what Republicans (and 
sometimes Democrats) see as overreach by Interior and a disregard of state 
and local government and community interests. Senator Barrasso 
previously coupled Carcieri with significant changes to the fee-to-trust 
process, and other members of Congress have insisted that other changes 
to the fee-to-trust process, including limits on the Secretary’s discretion, 
are necessary.   
Fourth, although Congress has enacted one-tribe 
specific Carcieri bill, and progress has been made on others, these tribe-
specific bills have significant limitations.  The Samish, Chumash and 
Lytton bills, for example, prohibited gaming.  Permanent restrictions on 
land use undermine self-determination; tribes, like other governments, 
have the inherent right to make their own decisions about the best use of 
the land they own and/or land over which they exercise jurisdiction.550  In 
addition, all three bills authorize specific land acquisitions, and do not 
resolve Carcieri questions for other acquisitions. The Poarch and Gun 
                                                           
548.  To reaffirm the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe reservation, and for 
other purposes, H.R. 312, 116th Cong. (introduced Jan. 8, 2019).  
549.  See supra Section III(a). 
550.  See, e.g., Exec. Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination with 
Indian Tribal Gov’ts, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000).     
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Lake bills are backwards looking only, as they fail to authorize new trust 
acquisitions.  
Finally, these bills fall short in establishing finality and clarity 
regarding tribal trust lands.  The Gun Lake Act, enacted to end years of 
litigation and uncertainty about the status of the tribe’s trust land, was 
challenged all the way to the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act, enacted in 1983, extended Section 5 trust acquisition 
authority to tribes who had voted against the application of the IRA in 
order to avoid piecemeal fee-to-trust legislation.551 Yet, 35 years later, 
Congress has reversed course, again returning to tribe and parcel specific 
legislation. 
 In our view, the last ten years of Carcieri litigation and 
congressional debates only serve to underscore the need for a universal, 
clean Carcieri fix.  Linking Carcieri and fee-to-trust has resulted in 
wasted Congressional hearings, never-ending litigation, and the 
expenditure of tribal, federal, and state/local government resources that 
could be better spent providing essential services.  There are legitimate 
discussions to be had about jurisdictional and taxation issues associated 
with trust acquisition, but Carcieri has not provided, and will not provide, 
the appropriate framework in which to discuss those issues.  We recognize 
the tension between arguing that Congress must enact a clean Carcieri fix 
and explaining why such a fix is unlikely. Yet the existing alternatives—
to give up and accept the status quo, or to allow the vocal few who oppose 
all trust applications as a matter of course dictate the terms of 
a Carcieri fix—are even worse. The better, and in our view, necessary, 
path forward is to enact a clean Carcieri fix, and then separately discuss 
changes to the fee-to-trust process with the conversation led by tribes.552   
 
B. Future Interior Action 
 
As explained supra, Sections III(b) and IV, during the Obama 
administration Interior responded to Carcieri in several different ways.  
                                                           
551.  25 U.S.C. § 2202; H.R. REP. NO. 97-908, at 13 (1982). 
552.  For example, in comments on Interior’s proposed changes to the fee-
to-trust regulations, discussed in Section V(b), infra, NCAI has proposed a larger 
conversation about regulatory changes to the fee-to-trust process, beginning with a 
study of land acquisition needs in Indian country. Letter from NCAI Exec. Dir. 
Jacqueline Pata to Sec’y Zinke (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.ncai.org/12.4.17_NCAI_ 
Letter_to_DOI_re_Part_151_Regulation_Proposal.pdf.  
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Interior consistently supported a clean Congressional fix to Carcieri.  
Interior also established a “bright-line test” that if the Secretary held a 
Section 18 election at a tribe’s reservation, that tribe was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934 without any additional analysis.  For those tribes who 
did not vote in a Section 18 election on whether to accept or reject the IRA, 
Interior developed a two-part framework for determining whether the tribe 
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. This test, first set forth in a fee-to-
trust decision for Cowlitz, was institutionalized with the issuance of M-
Opinion 37029 in March 2014.  Interior also vigorously defended its 
Carcieri opinions in federal court.  In addition, Interior considered 
whether other statutory provisions besides the first definition of Indian 
provided statutory authority for a trust acquisition, as in the case of 
Mashpee, UKB, Alaska tribes, and Oklahoma tribes.  Although Interior 
did not issue regulations responding to Carcieri, Interior did promulgate 
regulations in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak.  The 
“Patchak patch” eliminated a 30-day waiting period for fee-to-trust 
regulations and clarified and mandated exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.553 
 Two years into the Trump administration, Interior’s record on 
Carcieri is mixed.554  The new administration has yet to support a Carcieri 
fix.  Although Interior has not yet taken formal action to withdraw or 
modify M-37029, Associate Deputy Secretary Jim Cason has echoed the 
concerns of House Republicans and described it as “loose” and not 
sufficiently responsive to the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri.555 
Thus, it remains possible that Interior may seek to withdraw the M-
Opinion altogether or introduce new requirements for being under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934.  
 One particular fee-to-trust acquisition has gained attention in the 
Trump administration.  As noted above, the district court in Littlefield 
                                                           
553.  78 Fed. Reg. 67928 (Nov. 13, 2013).   
554. The current administration has recently issued a few positive Carcieri 
determinations in the context of fee-to-trust decisions.  See, e.g., Assistant Secretary 
– Indian Affairs Decision, Kramer v. Pac. Reg. Dir., (Feb. 25, 2019) (affirming the 
2014 trust decision, and underlying analysis, for the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash 
Indians); Snoqualmie Tribe Celebrates Land in Trust Decision, (Feb. 13, 2019) 
http://snoqualmietribe.us/content/snoqualmie-tribe-celebrates-land-trust-decision. 
555.  Trump Administration backs away from yet another pro-tribal legal 
opinion, INDIANZ (July 25, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/25/ 
trump-administration-backs-away-from-yet.asp. 
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remanded the Mashpee fee-to-trust decision to Interior to issue a 
determination as to whether the Mashpee were under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934.  On June 30, 2017, Associate Deputy Secretary Jim Cason shared 
a draft determination that, applying M-37029’s two-part framework, the 
Mashpee Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.556  Rather than 
issuing a final decision, the Associate Deputy Secretary allowed the parties 
to submit briefing on whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the Tribe 
by Massachusetts could be a “surrogate” for federal jurisdiction.557  
Following supplemental briefing, on September 7, 2018, the 
Department issued its final decision finding that the Mashpee Tribe was 
not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.558 The Department, acting through 
Assistant Secretary―of Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney, concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence of specific federal actions towards the 
Mashpee before and during 1934.559  It further rejected the Mashpee’s 
argument that certain legislation and legal principles, such as the Non-
Intercourse Acts and the United States’ assumption of the British Crown’s 
obligations, created federal jurisdiction over the Tribe by operation of 
law.560  
The Mashpee remand decision does offer a scintilla of hope. First, 
it expressly declined to vacate the M-Opinion, as urged by the Littlefield 
plaintiffs.561  Second, it did not adopt the position that a state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over a tribe implies the surrender of federal jurisdiction over 
that tribe.562  Nonetheless, the decision rejected the Tribe’s argument that 
                                                           
556.  Letter from Associate Deputy Sec’y Jim Cason to Chairman Cedric 
Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (June 30, 2017).  
557.  Id. at 2.  
558.  2015 Mashpee Remand Decision, supra note 535. 
559.  Id. at 20–38. 
560.  Id. at 13–15. 
561.  Id. at 11, 13. The Remand Decision did, however, caveat its 
declination to vacate by saying that only the Solicitor, Deputy Secretary, or Secretary 
has the authority to modify an M-Opinion unless it is otherwise overruled by the 
courts. Id. at 11, 13. 
562.  Compare id. at 9 (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments that federal and 
state jurisdiction could not co-exist in the original 13 states) with id. at 16–20 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ broad assertion that the 13 original states maintained independent 
and exclusive authority over Indian affairs, instead analyzing whether Massachusetts’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over Mashpee was coupled with federal participation or 
authorization). 
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Massachusetts’ exercise of jurisdiction was a surrogate for federal 
jurisdiction due to the absence, in this particular case, of “any Federal 
authorization, confirmation or ratification of state authority, or delegation 
of Federal authority to the state.”563  The decision, and the potential for the 
United States to take the land out of trust and revoke its reservation status, 
has alarmed Indian country, with the National Congress of American 
Indians characterizing it as an attack on the Mashpee Tribe’s 
sovereignty.564  
One other Interior Carcieri opinion from the Trump 
administration bears mentioning.  On November 9, 2018, BIA issued a 
determination to acquire 6.7 acres of land in trust for the Samish for non-
gaming purposes.565  As part of its decision, BIA applied the two-part 
Carcieri framework and concluded that Samish was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934.566 Like Cowlitz, Samish was recognized through the 
federal acknowledgment process, with the final acknowledgment decision 
issued in 1995.567  In determining that the Samish were under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934, BIA relied on: the negotiation and entering into of the 
Treaty of Point Elliott of 1855; the federal government’s course of 
dealings with the Samish and its members, including reporting Samish 
members in federal censuses; the granting of allotments to Samish 
members; federal attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Samish Indians 
living off-reservation; and federal approval of attorney contracts with the 
tribe.568  The Samish Carcieri opinion raised several interesting issues. It 
considered a federal court decision that the modern Samish Tribe was not 
a successor in interest to the Samish that were party to the Treaty of Point 
Elliot and, accordingly, lacked off-reservation treaty fishing rights. The 
opinion found the court’s determination legally distinct and not dispositive 
                                                           
563.  Id. at 20.  
564.  NCAI: Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe ‘stripped’ of its sovereignty, 
INDIANZ (Sept. 11, 2018),  https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/09/11/ncai-mashpee-
wampanoag-tribe-stripped-of.asp.  
565.  Letter from to the Honorable Tom Wooten, Chairman, Samish 
Indian Nation (Nov. 9, 2018), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/2018-11-
09-final-ftt-decision-reg-dir1.pdf.  
566.  Id., Attachment 1, https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/ 
2018-11-09-attachment-1-to-ftt-dec-samish-carcieri-analysis.pdf.   
567.  Id. at 6-7.   
568.  Id. at 16-28.  
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of 1934 federal jurisdiction.569  Similarly, the Carcieri opinion considered 
the evidentiary relationship between treaty rights litigation, the 
acknowledgment process, and Carcieri, determining that while the 
relevant evidence overlaps significantly, the legal outcome in one context 
does not dictate the outcomes for any other legal purpose.570  Last, the 
Carcieri opinion found that evidence of federal officials omitting the 
Samish from lists of tribes under federal jurisdiction and listing individual 
Samish as members of other tribes was insufficient to revoke federal 
jurisdiction.571  
 Beyond case-by-case Carcieri determinations for individual 
tribes, the new administration has taken a different approach to land-into-
trust than that of the Obama administration.  From nearly the day that 
former Secretary Zinke was sworn in, he and his team expressed concerns 
and skepticism about the importance of trust land and the fee-to-trust 
process. On May 2, 2017, Secretary Zinke commented, “Is there an off-
ramp? If tribes would have a choice of leaving Indian trust lands and 
becoming a corporation, tribes would take it.”572  Shortly thereafter, Jim 
Cason delivered testimony to the House Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, 
and Alaska Native Affairs expressing concern about the negative impacts 
of off-reservation trust acquisitions on local communities.573 At a hearing 
on October 4, 2017, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs John 
Tahsuda III reiterated Cason’s concerns.574 Tahsuda largely ignored any 
                                                           
569.  Swinomish Indian Tribal Community opposed the Samish 
application, and argued that, “because [United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 
1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979)] concluded that the Nation is not a successor to the Treaty 
of Point Elliott, it cannot be a successor entity to the treaty Samish.”  Id. at 12. BIA 
rejected this argument, distinguishing between the requirements to establish treaty 
rights, acknowledgment under the federal acknowledgment process, and federal 
jurisdiction status in 1934.  Id. at 16.  
570.  Id. at 12-16. 
571.  Id. at 30-31 (noting that “[s]uch inconsistencies are not uncommon, 
and do not in themselves demonstrate that the Samish Nation was not under federal 
jurisdiction”).   
572.  Secretary Zinke advocates ‘off ramp’ for taking lands out of trust, 
INDIANZ (May 3, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/05/03/secretary-zinke-
advocates-offramp-for-ta.asp.  
573.  Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition Hearing, supra 
note 527 (statement of James Cason, Acting Deputy Sec’y).   
574.  Doubling Down on Indian Gaming: Examining New Issues and 
Opportunities for Success in the Next 30 Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
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benefits to tribes from off-reservation trust acquisitions; rather, his focus 
was on the state and local government interests and impacts.575  
That same day, Interior sent tribal leaders draft revisions to the 
off-reservation fee-to-trust regulations, and scheduled consultation 
sessions to discuss the proposed changes.576  According to the Dear Tribal 
Leader letter, the goal of these changes would be to “provide Tribes with 
more certainty as to the possibility of an approval before expending 
significant resources.”577 The changes would have created a two-step 
review and approval process for off-reservation acquisitions: an initial 
review and then a final review.578  A determination whether a tribe was 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, or other analysis of the statutory 
authority for the application, would not be completed until the second 
phase.579  The changes also would have reintroduced the 30-day waiting 
period for trust land acquisition that had been eliminated by the Obama 
administration.580  
Interior subsequently withdrew the draft in response to calls from 
tribes for additional consultation sessions, and issued a new consultation 
schedule.581 The comment period closed on June 30, 2017.582 Indian 
country communicated “near-universal opposition” to the proposed 
changes to the fee-to-trust process, noting, inter alia, that they would give 
an oversized role to the interests of state and local government, at the 
                                                           
Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. (Oct. 4, 2017) (statement of John Tahsuda III, Acting 
Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs). 
575.  Id. 
576.  Letter from Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs John Tahsuda 
III to Tribal Leaders (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/assets/as-
ia/raca/pdf/DTLL - Trust Acquisition Revisions.pdf.  
577.  Id. at 1.  
578.  Id.  
579.  See Consultation Draft Part 151 – Land Acquisitions § 
151.11(c)(2)(ii), (BIA Dep’t of Interior, Oct. 2017) https://turtletalk.files.wordpress. 
com/2017/10/consultation-draft-trust-acquisition-revisions.pdf.  
580.  Consultation Draft § 151.12(c)(2)(iii).   
581.  Letter from Acting Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs John Tahsuda 
III to Tribal Leaders (Dec. 6, 2017).   
582.  Letter from Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs John 
Tahsuda III to Tribal Leaders (Feb. 15, 2018) 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/Updated_DTLL_02-15-
18_FTT.pdf.  
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expense of tribes and tribal communities.”583  In response, the Assistant 
Secretary of Indian Affairs, Tara Sweeney, recently indicated that Interior 
will not move forward with the proposed regulatory changes at this time.584  
There is no guarantee that Interior will stay that course, however, or that 
it will not eventually modify through regulation or other agency action the 
fee-to-trust process, including changes that address Carcieri.   
Significantly, however, with the exception of the Mashpee fee-to-
trust decision relying on the IRA’s second definition of “Indian,” the 
United States has continued to defend the fee-to-trust decisions, including 
the Carcieri opinions, of the Obama administration. The United States has 
filed briefs and participated in oral argument before federal courts in the 
North Fork, Enterprise, Ione, Oneida, Wilton, Chumash, UKB, and 
Cowlitz cases.   
 
C. Pending Carcieri Litigation 
 
As already discussed in Section IV(a), there are a number of fee-
to-trust cases pending in federal court.  
The litigation on a non-gaming trust acquisition for UKB is 
currently before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.585  The 
Carcieri claim in this litigation does not concern an actual Departmental 
determination of federal jurisdiction in 1934, but rather concerns whether 
the Department is required to conduct a Carcieri analysis when relying 
upon authority in Section 3 of the OIWA to effectuate a trust transfer.586 
If the Tenth Circuit affirms, the Department will need to determine on 
remand whether the UKB was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  There is 
a similar case raising the same Carcieri question for OIWA Section 3, 
                                                           
583.  Letter from United South and Eastern Tribes Sovereignty Protection 
Fund to Acting Assistant Sec’y John Tahsuda III, at 1 (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/91-USET.pdf.  
584.  See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe no longer being financed by backer 
of stalled casino, INDIANZ (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.indianz.com/ 
IndianGaming/2019/03/04/mashpee-wampanoag-tribe-no-longer-being.asp (quoting 
Assistant Secretary Sweeney as saying “[a]fter reviewing the comments & hearing 
from Indian Country, the department has determined it will not propose new 
regulations at this time”). 
585.  The Cherokee Nation v. Zinke, Nos. 17-7042 & 17-7044 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
586.  See supra Sections III(b)(iii)(a), IV(a)(vii).  
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pending in the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, that 
concerns a proposed trust acquisition for UKB for gaming.587  Given that  
merits briefing was completed over four years ago, it may be that the 
Northern District of Oklahoma is awaiting a final outcome in the Tenth 
Circuit before issuing its own decision on the merits. 
Another case brought by Stand Up! is currently before the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.588 This litigation involves a 
Department decision, made in the waning days of the Obama 
administration, to acquire trust land on behalf of the Wilton Rancheria, 
California (“Wilton”) for gaming purposes.589  Stand Up!’s amended 
complaint raises a claim that Wilton was not a recognized tribe under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934, alleging that “the Rancheria was set aside for 
homeless Indians, not a recognized tribe, and there is no established 
connection between the Indians living on the Rancheria in 1934 and 
members of the Wilton Rancheria today.”590  The arguments strongly echo 
those in the North Fork trust land litigation, also brought by Stand Up!, 
which were rejected by the same district court.  
 Most recently, Mashpee has filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the Department’s 
September 2018 determination that it was not under federal jurisdiction in 
1934.591  Mashpee alleges that Interior “failed to apply established law, 
contorting some of the relevant facts and ignoring others to engineer a 
negative decision.”592 This case marks the first time a determination that a 
tribe was not under federal jurisdiction will be litigated.   
While it is impossible, and unwise, to predict the outcome of 
particular cases, we expect that Carcieri will continue to fuel challenges 
                                                           
587.  See The Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. 12-493, 2017 WL 2352011 
(N.D. Okla. 2014). 
588.  See Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 315 F. Supp. 
3d 289 (D.D.C. 2018). 
589.  See Trust Acquisition of 35.92 acres in the City of Elk Grove, 
California, for the Wilton Rancheria, Rec. of Decision (BIA, Dep’t of Interior Jan. 
2017), http://www.wiltoneis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/record-of-decision. 
590.  See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 
86-91, Stand Up for California!, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-58). 
591.  Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke, No. 18-2242 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 
2018).   
592.  Id. ¶ 1.  
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to fee-to-trust decisions and may also be invoked in broader settings as 
time goes on.593   
 
D. Newly Recognized Tribes  
 
As described throughout this Article, tribes may become formally 
recognized by the federal government through two primary mechanisms: 
(1) administratively via the 25 C.F.R. Part 83 acknowledgment process; or 
(2) legislatively via specialized acts of Congress.594  Tribes who have 
obtained any type of formal recognition since 1934 will continue to be 
particularly susceptible to legal challenges on the basis of Carcieri.  
For legislatively recognized tribes, the degree of vulnerability 
regarding Carcieri depends greatly on the language of the act.  Some 
legislation may independently provide land acquisition authority, negating 
the need to utilize IRA Section 5. For example, legislation recognizing six 
Virginia tribes in early 2018 specifically addressed trust land 
acquisitions.595  For each tribe, the legislation specified guidelines and 
geographical boundaries for trust land acquisitions, mandating that upon 
tribal request, the Department must take into trust tribal fee land acquired 
before 2007 within certain geographic areas. Further, the legislation 
provided the Department discretionary authority to take in trust tribal fee 
lands acquired at any time (presumably after 2007) within those same 
                                                           
593.  See, e.g., Heidi Staudenmaier & Celene Sheppard, Impact of the 
Carcieri Decision, American Bar Association Gaming Law Gazette, Spring 2009, at 
2-3, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL430000pub/newsletter/ 
200905/staudenmaier.pdf (predicting that Carcieri could be invoked anytime the 
Department uses an IRA provision, beyond the land acquisition authority, or relies on 
the IRA definitions as they are used for other federal laws and programs).  
594.  See supra Sections III(b)(i) (describing the Cowlitz Tribe’s 2002 
acknowledgment through Part 83); III(b)(ii) (explaining the Carcieri M-Opinion’s 
discussion on historical recognition versus modern recognition); III(b)(iii)(a) 
(describing the UKB’s 1946 recognition act); and III(b)(iii)(b) (describing the 
Shawnee Tribe’s 2000 recognition act). 
595.  Thomasina E. Jordan Indian Tribes of Va. Fed. Recognition Act of 
2017, 115 Pub. L. 121, 132 Stat. 40 (Jan. 29, 2018) (recognizing the Chickahominy 
Indian Tribe, the Chickahominy Indian Tribe—Eastern Division, the upper Mattaponi 
Tribe, the Tappahannock Tribe, Inc., the Monacan Indian Nation, and the Nansemond 
Indian Tribe). 
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geographic areas.596 The Act expressly excludes these lands from 
gaming.597  Yet the Act does not address whether the six tribes may acquire 
trust land outside the specified geographic boundaries pursuant to other 
legal authority, i.e. IRA Section 5 and the Part 151 regulations.  
Other recognition acts may not provide independent authority for 
trust land acquisitions, but instead more generally apply all the privileges 
and benefits of the IRA to the subject tribe.  It should be argued that such 
privileges and benefits include Section 5, the capstone of the IRA, even if 
the recognition act does not expressly state as much.  
Tribes acknowledged through Part 83 may face even more 
significant challenges since they lack the benefit of express congressional 
action, including congressional guidance or independent authority for fee-
to-trust acquisitions.  It is important to remember, however, that the 
standard for Part 83 acknowledgement necessarily reflects longstanding 
tribal existence and the lengthy acknowledgment records include 
important evidence of federal interactions with the tribal entity, all of 
which may support a positive departmental finding of 1934 jurisdiction 
and/or rebut Carcieri-related claims by opponents.598  
 
E. Practice Tips for Tribal Attorneys 
 
The last ten years of Carcieri offers several takeaways for tribes and 
tribal attorneys. Accordingly, as we look to Carcieri’s future impact, we 
have compiled ten practice tips.  
 
(1) All tribes have a Carcieri problem—not just newly recognized 
tribes, tribes in certain regions, or tribes who lack an existing land 
base.  Regardless of tribal history, and the strength of evidence 
supporting jurisdiction, Carcieri can and often is raised by 
                                                           
596.  Id. §§ 106, 206, 306, 406, 506, 606. 
597.  Id. §§ 106(d), 206(d), 306(d), 406(d), 506(d), 606(d). 
598.  See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11 (requiring, among other criteria, that the 
petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 
continuous basis since at least 1900, the petitioner comprises a distinct community 
and demonstrates that it existed as a community from 1900 until the present, and that 
petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members as an 
autonomous entity from 1900 until the present). See also Carcieri M-Opinion, supra 
note 56, at 25 (finding that “[e]vidence submitted during the regulatory Part 83 
acknowledgment process thus may be highly relevant and may be relied on to 
demonstrate that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934”). 
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opponents during the agency decision-making process and in 
subsequent litigation. Following Carcieri, Interior must conduct 
case-by-case inquiries into statutory authority, carefully 
considering whether the tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, 
or whether some other section of the IRA or tribe-specific statute 
authorizes a trust acquisition. Therefore, be prepared at the onset of 
the fee-to-trust process to provide historical evidence and legal 
analysis supporting your tribe’s jurisdictional status or other 
statutory authority.  
 
(2) Think outside the box when looking for a statutory basis for a fee-
to-trust acquisition. Consider relying on more than the IRA’s first 
definition of Indian, or even more than one statute, to support a fee-
to-trust acquisition.599 Consider whether the OIWA, tribal 
restoration acts, or other authorities constitute an appropriate 
legislative hook—explicitly or implicitly—to provide tribes access 
to the land acquisition authority set out in the IRA.  Alternatively, 
these authorities may provide trust land acquisition authority that is 
separate and independent from the IRA altogether.600  
 
(3) If the first definition of “Indian” is the only option for statutory 
authority, consider relying on more than just one piece of evidence. 
As demonstrated above, certain evidence Interior views as 
dispositive, such as entering into treaties or voting in a Section 18 
election, has still been challenged in federal court litigation. So, for 
example, if your tribe entered into treaties with the federal 
                                                           
599.  For example, in a trust acquisition decision for the Tunica-Biloxi 
Tribe of Louisiana, Interior relied on both the first and second definitions of “Indian” 
in the IRA to conclude that it had statutory authority to acquire the parcel at issue in 
trust.  Trust Acquisition of 703.26 Acres in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana for the Tunica-
Biloxi Tribe, Decision Letter (BIA, Dep’t of Interior Aug. 11, 2011), 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/tunica-biloxi-carcieri-ruling-from-
interior.pdf.  
600.  For example, in a trust acquisition decision for the Pokagon Band of 
Potawatomi Indians, Interior relied on the Pokagon Restoration Act as independent 
statutory authority. Trust Acquisition of 165.81 Acres in the City of South Bend, 
Indiana, for the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, Michigan and Indiana, Rec. 
of Decision 61 (BIA, Dep’t of Interior Nov. 2016), 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc2-056228.pdf. 
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government, the United States provided numerous services to your 
tribe and its members in the years leading up to the IRA, and your 
tribe voted on the IRA, include all of the above in your Carcieri 
submission, particularly if you expect the fee-to-trust decision may 
be challenged.  In several recent decisions, Interior has concluded 
that Section 18 votes are dispositive, but went on to note the 
existence of other evidence as well.601   
 
(4) In providing an analysis to Interior of why your tribe was under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934, cite to, and apply, Interior’s two-part 
framework. Referencing and incorporating the framework will 
stage your arguments in a way that is easily understood by agency 
personnel, streamlining the process. Moreover, considering the M-
opinion while assembling your Carcieri submission will help you 
identify relevant evidence. 
 
(5) Familiarize yourself with the body of Interior Carcieri opinions that 
have already been issued for other tribes. You can likely pull 
successful legal arguments and analogous fact scenarios from these 
decisions.  Conversely, you will avoid wasting time on previously 
rejected arguments. We have tried to include citations to many of 
these decisions throughout this article. In addition, you can search 
the website of the IBIA, available at https://www.doi.gov/oha, for 
their decisions on Carcieri matters. 
 
                                                           
601.  See, e.g, Trust Acquisition of 35.92 acres in the City of Elk Grove, 
California, for the Wilton Rancheria, Rec. of Decision 71–72  (BIA, Dep’t of Interior 
Jan. 2017), http://www.wiltoneis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/record-of-
decision.pdf. (relying on the Section 18 election and a land acquisition for the tribe in 
1927, alone or together); Trust Acquisition of the Horseshoe Grande Site in Riverside 
County, California, for the Soboba Band of Luiseno Indians, California, Rec. of 
Decision 454–456 and n.33 (BIA, Dep’t of Interior, May 2015), 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc1-030437.pdf 
(relying on the Section 18 election as dispositive, but also noting a wealth of other 
evidence of federal jurisdiction); Trust Acquisition of 61.83 acres in Sonoma County, 
California, for the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians of California, Rec. of 
Decision 51–52 (BIA, Dep’t of Interior Apr. 2016), 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/oig/pdf/idc1-033914.pdf 
(relying on the Section 18 election as dispositive but also relying on the acquisition of 
the Cloverdale Rancheria in 1921). 
2019 ENOUGH IS ENOUGH  
 
141 
(6) If you expect opposition to your acquisition, try to anticipate and 
rebut the arguments of your opponents.  For example, if you are 
aware of statements by federal officials that the federal government 
did not have any responsibilities to your tribe, be prepared to show 
why these statements cannot overcome other indicia of federal 
jurisdiction prior to and in 1934.  Or, if there is a long period during 
which the federal government did not take affirmative actions 
towards your tribe, be prepared to provide the historical context, or 
rely on arguments in the M-Opinion as to why such inaction did not 
and could not terminate federal jurisdiction.  Do not assume (or 
hope) that these arguments will not be raised. Moreover, it 
strengthens the integrity of your analysis if you concede and address 
counterpoints upfront, rather than being perceived by agency staff 
as “hiding the ball.”  Be prepared to answer difficult questions by 
agency staff.  In addition, if an opponent files a lengthy submission 
arguing that your tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, 
file a reply explaining why they are wrong.  We recognize that this 
requires a significant expenditure of resources, but it is better to 
develop a strong record and address these issues upfront than having 
to confront them for the first time in litigation.   
 
(7) Be persistent with the Department.  If you provided your 
submission and hear nothing for months or even years, regularly 
follow-up with the Solicitor’s Office, BIA, or the Assistant 
Secretary of Indian Affairs.  Ask if they have any questions or need 
additional information.  Schedule calls to check-in and request 
decision timelines.  Build relationships with BIA and Solicitor’s 
Office staff to ensure your submissions are adequately covering 
issues/concerns that will be evaluated.   
 
(8) Do not evaluate your tribe’s history, or its relationship with the 
federal government, in a vacuum. Consider the larger historical and 
policy context(s), and whether such context explains any gaps or 
incongruities in the evidentiary record. 
 
(9) Remember that Carcieri is only one component of a fee-to-trust 
acquisition.  As explained by Associate Deputy Secretary Jim 
Cason and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
John Tahsuda, the Trump administration is very concerned about 
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the impacts of trust acquisitions on state and local governments. If 
you schedule a meeting with the Secretary’s Office or the Assistant 
Secretary’s Office to discuss a proposed acquisition, be prepared for 
questions about the views of state and local governments.  
Particularly for off-reservation acquisitions, if you have entered into 
an intergovernmental agreement with states and local governments 
regarding fee-to-trust, include that information in your fee-to-trust 
application.  If you have not entered into such an agreement (and 
such agreements are not required by the existing regulations), we 
recommend that you be prepared to explain why.  Relatedly, 
consider that many states and local governments do not make 
Carcieri arguments because they are actually invested in whether a 
tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  As this article has 
demonstrated, it is often a convenient vehicle for them to attack fee-
to-trust for other reasons.  
 
(10) Think beyond the Department of the Interior. The real fix, as 
explained supra, needs to come from Congress.  Do not let your 
local representatives forget that Carcieri continues to present an 
enormous obstacle for tribes.  If the substantial moral, historical, 
and practical reasons for a fix do not appear to move your 
representative, focus on the significant tribal and agency costs 
involved in determining, and then litigating, these Carcieri 
decisions. Tribes have had to hire expensive experts to compile 
historical reports, sometimes taking years to complete. Litigation 
has consumed tribal, Interior, and Department of Justice resources. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In 1994, Congress enacted changes to the IRA to ensure a policy 
of equality between federally recognized tribes. Congress prohibited 
Interior, and other federal agencies, from issuing any regulation or 
decision “that classifies, enhances, or diminishes the privileges and 
immunities available to [an] Indian tribe relative to other federally 
recognized Indian tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes.”602 
                                                           
602.  See 25 U.S.C. § 5123(f), (g).  Recently, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia interpreted section (f) broadly, rejecting an 
argument that it is limited to “powers of self-governance,” and applying it to gaming 
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Consistent with this mandate, Interior has embraced the policy that “there 
should not be different classes of federally recognized tribes.”603 Yet, as 
this Article has demonstrated, Carcieri means that there are some tribes 
who may be ineligible to have land taken into trust on their behalf—a 
reality that is irreconcilable with the sweeping purposes of the IRA.  
Moreover, in the ten years since the Supreme Court decided 
Carcieri, countless hours and incredible sums of money have been 
channeled into its implementation and attempted correction. Congress has 
contemplated fifteen clean Carcieri fixes, in addition to tribe-specific fixes 
and a broader fee-to-trust overhaul, largely to no avail.  Without a 
legislative fix, the Department has had to forge a path on its own, crafting 
extensive Carcieri guidance and continuing to process tribal fee-to-trust 
applications with its limited resources.  Opponents to tribal trust land 
routinely challenge these decisions on the basis of Carcieri in scorched 
earth litigation, drawing out any finality regarding tribal lands and 
jurisdiction for years and years.  Additionally, through its recent Mashpee 
determination and testimony before Congress, Departmental leadership 
has signaled a potential change of course in its Carcieri practice. This 
signal has alarmed tribes and advocates.604  
Ultimately, it is up to Congress to resolve this problem.  We hope 
that Congress will live up to its commitment of treating tribes 
indiscriminately and provide all tribes—regardless of factual specifics 
tethered to the year 1934—the ability to seek land in trust.  
 
                                                           
activities.  The Koi Nation of Northern California v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 17-
1718, at 58 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2019). 
603.  See Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. at 76890 
(removing the Alaska exclusion from the Department’s fee-to-trust regulations). 
604.  NCAI Objects to the Department of the Interior’s Decision on the 
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe and Questions What It Means to the Future of Indian 
Country, NCAI (Sept. 2018), http://www.ncai.org/news/articles/2018/09/11/ncai-
objects-to-the-department-of-the-interior-s-decision-on-the-mashpee-wampanoag-
tribe-and-questions-what-it-means-to-the-future-of-indian-country. 
